NATO-Russian Ukrainian War NATO-Russian War Russia Ukraine Zalyuzhnii Zalyuzhniy Zelenskii Zelenskiy Zelenskiy's 'Victory Plan' Zelenskiy's Victory Plan

Ukraine’s Battlefront Collapse, Zelenskiy v. Zaluzhniy 2.0, and a Split of the Maidan Regime?

As Ukraine’s frontline defense collapses and its army retreats and cracks under the persistent pressure of Russia’s mounting offensive and territorial advance, its Maidan regime is coming under increasing pressures. Early splitting of the regime seems to starting, though all this remains still barely visible. Thus, a regime split – that is, a split among the ruling elite, groups, and institutions appears perhaos to be slowly developing over the issue of war and peace. Regime splits tend to be precursors to regime even state collapse, coups, and revolutions. War, especially defeat in war, often is the cause or a main cause of such regime transformations. Besides Ukraine’s ongoing military defeat, there are the collapse of the war effort, additional destabilizing pressures on the regime and state include economic and social dislocation, the narrowing of the Maidan regime’s political base as a result of President   Volodomyr Zelenskiy’s increasingly authoritarian policies at home, and Ukraine’s growing dependence on foreign states (supposedly to ensure Ukraine’s survival) that drag out the catastrophic bloody war rather than provide Kiev with the means for victory or build an off-ramp to Moscow and an end to the conflict destroying the country. 

Thus, signs of an emerging regime split or at least significant cracks in the Zelenskiy iteration of the Maidan regime are beginning to emerge, centering around former commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy, fired by Zelenskiy earlier this year (https://ctrana.news/news/459385-opros-o-politicheskikh-simpatijakh-k-zaluzhnomu-rezultaty.html). If a Ukrainian ‘government-in-exile’ will be needed somewhere likely in the not too distant future, then the logical candidate to head it is Zaluzhniy, who now ensconced in London as Ukrainian’s ambassador to that staunchly anti-Russian country, and the set of such a ‘government’ would logically become London.

Zelenskiy has repeated often his rejection of Sino-Brazilian peace plan and other proposals, noting that they do not meet his requirement that Russia must withdraw its troops back behind Ukraine’s 1991 borders. But Zaluzhniy put in his rather contrary two cents, and the value of that ‘two cents’ is high as the general happens to be Ukraine’s most popular political and military figure (https://ctrana.news/news/459385-opros-o-politicheskikh-simpatijakh-k-zaluzhnomu-rezultaty.html). Now Ukraine’s ambassador to London, Zaluzhniy recently softened his position in contradistinction to that of Zelenskiy’s ‘Victory Plan’ and repeated statements that Ukraine will fight until it returns all its territories as they existed as of 1991. The UK’s Telegraph reported “Asked in London on Thursday if he could imagine a victory without getting all the lost territory back, he said: ‘I didn’t mention territories. I mentioned safety, security, and the feeling of being in one’s own home. For me personally, as Valery Zaluzhny, if I lived in my house and was aware my neighbour took a part of my garden, I’d say we need to resolve this. If not now, then your sons would have to resolve the issue‘” (www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/10/20/ukraine-fatigue-war-donbas-russia-loss-of-hope-defeat/ and https://kyivindependent.com/zaluzhnyi-protracted-war/). This suggests a willingness to entertain the idea of ending the fighting if only under the guise or intention of returning to the issue by military or diplomatic means later on. Zaluzhniy has also distanced himself from Zelenskiy’s Kursk incursion disaster, criticising it as mistaken in a widely publicised comment. As Ukrainian forces in that Russian region face encirclement and annihilation, reality is about to post another win for the general and another flop for the tragic ex-comic.

Active Ukrainian military officers and regular soldiers also have begun to express a more flexible position on talks and compromise with Moscow (as has Ukrainian public opinion). Zaluzhniy’s opinion may strengthen the peace camp’s numbers. At the same time that some in the Ukrainian army seem prepared for talks and even territorial compromises, this is far from true of the fiercest of them all and thus have paid perhaps the highest price in the war, the neofascists of Azov, Right Sector, the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, and others, as one mainstream media article contends. Hence, the military may split as well, as some support peace talks with other military seeing this as treason. Zaluzhniy might be the only figure who could persuade some oft he hawks to put off their revenge-taking for some time, as he has been noticably close to Right Sector, evidenced by among other things his appointment of its founder, Dmitro Yarosh, as an advisor and after the war began as a liaison with military medical assistance units. Yarosh is a situational supporter of Zelenskiy and the Maidan regime but repeatedly insists that the completion of a real nationalist (read: ultra-nationalist/neofascist) revolution is yet to come (www.facebook.com/dyastrub/posts/pfbid07fbi3Z2u8VLPQU1eESuQq9vPhBF9XY5gHe96TKnnXMnty8FZD89ghB9REvyiNgvil).Or would Zaluzhniy ‚pull a Zelenskiy‘ and come to power promising peace only to hand greater power to the radicals and hawks and continue the war? 

Another signal of likely regime splitting is the recent firing of Ukraine’s General Prosecutor Aleksey Kostin. The official claim is that Kostin was held responsoible for a corruption scheme among lower level prosecutors to acquire passes from military service (https://ctrana.news/news/474025-v-khmelnitskoj-i-cherkasskoj-oblastjakh-vyjavili-bolshoj-protsent-prokurorov-s-invalidnostju.html; https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/10/24/ukrainian-prosecutor-general-andriy-kostin-resigns-amid-draft-dodging-scandal; and https://ctrana.news/news/473967-vechernee-obrashchenie-zelenskoho-22-oktjabrja-2024.html). However, accusations on other scores had been addressed against Kostin ever since Zaluzhniy’s removal in February, and Kostin was rumored to be in danger of being fired at that time as well. Kostin‘s ultimate firing may have occurred for refusal to investigate further or draw up charges against Zaluzhniy, who before his removal was being investigated for treason and regarding whom there have been recent rumors of new investigations (https://ctrana.news/news/459608-pochemu-zaluzhnoho-otpravili-poslom-v-londone-.html).

At the same time, the increasingly powerful Head of Zelenskiy’s Office of the President, Andriy Yermak offered a somewhat different path in an interview to the Italian newspaper Corriere Della Sera. He said talks cannot begin until Russia withdraws it troops to where they stood before the beginning of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ (SMO) on 24 February 2022. Then, he claimed, it could be decided how Ukraine would return to its 1991 territorial borders, but this would require Ukraine possessing leverage such as a superior position on the battlefield and/or a shift in the position of the ‘global South’ in favor of Ukraine (www.corriere.it/esteri/24_ottobre_27/yermak-intervista-93e69859-37b9-4b67-9b0d-042e4e5cdxlk.shtml and http://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/10/27/7481612/). Yermak’s amendment to Ukraine’s official position seems small but creates wiggle room for agreement to begin peace talks. His formula implies that Russia would not necessarily or at all be required under any future agreement to give up its presently self-declared sovereignty and near full occupation of the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporozhe, Kherson, and Crimea. Once negotiations are engaged and leverage does not materialize, Zelenskiy can be removed, perhaps with an amenable US administration’s support.

Zelenskiy’s tendency to misplace reality is certainly one driver pushing some in his inner circle to separate themselves from their delusional president, and one of those who might break from him is Yermak. Last month Zelenskiy threatened that Kiev would develop nuclear weapons if his ‘Victory Plan’ demand of immediate accession to NATO was not granted. Kiev was left to scramble to deny this in an embarassment that had to have further discredited the increasingly desperate and floundering Zelenskiy in the eyes of many in and out of power in Ukraine (www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2024/10/17/7480187/). The NATO Gen Sec and other Werstern officials rejected immediate Ukrainian membership, and NATO even publicized the stipulation that before Ukraine could ever jopin NATO the former’s borders would have to be fully demarcated – an impossibility in wartime and Russian occupation of much of the border (https://ctrana.news/news/473674-ukraina-mozhet-vstupit-v-nato-posle-demarkatsii-hranits.html). Thus, Zelenskiy had to back off on his Victory Plan’s immediate NATO membership clause (https://ctrana.news/news/474297-zelenskij-zajavil-chto-kievu-nuzhno-prihlashenie-v-nato-a-ne-chlenstvo.html). Almost equally absurd was a secret protocol in his Victory Plan mandating the West supply Ukraine with US 2400 km. long-range Tomahawk missiles to hit targets across the Russian landscape. Then the leak to the New York Times about this secret clause further embarassed Zelenskiy publicly. He soon acknowledged the veracity of the NYT report and naturally reacted sharply to his becoming the latest victim of DC‘s promiscuous leak culture (https://ctrana.news/news/474382-zelenskij-priznal-informatsiju-smi-chto-prosil-u-vashinhtona-tomahavki.html and www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/europe/ukraine-zelensky-russia-war.html). Zelenskiy’s increasing foolishness, manifested in his unrealistic demands and incautious brinkmanship, along with his declining relations with the West are further undermining him at home.In lieu of elections, a softening of Zelenskiy’s war time authoritarian regime, or a general breakdown of the state, army and/or society, the only path out of the Zelenskiy knot for Ukraine is a regime split and the emergence of an authoritative figure to lead the regime-defectors – whether doves or nationalist hawks – against Zelenskiy’s ruling cohort. The only person fitting that bill at present is Zaluzhniy. Defectors from Zelenskiy could create an alliance led by one or more of those mentioned herein — Zaluzhniy and/or Yermak — and/or former President Petro Poroshenko, prosecuted and forced to flee Ukraine by Zelenskiy.

As the front and army continue to crumble, as Ukraine goes through a rough winter of blackouts, shortages of heat, and mounting battlefield defeats, and as Russian forces approach the Dnieper River, dissenting voices in the bifurcating pressure cooker that is Kiev could well call upon or be rallied by Zaluzhniy to act for the sake of the country’s salvation, disregarding the different factions’ preferences for continued war – partisan or otherwise – or a newfound peace.

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About the Author – 

Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D., is an Expert Analyst at Corr Analytics, www.canalyt.com. Websites: Russian and Eurasian Politics, gordonhahn.com and gordonhahn.academia.edu

Dr. Hahn is the author of the new book: Russian Tselostnost’: Wholeness in Russian Thought, Culture, History, and Politics (Europe Books, 2022). He has authored five previous, well-received books: The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin (McFarland, 2021); Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West, and the “New Cold War” (McFarland, 2018); The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus and Beyond (McFarland, 2014), Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), and Russia’s Revolution From Above: Reform, Transition and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime, 1985-2000 (Transaction, 2002). He also has published numerous think tank reports, academic articles, analyses, and commentaries in both English and Russian language media. 

Dr. Hahn taught at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, and San Francisco State Universities and as a Fulbright Scholar at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia and was a senior associate and visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Kennan Institute in Washington DC, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group.

2 comments

  1. Came back from Ukraine 5 days ago. My take: army crumbling, total war weariness in population. Trump is the coup de grace. Even Asov commander Berlitzki ready for peace. Russia could walk through soon but for one consideration: there’s still a fierce Ukrainian nationalism and I don´t see how Russia could occupy peacefully all of Ukraine. Especially as insurgents would be resupplied thru Poland. Only solution is some person with Nationalist credentials who reigns in the worst fanatics, softens the language laws and foreign policy wise follows Moscow’s line. Some sort of Ukrainian Petain. Seems to me that Salushny could fit the bill. No need for exile government. What do you think?

    1. This is not going to happen Tom, as one of Russia’s war aims is the de-nazification of Ukraine. This means the destruction of extreme-nationalism in Ukraine. The shape and form that Ukraine takes after this conflict will be the one that Russia imposes. I cannot see how they will settle for less than the complete return of Novorossiya and the total neutering of rump Ukraine so that it can never again threaten Russia.

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