NATO-Russian Ukrainian War NATO-Russian War Russia Ukraine

Hersh’s NordStream Terrorist Attack Revelations and the Causes of the NATO-Russian Ukraine War

I have written several pieces on the causes of the NATO-Russian Ukrainian War. In them, I focused on long-term as well as the immediate causes in the runup to Putin’s decision to invade. However, all this needs to be put together with new revelations in order to understand the mood in the Kremlin in late January-early February (most likely mid-February) when Putin dedided to pull the trigger.

We have the background causes: decades of NATO expansion; NATO’s attack on Serbia, Westwern recognition of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia despite a UN resolution it sponsored stipulating Serbia’s territorial inviolability; ‘democracy promotion’ color revolutionism in Ukraine and other states neighboring Russia; Western financial and moral support for a color revolution in Russia, the Western-backed February 2014 Maidan color revolution; the cover up of the Maidan ultranationalist, neofascist wing’s snipers’ flag terrorist attack that sparked the ultimate overthrow of Yanukovych, which the West to this day still ‘fakes’ as carried out by Yanukovych’s security forces; Western support for Maidan Kiev’s anti-terrorist operation targeting the civilian population in Donbas as well as the rebels who were merely repeating the Western-backed Maidan method of an illegal seizure of power; the certain loss for Russia of its Black Sea Fleet naval base as a result of the Maidan putsch; Kiev’s failure to fulfill the Minsk 2 accord’s stipulations that it negotiate with the Donbas rebels directly and adopt legislation granting the region autonomy; and NATO’s buildup of the Ukrainian army into the second largest force in Europe and as a de facto member of world history’s most powerful military alliance, and much more (e.g., abandonment and violations of arms control treaties).

The more immediate causes I have demonstrated include Zelenskiy’s threat to develop nuclear weapons a week before Putin’s invasion, a deployment of Ukrainian forces to the contact line perhaps in a posture that signaed an imminent attack on Donbas, and a sharp escalation in fighting initiated and ratcheted up by Kiev’s forces (regular and neofascist ‘national batallions’), who frequently targeted civilians, along the Donbas line of contact days before Putin;s invasion and precisely he took the decision to invade.

Now we can add to the immediate causes US President Joe Biden’s and Victoria’s Nuland threats to destroy Russo-European Nord Stream gas pipelines delivering Russian natural gas to Germany and the fact that as a result of their provocative incitements Russian intelligence most certainly would have concluded that there was a grave threat that the US planned to destroy the pipelines. This would be true, even if Russia had no other intelligence regarding the internal discussions and planning for the attacks by the US government, intelligence, and military.

Seymour Hersh’s article, citing unnamed sources inside the administration, shows that with few to no caveats would have determined and reportd to Putin that US plans to destroy Nord Stream placed the pipelines and Russian gas sales to Europe under threat. This is so regardless of the fact that the US threat to attack Nord Stream was delivered in an implied, valed manner and as a reponse to any Russian invasion of Ukraine. For the Kremlin the danger of an attack on the Nord Stream pipelines would have represented not just a threat to those particular pipelines but an emerging general Western threat to any and all Russian pipelines outside of the Ukrainian context. The irresponsibility of the Biden administration’s loose talk about what was, as a source in Hersh’s report notes, “an act of war” could only have piqued Russian angst and constituted another weight tipping the scales in favor of a decision by Putin to invade. If, moreover, Russia had intelligence or concluded based solely on the verbal threats that planning and organization for the attack was already underway, then the threat to Russia’s pipelines becomes that much greater and that much more provoking of Russia’s invasion.

Like him or not, when asking why Putin decided to invade the reasons were legion to undertake a preemptive measure obviating the need for a larger future war that could face the country in a less advantageous correlation of forces between Russian and the West.

Why did Putin invade? Zelinskiy’s nuclear threat, Biden’s NordStream threat, Ukraine’s increasingly powerful NATOized military, the substantial and growing ultranationalist and neofascist nature of Ukraine’s state ideology and political culture? Take your pick or take them altogether.

The American Democrat Party-state’s arrogance, hubris, ideologization, and simple inability to listen and take into account real Russian national security concerns over the course of three decades have had their consequences. So too have: the American mass media’s corruption; their allied police organs’ politicization, authoritarianization, and lack of restraint; and the resulting cluelessness of the American public regarding the outside world and America’s increasingly malignant role internationally.

Hersh’s article will have no effect on US public opinion no less on the conceited and perverted elites. Correspondingly, the impending military clash between the globalist, American-led, and increasingly authoritarian empire of the West and the authoritarian-led Sino-Russian challenge of the rest draws ever closer.










Об авторе

Гордон М. Хан, доктор философии, является экспертом-аналитиком Corr Analytics, . Веб-сайты: Российская и евразийская политика, и Доктор Хан является автором новой книги “Русская цельность: целостность в русской мысли, культуре, истории и политике” (Europe Books, 2022). Он является автором пяти предыдущих, хорошо встреченных книг: Российская дилемма: безопасность, бдительность и отношения с Западом от Ивана III до Путина (Макфарланд, 2021); Украина за гранью: Россия, Запад и “Новая холодная война” (Макфарланд, 2018).; Моджахеды Кавказского эмирата: глобальный джихадизм на Северном Кавказе России и за его пределами (Макфарланд, 2014), Исламская угроза России (Издательство Йельского университета, 2007) и Революция в России сверху: реформы, переходный период и революция при падении советского коммунистического режима, 1985-2000 (Transaction, 2002; Routledge, 2018). Он также опубликовал многочисленные отчеты аналитических центров, академические статьи, анализы и комментарии как в англоязычных, так и в русскоязычных СМИ.

Доктор Хан преподавал в Бостонском, Американском, Стэнфордском, Государственном университетах Сан-Хосе и Сан-Франциско, а также в качестве стипендиата программы Фулбрайта в Санкт-Петербургском государственном университете, Россия, и был старшим научным сотрудником и приглашенным научным сотрудником Центра стратегических и международных исследований, Института Кеннана в Вашингтоне, округ Колумбия, Института Гувера в Стэнфорде. Университет и Центр исследований терроризма и разведки (CETIS), Akribis Group.


  1. not NS1 –

    how high would you estimate dead on Russian / Ukrainian side currently, one year into this mess?
    The numbers I find are incredibly disparate.

    And how many tanks/planes did the AFU initially really have?

    In the Western press since 2022 it always appears as if Ukraine were a peaceful peasent state, not one of the major arms manufacturers until recently.


  2. re: numbers of forces by AFU by end of 2021 – I got Jacques Baud´s numbers now:

    “(…) At the end of 2021, this force has around 120,000 men, 500 battle tanks, 1,500 armored vehicles, 550 multiple rocket launchers, 2,000 artillery pieces, around 100 combat aircraft and around 40 combat
    helicopters. Added to this are the National Guard forces, which are essentially paramilitary forces,
    deployed in the cities, giving a total of 450,000 men according to the National Review (although this
    figure seems a bit excessive). (…)” – yours wouldn´t be so different I assume.

      1. thank you for taking the time!

        You suggest then 400k-600k on Ukraine´s side???

        This MacGregor guy spoke with this Judge Napolitano about 150,000 1 month ago.

        On MoA some commentator quotes: 309,666

        Thi would be very differing numbers.

        If McGregor on the other hand suggested 20,000 on Russian side what would your estimate be now?

        I believe you gave high numbers already in the summer when I first asked you about RF dead.

        I assume they have since been able to control dead better via better battlefield coordination.

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