Russian Strategic Transformation in Ukraine: From ‘Aggressive Attrition’ to ‘Attrit and Advance’?

The Russian Defense Ministry routinely refers to Russia’s strategy in its ‘special military operation’ (SMO) as “active defense”. Alexander Mercouris has seemed to notice a shift or at least viewed that strategy a little differently, referring to it as “aggressive attrition.” These terms refer to a strategy in which Russia creates less defended lanes to draw Ukrainian forces into ‘fire sacks’, where they will be quickly destroyed by artillery, drone, missile, tank, and infantry attacks. The emphasis here is on destroying the enemy’s forces rather than gaining ground or conquering territory.

However, since Kiev is persistent in refusing to engage in ceasefire and peace talks, Russia will be forced sooner or later to advance territorially either in order to pressure the Maidan regime to talk or capitulate or in order to advance on and surround or seize Kiev, forcing the Volodomyr Zelenskiy version of the Maidan regime to take refuge in western Ukraine (likely under intervening NATO forces’ protection). It seems that it is precisely now that the time has come, and Russia is transitioning from the aggressive attrition strategy to a more forward-leaning ‘attrit and advance’ strategy. The difference will appear at first to be rather subtle but as the Russian advance slowly accelerates, the distinction will become clear, perhaps clarified by another transition to ‘big arrow’ offensive operations at some point. The fundamental difference is that in aggressive attrition the goal is attrition, while in attrit and advance the goal is advancing battle positions forward.

Under ‘attrit and advance,’ Russian forces continue the ‘active defense’ practice of drawing Ukrainian forces into fire traps where they can be easily annihilated. By using air and other forms of stand-off power, they minimize the use of infantry in close-up fighting and thus limit Russian casualties. This strategy could also be called passive or stationary offense. However, under ‘attrit and advance,’ once the enemy is exhausted on any one front or any one battle for a village, town, or larger territory, it will be attacked with the aim of forcing a retreat by careful armored and infantry advances forward, supported by air or stand-off power in all forms: artillery, drones, missiles, and aircraft. Of course, some might say, we have seen Russian forces attrit, advance and take territory before in this war. Last spring, it took Mariupol in 2022 and Bakhmut in May last year, but this was before the Ukrainian counteroffensive last summer recommended an active defense strategy.

A Russian attrit and advance strategy might not be all that different from standard offensive warfare, with the caveat that greater emphasis is placed on attrition and the decision to switch from attrition tactics to offensive tactics. It may be equivalent to a gradually intensifying offensive designed to keep the Ukrainians off foot for as long as possible. ‘Attrit and advance’ differs from ‘active defense’ most of all in that the violence is aimed not just to eliminate forces but to prepare for the movement of one’s troops forward, with the timing of the decision to do so key to its success in minimizing one’s own casualties and easing the advance forward. One thing is for sure. Neither Putin nor his military leaders will tip their hand as to their strategy and tactics as, the Ukrainian leadership so unwisely and catastrophically did in the run-up to last summer’s counteroffensive.

This winter, with the demonstrated failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive obvious by autumn, we have begun to witness Russian forces’ transition to attrit and advance across the entire front, except on the Krynki foothold on the southern Dniepr in Kherson. In November, Russian forces occupied an addition some 13 kilometers and tripled that result in December. We can expect in January a multiple of December’s 40+ kilometers, evidencing the second ‘advance’ aspect of ‘attrit and advance’.

Or at some point, with Ukrainian army perhaps exceedingly attritted across the front ranging from Kherson on through western Donetsk and Luhansk to the northwest in Kharkiv in the northeast, Russian forces may begin ‘big arrow’ operations in order to drive to the Dniepr River along its length from Kherson to Kiev. Whether we see such a transition large-scale offensive operations or Moscow holds to a gradually intensifying attrit and advance strategy to the gates of Kiev remains to be seen. One factor will be the extent to which Ukraine’s new defense line and supposed switch to a defensive strategy impedes Russian movement forward. In the end, Russian strategy will hinge on Ukraine’s and the West’s responses to Russian advances, particularly should Putin’s forces break across the new Ukrainian defense line being prepared before the less settled areas that lie in the approaches to the Dniepr. Should they persist in rejecting negotiations, then the Russian advance now seems destined to end no sooner than the Dniepr River and the flight, fall, or breakdown of the Maidan regime and perhaps the end of a Ukrainian presence east of the Dniepr.

This is unlikely to be an end of the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War. It will enter an new, perhaps intermittent perhaps or short-term hybrid phase. From then on, rump Ukraine, infused with NATO advisors and troops and burgeoning with NATO weapons, will sponsor partisan and sabotage activities in the east. Hopefully, this phase of semi-frozen conflict will lead years down the road to a non-military resolution of this conflict. The risk inherent in this hopeful, if not wishful thinking becomes apparent if we turn our eyes to the south at Gaza, the West Bank, Israel, Lebanon, and the Middle East writ large. Thus, before or after the beginning of a new hybrid phrase, Odessa, Transnistria, Belarus or one of the Baltic states may become a flash point that ignites a full-scale NATO-Russian War for which some in Western corridors of power seem to long.

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About the Author –

Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D., is an Expert Analyst at Corr Analytics, www.canalyt.com. Websites: Russian and Eurasian Politics, gordonhahn.com and gordonhahn.academia.edu

Dr. Hahn is the author of the new book: Russian Tselostnost’: Wholeness in Russian Thought, Culture, History, and Politics (Europe Books, 2022). He has authored five previous, well-received books: The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin (McFarland, 2021); Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West, and the “New Cold War” (McFarland, 2018); The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus and Beyond (McFarland, 2014), Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), and Russia’s Revolution From Above: Reform, Transition and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime, 1985-2000 (Transaction, 2002). He also has published numerous think tank reports, academic articles, analyses, and commentaries in both English and Russian language media.

Dr. Hahn taught at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, and San Francisco State Universities and as a Fulbright Scholar at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia and was a senior associate and visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Kennan Institute in Washington DC, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group.