Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER) 59

23 July 2012

by Gordon M. Hahn

Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies




* IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted.  Research assistance is provided by Anna Nevo, Casey Mahoney, Daniel Painter, Elizabeth Wolcott, Jerry Davydov, Kevin Butts, Michelle Enriquez, Olga Volcsko, and Stephanie Barko.  IIPER accepts outside submissions.




CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov issued another videotaped appeal in late June.  The appeal was delivered in the Chechen language – which is rare for Umarov – and translated into Russian.[1]  Umarov’s appeal is directed to the Chechen diaspora, to which he extends his “hand in peace and brotherhood,” including “those who stood with Shamil (Basaev), Khamzat (Gelaev), Aslan (Maskhadov), those who stood with Abdul Khalim (Sadulaev), and those who stood with Mansur.”  However, excludes “those who are condemned by the Shariah Court and those who do not want to submit to Shariah law” – a likely reference to Akhmed Zakaev, who resides in London and was condemned to death by the CE’s Shariah Court and its late first qadi ‘Seifullah’ Anzor Astemirov in 2008.  Umarov calls all of them to “unity” if they are willing to submit to the primacy of the religious struggle as defined by his jihadist project, the Caucasus Emirate:

“Everything depends on our preparedness to carry (Allah’s) religion)”…

“(A)ll misunderstandings between us are caused by our weakness of faith and therefore Satan directs our hatred”…

“Don’t ry to creat a third side, and there will be no third party.  I swear to Allah, and I say this because we will not allow it and because Allah will not allow it. …”

“… Muslims, who did not have a true concept about their religion, were deluded, and they are beginning to understand, and Allah is giving them this understanding today.  The understanding of Islam.  A great differentiation and separation of Muslims and infidels is occurring.

“Earler we had no access to Islam, and we did not understand our religion.  Today Allah has lightened each Muslim’s access to Islam, even through the Internet, and gave each the opportunity to determine which side to join.

“So before us there are two paths – there are no others, and there cannot be.  Do not try to continue a third path, such is my request and call to you.  Forgive me for all the misunderstandings between us, and if something in me does not suit you, say so and we will decide it according to Shariah law.

I am recording this talk under encirclement of the Russian infidels.  Each day, each of us here can be killed.  In the morning we do not know if we will live till evening, and at night we do not know if we will live till morning.

Believe me, in such a situation the heart is completely freed from arrogance.  Because when you are under the fire of the infidels and see your killed brothers, pride abandons the heart.

I very much ask you to be with us and continue together our efforts of Allah’s path.  Do not try to crate a third side.” [2]

Umarov’s appeal to the Chechen diaspora is likely motivated by the bad state of affairs within the CE’s Chechnya network, the so-called Nokchicho Vilaiyata (NV), as compared with its Dagestani (Dagestan Vilaiyat or DV), Kabardino-Balkariya (part of the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariay and Karachai or OVKBK which also includes Russia’s Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya), and Ingushetiya (Galgaiche Vilaiyat or GV) networks.  The NV has lagged behind the DV and OVKBK and at times even the GV as well in the number of attacks carried out in recent years.

Although some of the Western-based Chechen separatists’ cheerleaders in both the West and elsewhere will seize upon Umarov’s appeal to the Chechen diaspora as evidence that the ethno-national separatist project of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya is reviving, Umarov’s reliance on the supremacy of Shairah law and condemnations of any “third way” in this appeal unqualified support for the global jihadi in his and his colleagues’ other statements’ continue to demonstrate the futility of such claims.



The Caucasus Emirate-affiliated website UmmaNews.com continues to issue monthly reports on the number of attacks carried out by the CE mujahedin and the casualties that have resulted from those attacks among both Russian state agents and on the side of the mujahedin as well in the North Caucasus.  The UmmaNews data are also re-posted on the CE’s official website Kavkaz tsentr.  It appears that the data do not include counter-terrorist operations initiated by the Russian and local forces and police.  The UmmaNews/CE data for approximately the first six months of 2012 show 260 attacks; all carried out in the North Caucasus (see Table 1).  I say ‘approximately’ because the data are presented according to the


Table 1. CE Data on Number of Attacks and Casualties During the First Six Months of 2012 (the figure in parentheses is the figure for the first six months of 2011).

Vilaiyat of the  Caucasus Emirate  










Nokchicho Vilaiyat or NV (Chechnya)       20 (44)           

  49 (38)


   90 (104)


   7 (20)

Galgaiche Vilaiyat or GV


      41 (42)  

      8 (11)


 25 (14)


     6 (13)

Dagestan Vilaiyat or DV


    165 (220)   139 (129)  

  269 (189)

   43 (64)



      33 (74)


    17 (38)


    22 (49)


   20 (23)


Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat**


        1 (3)


      0 (5)


 0 (6)

     0 (0)



        0 (1)

      0 (39)        0 (180)  

     0 (1)



    260 (384)  

  213 (260)


  406 (552)

  76 (121)

*OVKBK – the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya and Karachai, the CE’s jihadi network the North Caucasus republics of Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya.  There appears to be a problem with the reporting on the OVKBK’s attacks, since the same CE source reported that the OVKBK had carried out 108 attacks by the end of November – 14 more than the final annual total.  Moreover, the OVKBK’s websites reported several attacks undertaken by OVKBK mujahedin in December.

** Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat covers the North Caucasus regions of Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai for the CE.


SOURCES: “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevikh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats safar 1433 goda po khidzhre (26 dekyabrya 2011 – 23 yanvarya 2012 g.,” Umma News, 27 January 2012, 19:42, http://ummanews.ru/news/kavkaz/5229———-1433—-26–2011–23–2012-.html; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevikh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats rabi-al’-avval’ 1433 goda po khidzhre (24 yanvarya – 23 fevralya 2012 g.,” Umma News, 24 February 2012, 15:52, http://ummanews.ru/news/kavkaz/5700–1433-24-23-2012-.html; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevikh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats rabi-as-sani 1433 goda po khidzhre (24 fevralya – 23 marta 2012 g.),” Umma News, 24 March 2012, 18:19, http://ummanews.ru/news/kavkaz/6160————1433—-24—23–2012-.html; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevikh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats dzhumada-l’-ulya 1433 goda po khidzhre (24 marta – 21 aprelya 2012 g.),” Umma News, 22 April 2012, 20:48, http://ummanews.com/news/last-news/6601————1433—-24—21–2012-.html; “Imarat Kavkaz. Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats dzhumada-s-sani 1433 goda po khidzhre (22 aprelya -21 maya 2012 g.),” Umma news, 22 May 2012, 16:28 http://ummanews.com/news/last-news/7006————1433—-22—21–2012-.html; and “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevikh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats radzhab 1433 goda po khidzhre (22 maya – 20 iyunya 2012 g.),” VDagestan.com, 21 June 2012, http://vdagestan.com/imarat-kavkaz-svodka-boevyx-operacij-modzhaxedov-za-mesyac-radzhab-1433-goda-po-xidzhre-22-maya-20-iyunya-2012-g.htm.  _________________________

Muslim calendar year and system of the monthly breakdown beginning from 26 December 2011 to late 20 June 2012.  The figure of 260 attacks represents a sharp 32 percent decline from the same period last year, when there were 384 attacks (see IIPER, No. 44 at http://csis.org).  The decline was most sharp in the CE’s subnetwork covering the republics of Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya and Karachai (OVKBK), which saw a 55.4 percent decline (33 in the first half of 2012, down from 74 in the first half of 2011) followed by a 54.5 percent decline year-on-year in Chechnya’s Nokchicho Vilaiyat (NV), a 25 percent decline in the CE’s most powerful network, the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) in Dagestan (165 in the first half of 2012 from 220 in the first half of 2011); and only a slight decline of 2 percent in what for the first half of 2012 was the CE’s second most capacious network operationally – Ingushetiya’s Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV) – with 41 attacks in the first half of this year compared with 42 in the first half of last year.  It cannot be excluded, however, that some of the attacks occurring in Ingushetiya are carried out by the NV Chechens as they abscond for the somewhat softer regime of Yunusbek Yevkurov as compared with Ramzan Kadyrov’s in Chechnya.

The largest number of CE attacks continues to be carried out by the DV mujahedin.  This has been the case for more than two years now, since April 2010.  According to the mujahedin’s data, the DV carried out 63.5 percent of CE’s attacks in Russia during the first half of this year.  The DV was followed by the GV at 15.8 percent, the OVKBK at 12.7 percent, and lastly by the increasingly weak Chechens of the NV with a mere 7.7 percent.  The DV’s operational dominance in terms of this percentage indicator was at its highest level ever, while the NV’s share of operations was at its lowest level ever in the first half of this year.

Since the reports continue to divide fatalities and wounded into the categories of kafiry (infidels) and murtady or marionetki (apostates or puupets), we are unable to delineate between casualties among state agents and those among civilians from the jihadi sources, as we do for our own estimate.  Therefore, the UmmaNews/CE data give us the total number of fatalities and wounded with no separation between civilians and non-civilians.  According to the data, CE ops have become somewhat more effective.  Thus, while the number of attacks declined by 32 percent in the first half of this year, the number of casualties inflicted by those operations declined by only 23.8 percent. Whereas in the first half of last year, when CE operations were yielding 2.11 casualties per operation, this year the number is 2.38 casualties/op.  The most effective operation/casualty ratios is that of the NV in Chechnya with 7.0 casualties per attack, followed by the Dagestan’s DV at 2.5, the OVKBK at 1.2, and Ingshetiya’s GV at 0.8.  The great disparity between the effectiveness of NV and GV operations suggests that if NV mujahedin are crossing over into Ingushetiya to carry out attacks being credited to the GV, then they must be far and few between.

Another mark of effectiveness would be the number of mujahedin lost as compared to the number of operations carried out.  Although the UmmaNews/CE data on mujahedin lost includes only those killed and does not include those captured, and the number of those killed is probably understated, it is worth examining this aspect of the data provided by the mujahedin.  It shows that the ratio of mujahedin killed to operations carried out is lowest and thus represents greater effectiveness in Ingushetiya’s GV with just 0.15 mujahed killed per operation carried out, followed by Dagestan’s DV at 0.26, Chechnya’s NV at 0.35, and lastly the OVKBK at 0.61.

Thus, according to the mujahedin’s own data, the Dagestan DV remains the dominant vilaiyat within the CE in terms of size and operational capacity, and in some ways it is also the most effective or at least second most effective.

If the UmmaNews/CE data is reliable or at least indicative of the trends and their strength, then how does one explain the apparent decline in the CE and especially the recently robust DV’s operational capacity in the first half of the year?  One possibility is that the apparent trend is just that: a trend showing an overall decline in operational capacity.  However, the data’s comparison with the first half of 2011 may be misleading, since that period was a bit of an aberration.  The winter of 2010-2011 and the first half of 2011 were the most vigorous winter and first half of the year in terms of jihadi violence in the North Caucasus on record.  The 384 attacks in the first half of 2011 were more than two-thirds of the total number of attacks in 2011.  In other words, a decline of 50 percent was recorded between the first and second halves of 2011.  Of the 546 attacks in 2011, only 162 or 29.7 percent of the year’s total occurred in the second half of the year.  That means that the 220 attacks in the first half of 2012 represent an increase of 35 percent over the second half of 2011.  So there may be nothing that needs to be explained other than perhaps the decline in the second half of 2011.  The second half of the year is usually more robust in terms of jihadi activity than the first, because of the better weather conditions, with three good months (July-September) in the second half rather than two (May and June) in the first.

If there is a decline to explain in 2012, there are several possible factors to consider.  First, the CE DV’s increased focus on foreign operations, represented most recently by the multifaceted plot uncovered in neighboring Azerbaijan organized by the DV could have drained resources away from operations in Dagestan.  Second, the recent efforts by Dagestani authorities this spring to develop a rapprochement between the republic’s official clergy and Sufis, on the one hand, and the Salafis, on the other, could be paying dividends.  But it is hard to imagine that this would have already reduced DV recruitment.  Indeed, the DV mujahedin reported that 30 new recruits joined the CE’s jihad in Khasavyurt in just a two-week period in mid-June.[3]  Even if it already has, it is hard to imagine that falling recruitment would already be telling on DV operations.  It is possible that some mujahedin may have decided to temporarily cease activities and see how the rapprochement plays out.  The operational record in the second half of this year will help us answer some of these questions, perhaps.

IIPER will be coming out with its data for the first half of 2012 in one of the next few issues.



Chairman of the Mulsim Spiritual Addministration of Tatarstan (DUMD), in other words the mufti of Russia’s republic of Tatarstan, Ildis Faizov, was hospitalized after three powerful explosions hit his car in the late morning of July 18th.  There were reportedly several deaths as a result of the explosion. SOURCES Faizov had been backed by Tatarstan’s authorities for the post in a bid to stamp out growing Salafist infiltration of DUMD institutions allegedly allowed or encouraged by his predecessor Gusman Iskhakov.[4]  Iskhakov was reported to have fled to the Middle East while relatives continued to organize a Salafist opposition.[5]  At about the same time, Faizov’s deputy in the DUMD, Valiulla Yakupov was shot dead outside his home.[6]  Russia’s Investigative Committee (IC) reports that one of the suspects, Rustem Gataullin, 57, owned the company ‘Idel-Haj’ that organized hajj pilgrimages.  A second, 39-year old Murat Galleyev, heads a mosque in Tatarstan. The three other detained suspects are 41-year old Airat Shakirov, 31-year old Azat Gainutdinov, and 36-year old Uzbekistan national Abdunozim Ataboyev.[7]

IIPER will have more on these attacks in its next issue.  Suffice it to say here that there are one or more possibly accurate interpretations of this event: (1) an attempt by the CE to expand operations to Tatarstan as it has been attempting to for years; (2) and/or an attempt by Tatarstan or Bashkir jihadists to win recognition by the CE; (3) and/or an operation perpetrated by the Pakistan-based and AQ-allied Bulgar Jamaat, populated largely by Tatars; (4) an attack by Iskhakov’s allies or other Islamists; or (5) a criminal group’s attempt intimidate the DUMD.

Both Faizov and Yakupov were strong opponents of Islamism and had been leading an effort to cleanse all DUMT organizations and operations of radical Islamist elements.  As I noted in IIPER, No. 59, Faizov had replaced Iskhakov as DUMT chief mufti because of a rise of Islamist sentiment in Tatarstan and within the DUMD specificially, which he was suspected of sympathizing with or at least permitting without much resistance.  Faizov had moved to remove several mullahs in an attempt to return several mosques taken over by alleged Islamists to Tatarstan’s jadidist- and kadimist-dominated traditional Hanafi Islam. Idel-Haj Chairman Gataullin and Murat Galleyev were likely holdovers from the Gusman Iskhakov administration.  Gataullin’s Idel-Haj had landed the contract for haj travel from the DUMT by Iskhakov, but Faizov had transferred the contract for the DUMT’s quota of 1,600 pilgrims – whether for theo-ideological or business reasons or both – to a different organization, Tatarskii Delovoi Mir or TDM (Tatar Business World/TBW), which belonged to a DUMT official, according to the Russian daily Kommersant.[8]  At first glance, therefore, this attack appears to have been the result of a tussle over resources based on theo-ideological differences.

There has been a growing Salafist presence, an ongoing Hizb-ut Tahrir Islami presence for years, and growing tensions between Salafists and traditional Muslims in Tatarstan in recent years.  A jihadi “Idel-Ural Jamaat” emerged in late 2010 claiming sovereignty over more than 20 regions of Russia, including Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, but CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov never requited its request, at least publicly, to be recognized by and included under the CE’s banner.  Earlier this year there was a violent jihadi incident by an Uzbek émigré (see IIPER, No. 53), and there was a jihadi jamaat uncovered in late 2010 (see IIPER, No. 31).



VDagestan.com, the main website of the Caucasus Emirate’s (CE) Dagestan network, the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV), recently published an article giving is an inside view of the DV.  The author explicitly states that he modeled his article on the charismatic, deceased CE mujahedin Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii’s series of articles titled “The Heroes of the Truth and the Lie” on the mujahedin of the Galgaiche and Nokchicho Vilaiyats of Ingushetiya and Chechnya, respectively and suicide shakhids of the Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs’ Brigade with which he worked very closely by his own account.  (On Buryatskii’s writings see Gordon M. Hahn, IIPER, Nos. 1-5.)  This and the author’s revelation that members of the DV’s Kadar Jamaat most often listened to Buryatskii’s lectures in their mountain hideout testify to Buryatskii’s enduring legacy in the Russian-speaking jihadi world.[9]

This recent article on the DV is titled “Heroes of Our Time (Vilaiyat Dagestan, Part 1)” and was penned by someone identifying himself as Abu Tal’kha Ad-Dagestani of the DV’s Central Sector (CS).  Ad-Dagestani appears from the text’s details to be a member of a jamaat in the Kadar Sector, mentioning being under encirclement with Kadar “jamaat” amir ‘Umar’ Islamil Ichakaev on 26 May 2011 and being a sleeping-hole mate with another Kadar Jamaat amir, Mukhammad Jamal (Dzhamal) Abuev.[10]  Thus, the article gives an inside view into the DV’s Central Sector, which was built up and led by the notorious ‘Sefullah Gubdenskii’ Magomedali Vagabov until he was appointed as the DV’s amir and the CE’s Shariah Court qadi by CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov in spring 2010.

Vagabov was killed by security forces in August 2010.  Ad-Dagistani describes his interactions with, and observations of several DV CS mujahedin, “who have already left this world.”  Ad-Dagestani’s first subject is amir ‘Adam’ Ullubii Imashev – the person “who opened the doors of Jihad” to Ad-Dagestani.  Imashev’s photograph shows him holding a pistol aloft.  He is said to “have been distinguished by a strong tavakkul” (reliance on Allah) unequalled in any one else Imashev had met, soft towards believers and severe with infidels, many of whom “in the bodies of man-made laws (taghut) felt the the severity of this brother.”  He was part of a trend in Dagestan during 2009-2010 in which many left cities “of Russia” in favor of coming to the North Caucasus and joining the jihad, according to Ad-Dagestani.  Imashev had lived in Moscow for ten years and often attended the mosque on Novokunetsk Street, where he would defend the mujahedin against critics.  He left Moscow and joined the CE jihad sometime in 2009-2010.[11]

According to Imashev, Imashev arrived home in Dagestan, took the loyalty oath to Vagabov, began to gather together groups of his friends, and helped others travel from Moscow to join them.  Soon DV Central Sector amir Vagabov appointed Imashev as amir of several small groups created by Vagabov “fully isolated from each other that could quietly move around the city and engage the infidels any time of day.”  These were supplemented by other jamaats “that worked autonomously, observing the rules deep secrecy.”  Vagabov, according to Ad-Dagestani, paid special attention to developing combat jamaats of both those who were already on wanted lists of the authorities and the ‘legal’ mujahedin (those who tend to live a normal life outside of their involvement in fighting jihad) in Dagestan’s capitol Makhachkala, appointed.  As a result of Imashev’s work “from 2009 to September 2010, service and personal automobiles of personnel of the MVD, FSB and ministers threw through the air in various parts of the city,” meaning they were bombed one way or another by mines, IEDs etc.  Imashev supplied the mujahedin with food, participated in scouting sites to place IEDs, gathered bomb components, and prepared new groups once an attack was brought to fruition.  He once told Ad-Dagestani that he was amazed how the infidels “squealed like pigs” when mortally wounded, something he witnessed frequently because after the explosion he was always “the first to approach the car, hoping to get at survivors” pretending to be an emergency medical worker.  Imashev met his end in the early morning of 29 September 2010 in the city of Kaspiisk, when he, Makhachkala’s amir Khalid, his naib Khattab, and several other airs and mujahedin were surrounded and killed.[12]

Ad-Dagistani writes that his second portrait would have been of Izberbash amir ‘Seifullah’ Kamil Magomedov but for events that occurred in in late April and early May 2012.  This could be a reference to the May 3rd twin suicide bombing in Dagestan and preparations for it about which Ad-Dagestani may write about in future in the Buryatskii mode of detailing the mindset of soon-to-be-shakhids.  Because of these events he decides to provide three portraits from them that he calls “Three Histories from the Life of the Mujahedin.”  The first is of Kadar Jamaat amir ‘Mukhammed’ Jamal Abuev, who is portrayed as a selfless comrade, who at one point gave up his only shoes, sneakers, to one of several mujahedin without footwear.  Ad-Dagestani briefly decribes Magomedov’s death in battle, which he promises to describe in more detail in another article.[13]

Ad-Dagestani’s second ‘history’ is of Kadar Jamaat sniper Abu Yusuf Tagir.  Two photographs show Tagir in white winter camofluge and in white shroud after his death in battle.  His death comes like Abuev’s – in battle, exposing himself with no attempt to find cover, according to Ad-Dagestani’s account.  The third ‘history’ is of Ali Abu Usama Ramazan, an ethnic Lak form Semender is brief, only noting that he met his death in fighting shortly after he expressed the wish that he could be killed fighting jihad as his colleague Tagir and another mujahed had been hours earlier.[14]

Ad-Dagistani also claims that two battles between mujahedin – one on 26 May 2011 and another in March of this year – were falsely reported in the Russian media with false claims that only several siloviki were killed when actually tens were.

Ad-Dagistani’s propaganda piece is less effective than Buryatskii’s articles were, but betrays the same culture of martyrdom and hatred for the infidel.  One example of the former follows:

“It is amazing.  Bullets fly over us, but one remains for years in Jihad, and Allah selects others immediately and makes them Martyrs.  Everyone is leaving this world, and not one person will remain here.  The best of people, our Prophet abandoned this world, and we also are going.  This is a fact and Allah’s law, about which there can be no doubt.  Even going to Jihad in no way brings death closer.  Even if we hide in a fortified place, we without fail will go to where death awaits us, at the appointed time.  And what can be better or more honorable a death than the death of a Martytr?  What is better, to die at home when some dirty infidel’s boot can at any time burst in, arrange a search, walking around on the carpet where you make saj to Allah, checking books with their dirty infidel hands or to die in battle carrying away with you infidel bodies, stepping upon which you will when you rise to the level of Paradise on Judgement Day?  It is necessary to take a step on this path, one small step, and if we reach the end, then we will never regret it.”[15]

Ad-Dagistani closes with a threat: “2012 – the beginning of the season turned out to be hot, and we, Allah willing, will do everything so that for you (infidels) it becomes hotter still.  We will do everything so that after the next attack where it will possible to gather up 200 hands and feet within hundred of meters of the explosion, and the press attaché of the infidel law enforcement structures, with imperturbable lying mug produces from himself the phrase: ‘one killed and two hundred wounded.”



Russian media and security sources as well as Western media reported that a Russian immigrant to Canada, William Plotnikov, has turned up among a group of seven mujahedin under the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV), the Caucasus Emirate’s (CE) network in the Republic of Dagestan, who were killed near the settlement of Uitaamysh in Dagestan’s Kayakent District on July 15th.  Plotnikov is reported to have been living in Tyumen Oblast before joining the CE jihad in Dagestan.  He was 23-years old and a former boxer who immigrated to Canada and received Canadian citizenship in 2008, but reports do not say from where in Russia he had emigrated.  His profile page on the popular Russian social networking site ‘Odnoklassniki’ says he finished high school in 2005 in the oil town of Megion in western Siberia, located 760 kilometers northeast of the city of Tyumen.  He studied at Seneca College in Toronto in 2009-2010.  At one time, Plotnikov a boxing student of the prominent Russian trainer Boris Gitman at the European Boxing School in Toronto.[16]  He returned to Russia in 2010.  Sources in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service note that the phenomenon of Canadians going to jihad and groups like Al Qa`ida and Al-Shabaab is “very real” and 45-60 Canadians have done so.[17]  Among the mujahedin Plotnikov was called ‘the Canadian.’  Also killed in the battle with security forces was the CE DV’s Sergokala Jamaat amir ‘Abdulkhalikh’ Islam Magomedov (also called ‘Khomyak,’ among the mujahedin) and Izberbash amir ‘Abdullah’ Arsen Magomedov.[18]


[1] “Obrashenie k bratyam Amira IK Dokku Abu Usman: ‘Bol’she net putei – libo k musul’manam, libo k kafiram’,” Kavkaz tsentr, 29 June 2012, 13:30, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/06/29/91605.shtml “Obrashenie – Amir IK Dokku Abu Usman: ‘Bol’she net putei – libo k musul’manam, libo k kafiram’,” VDagestan.com, 1 July 2012, http://vdagestan.com/obrashhenie-amir-ik-dokku-abu-usman-bolshe-net-putej-libo-k-musulmanam-libo-k-kafiram.htm. It appeared first on You Tube on June 27th.  See http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=LDGJMz4LulU.

[2] “Obrashenie k bratyam Amira IK Dokku Abu Usman: ‘Bol’she net putei – libo k musul’manam, libo k kafiram’.”

[3] “Radostnyie vesti: Za dve nedeli k mudzhakhidam Khasavyurta prisoedinilos’ do 30 novobrantsev,” VDagestan.com, 21 July 2012, http://vdagestan.com/radostnye-vesti-za-dve-nedeli-k-mudzhaxidam-xasavyurta-prisoedinilis-do-30-novobrancev.htm.

[4] Alissa de Carbonnel, “Attacks target Muslim leaders in Russia’s Tatarstan,” Reuters, 19 July 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/attacks-target-muslim-leaders-russias-tatarstan-091105739.html.

[5] See Gordon M. Hahn, “2011: Year of Growing Tensions and Divisions Within and Around Russia’s Islamic Clergy,” IIPER, No. 49, 30 December 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/111230_Hahn_IIPER_49.pdf.

[6] Alissa de Carbonnel, “Attacks target Muslim leaders in Russia’s Tatarstan,” Reuters, 19 July 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/attacks-target-muslim-leaders-russias-tatarstan-091105739.html.

[7] Nikolai Sergeev, “V raspredelenii khadzh-turov nashli priznaki terrorizma,” Kommersant, 20 July 2012, 10:57, www.kommersant.ru/doc/1984193 and “Russian prosecutors say 5 suspects in killing of Muslim cleric, wounding another, detained,” AP, 20 July 2012.

[8] Nikolai Sergeev, “V raspredelenii khadzh-turov nashli priznaki terrorizma,” Kommersant, 20 July 2012, 10:57, www.kommersant.ru/doc/1984193.

[9] Abu Tal’kha Ad-Dagestani, “’Geroi nashego vremeni (Vilaiyat Dagestan, chast’ 1),” VDagestan.com, 20 May 2012, http://vdagestan.com/geroi-nashego-vremeni-vilayat-dagestan-chast-1.htm.

[10] Abu Tal’kha Ad-Dagestani, “’Geroi nashego vremeni (Vilaiyat Dagestan, chast’ 1),” VDagestan.com, 20 May 2012, http://vdagestan.com/geroi-nashego-vremeni-vilayat-dagestan-chast-1.htm.

[11] Abu Tal’kha Ad-Dagestani, “’Geroi nashego vremeni (Vilaiyat Dagestan, chast’ 1),” VDagestan.com, 20 May 2012, http://vdagestan.com/geroi-nashego-vremeni-vilayat-dagestan-chast-1.htm.

[12] Abu Tal’kha Ad-Dagestani, “’Geroi nashego vremeni (Vilaiyat Dagestan, chast’ 1),” VDagestan.com, 20 May 2012, http://vdagestan.com/geroi-nashego-vremeni-vilayat-dagestan-chast-1.htm.

[13] Abu Tal’kha Ad-Dagestani, “’Geroi nashego vremeni (Vilaiyat Dagestan, chast’ 1),” VDagestan.com, 20 May 2012, http://vdagestan.com/geroi-nashego-vremeni-vilayat-dagestan-chast-1.htm.

[14] Abu Tal’kha Ad-Dagestani, “’Geroi nashego vremeni (Vilaiyat Dagestan, chast’ 1),” VDagestan.com, 20 May 2012, http://vdagestan.com/geroi-nashego-vremeni-vilayat-dagestan-chast-1.htm.

[15] Abu Tal’kha Ad-Dagestani, “’Geroi nashego vremeni (Vilaiyat Dagestan, chast’ 1),” VDagestan.com, 20 May 2012, http://vdagestan.com/geroi-nashego-vremeni-vilayat-dagestan-chast-1.htm.

[16] “Canadian Shot Dead in Dagestan Anti-Terror Operation,” The Moscow Times, 15 July 2012, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mobile/article/canadian-shot-dead-in-dagestan-anti-terror-operation/462121.html.

[17] Stewart Bell, “Canadian killed by Russian forces during anti-terrorism operation: reports,” National Post, (Canada), 16 July 2012, http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/07/16/william-plotnikov/.

[18] “Ustanovleny lichnosti vsekh semerykh unichtozhennykh v Dagestane boevikov,” RIA Novosti, 15 July 2012, 11:58, http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20120715/700040315.html and http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20120715/700040315.html#ixzz20uYo86bU.




Interview with Gordon M. Hahn, Hamid Hamidov, “Gordon Khan: ‘Iranskii vopros stal oslozhnyayushim faktorom  kak v azerbaidzhano-rossiisckikh, tak i azerbaidzhano-amerikanskikh otnosheniyakh’,” 1News.az (Azerbaijan), 17 July 2012, 09:40 www.1news.az/interview/20120717093826472.html.

Gordon M. Hahn, “The Rise of the Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus,” Fair Observer, 12 July 2012, http://www.fairobserver.com/article/global-jihadism-comes-russia%E2%80%99s-north-caucasus.

Gordon M. Hahn, “Putin’s Fines and Searches: The End of the Thaw?,” Russia – Other Points of View, 3 July 2012, http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2012/07/putins-fines-and-searches-the-end-of-the-thaw.html.

Gordon M. Hahn, “The ‘Reset’ and the War Against Jihadism,” Russia – Other Points of View, 21 June 2012, http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2012/06/the-reset-and-the-war-against-jihadism.html.



               Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER) is a project of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.  It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam, Islamism, and Jihadism in Russia and Eurasia writ large.  All issues of IIPER will soon be permanently archived at http://csis.org/program/russia-and-eurasia-program.  All back issues temporarily remain archived at: http://www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/ghahn/report.

               IIPER is compiled, edited and, unless indicated otherwise, written by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn.  Dr. Hahn is a Senior Associate (Non-Resident) in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor at the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP), Monterey, California.  He is also a Senior Researcher at the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group and an Analyst and Consultant for Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch, http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com.  He teaches courses on both politics and terrorism in Russia and Eurasia at MonTREP.  Dr. Hahn is the author of two well-received books, Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002) as well as numerous articles on Russian, Eurasian and international politics. 

               IIPER welcomes submissions on any aspect of Islamic, Islamist, or Jihadist politics in Eurasia as well as financial contributions to support the project.  For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact:

Dr. Gordon M. Hahn

Tel: (831) 647-3535 Fax: (831) 647-6522

Email: ghahn@miis.edu or gordon-hahn@sbcglobal.net

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