*THIS ARTICLE ORIGINALLY WAS PUBLISHED THERE ON 4 SEPTEMBER 2026 MY SUBSTACK SITE AT: https://gordonhahn.substack.com/p/anti-bourgeoisism-in-russian-culture-9ff?r=stexy
Introduction: Russian Transcendentalism and Russian Anti-Bourgeoisism
As I noted in my series “John Coltrane Through a Russian Prism,” Russian culture, thought, history and, to some extent, even politics have been infused with transcendentalism for centuries. Although this cultural strand is most strong among the intelligentsia, it has bled into the masses over the centuries largely as a result of the power of Orthodox Christianity in Russian culture and countervailing but equally transcendental trends in response.
Many have perceived a certain transcendentalism in Russian religious, philosophical, literary, and general cultural discourse as well as in certain behaviors. One of the recent decades’ leading analysts of Russian culture, James H. Billington noted, many post-Soviet Russians are inclined to seek out something transcendental, a transcendent experience.[1] Russian literary critic I. I. Yevlampiev observed: “Pushkin expressed in a vivid artistic form the main feature of our national character – the contradictory combination and interaction in our spirituality of two intentions, two attitudes to the world: ‘admiration’ for the world, empirical reality, a clear sense of one’s inseparable belonging to this earthly reality and an equally clear sense of higher harmony, a passionate desire to join it and see the whole world transformed in accordance with an unearthly ideal.”[2] Russians’ aspiration to monism and universalism through a ‘higher harmony’ for the ‘whole world’ reflects or results in transcendentalism, escaping beyond the bonds of the human condition to a higher, purer, more integral one, a ‘transformation ‘in accordance with an unearthly ideal.’
Russian transcendentalism is part and parcel, perhaps one or the lone driver of other aspects of Russian culture: prometheanism (belief in humankind’s potential for attaining achievements that transcend standard human capacities), messianism (a Russian mission to help humankind save or transcend itself and earthly life as it is), and utopianism (belief in the possibility or even inevitability of a perfect world brought by superhuman or divine intervention). Russian transcendentalism aspires to move humankind, Russian society, and/or the individual beyond various limits: the ordinary (bourgeois) life; evil’s hindering of the good and the divine; imperfection stymying perfection whether in the form of an earthly or heavenly utopia; and Russian imperfection overcome by Russian perfection facilitating a messianic role for her. Transcendentalism seeks to overcome division, producing Russian tselostnost’ in the form of the monism, universalism, communalism, and solidarism discussed in Part 2 of “John Coltrane Through a Russian Prism.” Russian transcendentalism lends itself to Russian anti-bourgeois sentiment. For the Russian intelligentsia, there is a preference for romantic transcendentalism manifested variously as utopianism, prometheanism, heroism, Orthodox, communist, and nationalist messianism etc. Historically, in much of Russian discourse, though perhaps lesser so nowadays, bourgeoisism or ‘meshchanstvo’ in Russian is rejected and carries a firmly negative connotation.
This tradition in Russian thought has its origins in the accidents of history that have shaped Russian life. A unique feature of Russia’s historical development since the Mongol yoke has been its lack of institutional and social elements that would support bourgeois beliefs and practices, including pro-market sentiment: the institution of private property, social stratification into distinctive classes, a significant middle class, and a civil society. The institution of private property and ownership existed in Russia or Rus’ before the imposition of the Mongol or ‘Tatar’ yoke. It was abolished under the Mongols, as all property belonged to the khan. When the Moscow principality finally fought off completely Mongol control, the Moscow prince willfully inherited the practice of a ‘state’ monopoly on all property. Property was lent to subordinate boyars and princes in return for state service to the Grand Prince. As Russian philosopher and culturologist Vladimir Kantor notes, the private ‘votchina’ was replaced by the ‘pomeste’ granted for use in exchange for service.[3] Private property would return to Russia on any significant scale only with the agrarian reforms of Pyotr Stolypin in the early 20threvolution only to be banished after the 1917 revolution and Bolshevik coup, excluding the brief New Economic Program or NEP in 1921-1928. The absence of a middle class of ‘shopkeepers’ – that is, small and medium-sized business with a middling level of education, property, and consumption – left pre-Soviet and Soviet Russia with two classes. The first is an elite, including a bureaucracy and intelligentsia, respectively with the propensity to build society ‘from above’ by way of the state apparatus or with the leisure read, write, philosophize, and otherwise engage in social and existentialist thought. The second was a large cohort of propertyless poor, which in various periods comprised different social groups: peasants, industrial workers, village, small town, and one-company town dwellers. In prerevolutionary Russia and the post-revolutionary USSR, therefore, thought leaders, denigrated meshchanstvo.
Transcendentalism, like utopianism, messianism and prometheanism, almost preclude embourgoisment; hence the persistent and pervasive anti-bourgeoism in Russian thought across countervailing trends and th vicissitudes of Russian history. Among the Russian masses there have been various cultural and ideological trends defined by the intelligentsia and/or the state that pursued with a Prometheus-like, maximalist pursuit of transcendence beyond the ordinary, middle-class lifestyle. Transcendentalism and its handmaiden anti-bourgeoisism are manifested today in Russians’ preference for adventure, extreme or even socially unapproved behaviors, criminal activity, and a life of state service over ‘selfish’ ambition for one’s career or simply enjoying the challenge of entrepreneurship or just simple work. The shopkeeper’s fate was rendered by history too ordinary by Russian intellectuals and for many more ordinary Russians.
Many Russian thinkers have hoped to escape the world through grand Christian, socialist, or nationalist utopian visions, eschewing and seeking to transcend the ordinary Russian, particularly middle-class life in favor of non- or anti-bourgeios existence. The search for alternatives to middle class life, consumerism and capitalism came part and parcel with the transcendentalism, prometheanism (superhumanism) and utopianism of Russian thinkers, including among fervent Orthodox Christians, ardent nationalists, as well as their communist opponents.
The Orthodox Roots of Russian Anti-Bourgeois Thought
Long before the advent of Marxism and the communists, many Russian thinkers adopted an anti-bourgeios sociopolitical stance in search of socialist, religious, and nationalist alternatives to consumerism and capitalism. Indeed, Eastern Orthodoxy’s ancient holy fathers, whose works were imbibed wholly by Russian Orthodoxy, taught that asceticism was the only path to holiness. For example, the archbishop of Constantinople Johan Zlatoust (Chrysostom) (347-407), whose works remain central in Russian Orthodoxy, declared that “saintliness is only attainable by the ascetic path.”[4] Subsequently, the quiet, quaint middle class bourgeois life of shopkeeping and small business has had limited attraction for Russians, evidenced in the writings of Russia’s most admired thinkers. Thus, down to the 20th, indeed the 21st century, we hear the same message from Russian Orthodoxy. Pavel Florenskii – the ‘Russian Da Vinci’ executed by the Soviet Stalinist regime at the height of Iosif Stalin’s Great Purges in 1937 – wrote that “asceticism is the path to salvation.”[5] Florenskii and other similar Russian Orthodox thinkers are undergoing a powerful rehabilitation and revival in Russia since the Soviet collapse, and there is talk of the Russian Orthodox Church canonizing Florenskii.
Perhaps a result of this emphasis on asceticism is a surfeit of the positive images of labor – excluding the Soviet era – and mercantile activity in Russian culture in contrast to Catholic and especially Protestant Calvinist ideas of salvation through labor and indeed profitmaking. Contemporary political scientists and culturologist, Grigorii Tulchinskii has noted that lack of positive models of simple labor and commercial activity. “The near complete absence of toilers in Slavic and later Russian mythology – builders, weavers, artisans or, most especially, the peasants – is perhaps indicative of the mediocrity attributed to the doer of ‘small’ deeds. The mythological merchant Sadko, appearing only in Novgorod chronicles, is the rare exception.”[6] Thus, “(t)he theme of labor as an activity connected with а feeling of happiness is practically absent.” [7] Manuel Sarkisyants similarly observed that classic Russian literature almost never celebrated themes such as family happiness, economic success or joyful love.[8]
The predominance of Orthodoxy in Russian culture into the early 20th century ensured such religious transcendentalism’s proliferation throughout Russian culture until the Bolshevik takeover. Although the great Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevskii is well-known for his moral and religious condemnation of Russia’s socialist/communist revolutionaries in his great novels such as The Brothers Karamazov and The Devils, he also despised republicanism and non-spiritual secularity and bourgeois values for the everyday “mediocrity.”[9] Ironically, as Manuel Sarkisyants pointed out, the Bolshevik Anatolii Lunacharskii and the Russian Orthodox unmasker of revolutionary degradation, Fyodor Dostoevskii, essentially agreed that the “embourgeoised West” was incapable of the kind of “tortures” needed to ring in the revolution that “the Russia people could carry forth.”[10] The realization of utopia dreams and the promethean acts of self-sacrifice required are not to be found in narrow perspective nurtured by shop-keeping, lawn-mowing, and home improvement. That this orientation can be found among the Russian Orthodox and the Bolsheviks demonstrates just how ubiquitous it is in Russian culture and discourse.
Anti-Bourgeois Thought in the Russian Imperial Twilight
Perhaps Russia’s most influential thinker, the great Russian Orthodox, anti-Western Slavophile, and anti-revolutionary novelist and essayist Fyodor Dostoevskii asserted that the bourgeois “kingdom” in Europe had given birth to “senseless filth.”[11] He blamed the bourgeoisie – “the new world conquerors” – for the French revolution and Napoleon[12] Dostoevskii had somewhat contradictory views on ‘bourgeois capitalism,’ as the Bolsheviks called. While he supported capital, he rejected the bourgeosie.[13] But ultimately, he believed that the Russian state and national interest, which he always supported, contradicted the principle of private property.[14] Always a believer in the simple Russian peasant, the land (zemlya) and soil (pochva) were the natural abode of humankind – superior to the false “crystal” cities and “factory perversion” “worshipped by the bourgeoisie.” Europe had led the era of the castle (feudal, medieval times) and the era of the city (capitalism and rationalism). The next phase would that of the “Garden” would return Europe to the land and soil, on which Russia still had one foot. [15] Dostoevskii saw an impending catastrophe he saw approaching Europe was being driven not by one false element, socialists, but a second—the bourgeoisie. In his view, “(o)ne side and the other side are terribly wrong, and one and the other will perish in their sins.”[16]
The conservative, anti-Western Slavophile movement sought a way to save Russia from following the European bourgeois materialist and capitalist path of development so their homeland would remain oriented on its Orthodox, Slavic and agrarian traditions. Thus, Slavophile comparativist of Eastern and Western cultural tendencies, Konstantin Leont’ev, lamented the triumph of bourgeoisism in the West in his 1882-1883 series ‘On Eastern Matters”: “Would it not be terrible and insulting to think that Moses climbed Sinai, that the Greeks built their graceful Acropolis, that the Romans waged the Punic Wars, that the brilliant and handsome Alexander, wearing some kind of feathered helmet, crossed the Granicus and fought at Arbella, that the apostles preached, martyrs suffered, poets sang, artists painted, and knights shone in tournaments, only for the French, German, or Russian bourgeoisie, in their hideous and comical attire, to revel ‘individually’ and ‘collectively’ on the ruins of all this past grandeur? It would be shameful for humanity if this vile ideal of universal benefit, petty labor, and shameful prose were to triumph forever!”[17]
However, it was not just conservative thinkers like Dostoevskii and Leont’ev who rejected bourgeoisism. Liberal thinkers, not to mention socialist ones, also rejected the European bourgeois life and outlook. The great Russian liberal-patriotic thinker and dissident Aleksandr Herzen (1812-1870) turned vehemently against the bourgeois lifestyle and its consequences after going into exile in Europe, despite his continuing commitment to replace the autocracy with a republican form of government. Herzen’s growing anti-Western critique was in significant anti-bourgeois in sentiment: “In our (Russian – G.H.) life there is something outrageous, but there is nothing cheap, nothing unsophisticated, and nothing bourgeois.”[18]
Ironically, perhaps Russia’s greatest thinker, Nikolai Berdyaev, a bitter opponent of Marxism and Bolshevism, held the bourgeoisie or at least “bourgeoisism” in as low esteem as did Marx and Lenin, yet, as Sarkisyants averred, “the Bolshevik hatred of the bourgeoisie was one of the driving forces of Bolshevism.” [19] Still, Berdyaev expressed, in Sarkisyants’ words, “the “Russian view” on meshchanstsvo in the article “Christianity and Bourgeoisness” (Khristianstvo i Burzhuaznost’). There, Berdyaev held that “bourgeoisness” was a spiritual rather than a social or economic factor—an ontological, psychological and ethical state in which intellectualism and spirituality is suppressed by the world’s commercialism and materialism, precluding the transcendental, promethean, utopian, and any “breakthrough to eternity.”[20] Berdyaev an anti-materialist, metaphysical Orthodox religious thinker castigated the rationalist materialism of the West in its concentrated bourgeois form for its culture of action: “The bourgeois is an idolator; he lives in slavery to the visible. ‘Idolatry is a preference for the seen over the unseen.’ For the bourgeois ‘action’ (delo) is his God, his Absolute. It is the bourgeois that crucified Christ. On Golgotha the bourgeoisie cut off the world from Christ and ‘money’ from the poor.”[21] Here, Berdyaev anticipates the French philosopher Rene Guenon’s view that Western culture is a culture of action, while the East – which for Guenon did not include Russia – consists of civilizations and cultures of knowledge.[22] Berdyaev went so far to blame the advent of World War I on Blames WW I on the non-spiritual, bourgeoisie life, which kills human spirituality.[23]
The Russian religious and mystical mind’s obsession with eschatology has worked against the quaint comforts of the bourgeois life. The Orthodox-influenced symbolists were dreamers. Many eagerly awaited the revolution and the advent of a new world, mixing their Orthodox roots with mystical and contemporary European aesthetics in conjuring the new era. Symbolist poet and God-seeker Dmitrii Merezhkovskii (1866-1941), who believed the world would become divine by way of a miracle, declared: “We will not accept any middle ground, because we believe in the end, we see the end, we want the end, because we ourselves are the end, or at least the beginning of the end.”[24] The symbolist Vasilii Rozanov saw the development of the bourgeoisie, a kind of ‘bourgeoisism,’ as “obnoxious” (protivnyi). He condemned the bourgeoisie for “not being interested in the transcendent and anything whatsoever that is not in their daily circle” and hated , as Sarkisyants, notes, “all that has not drowned in the swamp of his mediocrity.”[25] The symbolists’ contemporary, the liberal Orthodox political philosopher Fyodor Stepun favored the “democratic parliamentarianism of Europe” even if it “is sliding into meshchanstvo.”[26]
Russian Populist and Communist Anti-Bourgeoisism
The Imperial twilight era’s pre-revolutionary populist and the revolutionary movements the former helped to spawn were intrinsically anti-bourgeois, rejecting both the aristocratic and autocratic elements of Russia life as well as its early capitalistic and bourgeois trends, with many turning to agrarian solutions to avoid the era of the industrial, bourgeois city. As Walicki noted, 19th century Russian populism or narodnichestvo should not be thought of as a specific strand of revolutionary thought but as “a dynamic ideological structure within which many positions were possible.” Generally, it encompassed “bourgeois democratic radicalism with opposition to capitalism as a social system” to be expressed in various mostly, pre-Marxist forms of socialism—what Lenin criticized as a Janus-faced “economic romanticism” that looked “with one face to the past and the other to the future.” In its Fourierian, Saint-Simonian and Owenian forms, Walicki asserts, populism emphasized agrarian socialism, rendering it, somewhat like Slavophilism, “a backward-looking utopia idealizing precapitalist economic and social relations.”[27] Russian historian A.S. Vengerov made a similar observation (1911).[28] Not just pre-Marxist and Marxist socialism but also agrarian socialism, anarchism and even Slavophilism (which first cherished the peasant obshchina) informed narodnichestvo. Like Slavophilism, the backward-directed thinking of the nardoniki, despite their desire for change, was driven by a desire for Russia to avoid the spiritless, rational bourgeois path of Europe and America.
After the Bolsheviks overthrew the Russian ‘bourgeoisie’, a famous Stalinist formulation of the late 1920s and 1930s read: “Fascism is the highest stage of capitalism.” Florenskii, whom would be put to death by the revolutionary regime in 1937, averred something of the mirror opposite: “In essence, Bolshevism is the logical conclusion of bourgeois culture.”[29] Ironically, publication of the works of Florenskii, Dostoevskii, Berdyaev, Herzen, Ivan Turgenev, and Anton Chekhov and hundreds of other Imperial era writers and thinkers was either banned or strictly limited because of their bourgeois origins, sympathies, and worldviews. It is important to note that the anti-meshchanstvo element in Russian culture did much to fertilize the Russian soil for the growth of working-class protest and revolutionary movements.
In significant part, the Bolshevik Marxist ideology was a harsh radical Russian reaction to the emerging bourgeois element in late Imperial life that supplemented and buttressed the anti-proletarian sensibility, including snobbery and a sense of superiority among the upper classes. The extent of anti-bourgeois sentiment in the Marxist ideology and the movements, revolution and Soviet proletarian experiment it helped to engender is well-known and needs little elaboration. Suffice it to say that the Bolsheviks championed a “dictatorship of the proletariat” or working class and that dictatorship’s primary task was to eliminate in one way or another the bourgeois and aristocratic classes and pave the way for a new proletarian or ‘Soviet man’, a new proletarian culture – which came in the form of socialist realism and for the first time glorified labor – and a new proletarian world.
During Stalin’s Great Terror, the arrested, tried and executed innocents were invariable charged with ‘bourgeois deviations,’ ‘bourgeois nationalism,’ and being in the pay of enemy ‘bourgeois capitalist countries’ and their intelligence services. This is demonstrated by the seminal speech of Leningrad Obkom First Secretary Andrei Zhadnov’s August 1946 speech, which kicked of the Zhdanovshchina repressions among Soviet intellectuals, in which Western influences in post-war USSR and condemning beourgeois elements ostensibly seeping into Soviet literature were harshly denounced. Zhdanov noted: “Some of our literati have begun to consider themselves not teachers but students of bourgeois-meshchanskikh writers and to get lost in a tone of kowtowing and bowing to the petty – bourgeoisforeign literati. Does it become us, Soviet patriots, to worship such lowly things, us who built the Sovietsystem, which is a hundred times higher and better than any bourgeois system? Does kowtowing to the limited meshchanski-bourgeois literature of the West become our advanced Soviet literature?”[30]
Therefore, it is a great irony that one of Russian history’s few periods of ‘bourgeoisization’ or ‘embourgeoisment’ came in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union. From the Stalin era to the Khrushchevan era we see an “erosion of transcendentalism” (as well as maximalism and utopianism) and the onset of Soviet meshchanstvo and mass culture and consumerism as the Soviet leadership begins to promise and society begins to desire social comforts and consumer goods.[31] This marked a Russian Western civilizational choice in the realms of daily life and economics, according to Tul’chinskii.[32] Despite a turn to Eurasia and Asia in Russia’s geopolitical orientation under President Vladimir Putin, this kind of bourgeois choice persists in the post-Soviet era and was a driver of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroikareforms, which brough it about. However, as he also points out, intellectually, especially among the authorities and the traditionalist wing of the intelligentsia, there remains an anti-market or at least non-market essence in Russian political and economic culture.[33] Despite its own embourgoisment, Soviet culture retained the stereotype of “West – mass culture – meshchanstvo” developed in Russian and persisted in post-Soviet culture, despite increasing meshchantsvo in Soviet culture in the post-Stalin era.[34] This demonstrates a certain historical tselostnost’ or wholeness in Russian culture, as I have pointed out, as well as “united cultural code,” as Tul’chinskii wrote.[35]
Traditionalist and Residual Communist Anti-Bourgeoisism
To a certain extent, the Soviet experience has somewhat increased the attraction of a comfortable middle-class life for many Russians. Nevertheless, transcendentalist anti-bourgeoisism still persists. In cultural discourse, the revival of pre-Soviet Russian thinkers with anti-bourgeois sentiment rooted in Russian Orthodoxy or hagiography of Russian agrarian life now mixes with residual socialist and communist thought, recreating a robust anti-bourgeois milieu. Orthodox Christianity’s post-Soviet revival means the revival of the thinkers noted above and their religious-based transcendentalism, but new countervailing transcendentalist and utopian projects have emerged to replace communism. Today’s Russian discourse allows Florenskii to sit side by side with Lenin, though communist thought is now a minority position, while Russian Orthodox-influenced thinkers comprise a plurality or even majority position. Still, the works Marx, Lenin, and Stalin are still available, though in fewer and fewer bookstores. Berdyaev, Dostoevskii, the Slavophiles, and the like are far more available.
Another example of contemporary anti-bourgeoisism’s roots in pre-Soviet Russian thought are the esoteric Russian Orthodox metaphysics and political theories of the influential Aleksandr Dugin. In his ‘fourth political theory’ of ‘Dassein,’ Dugin proposes a return to a hyper-centralized, even mono-organizational state encompassing much, if not all of society and social, cultural, religious, and political activity. In his imagined “global holy Empire of the End” – a “Platopolis” and “existential State” – there would be no political parties and no democracy. For our prurposes, there would neither a bourgeoisie nor private property. There also would not be nations (“a subjective, bourgeois and historically unnecessary reality”), nationalism, nor a “contemporary State,” which are “bourgeois abberations subject to destruction.”[36] Dugin would reverse the Bolshevik model of urbanization and industrialization; there will be “singing the praises of the peasantry,” “support of the village,” “resettlement of the cities,” “suppression and destruction of the bourgeoisie,” and an “economy in the hands of a ruling spiritual aristocracy.”[37]
Another example can be found in contemporary Russian transhumanism, which has roots in Nikolai Fyodorov’s cosmism and immortalism and stands at odds with the Russian Orthodox Church. Russia’s leading transhumanist, Dmitrii Itskov, pursues human-technological singularity towards a “neomankind.” The first chief trait of his neomankind is: “(S)triving for self-improvement and self-development – instead of creating, accumulating and consuming material goods.”[38] This emphasis on striving for self-improvement over consumption has echoes of the self-deprivation inherent in both Orthodox asceticism as well as anti-meshchanstvo.
Cultural sociologist Kseniya Kasyanova confirmed both by her work and her own ideas that Russians are beholden to a similar preference for Russian Orthodox collectivism over individualist bourgeoisism. In her study of the Russian character, published in 2003, she found that values that we might construe as being supported by a bourgeois lifestyle and mindset, such as achievement (dostizhitel’nost’) and determination (tseleustremlennost’), are weak in Russian culture as compared to American culture but competitiveness (konkurentnost’) is not.[39] Kasyanova then attempts to build a hypothesis of a peculiarly Russian form of “goal-setting” (tselepolaganie). Russians act in accordance with traditional authority, in Max Weber’s terminology, and ‘value-rationality’, in Talcott Parsons’ terminology, rather than rational-legal authority and pure rationality, in their respective schemes. With a greater emphasis on value-driven action, Russians are more likely to think and act under the influence of their national culture than are Americans. Thus, according to Kasyanova, in Russia the authorities and historical experience play a greater role than in the U.S., creating a culture emphasizing unity which leads to some repression of the individual’s aspirations in favor of the those valued by the collective and its culture.[40] One can conjecture further that Kasyanova’s findings suggest a cultural resistance among Russians to the pluralistic, even anarchic economics of the market and the pluralistic, even anarchic politics in republics. In addition, the weak values of achievement and more so determination are more internally driven, while competitiveness can be more focused on competitors. This transfers attention from the perfection of one’s own personal knowledge and skills, inducing one to look externally and the struggle against what can easily become to be seen as antagonistic foes, opponents, and enemies. The potential for conflict in this model renders the pluralism of the market unattractive in Russian culture.
Kasyanova reveals her own Russianness, waxing philosophically and theologically over the ancient Russian Orthodox expression “God’s world” (Bozhii mir): “Saying Bozhii mir, it is as if we see the world from the point of view of the Creator, and then its integrality, finiteness, and the purposeful interrelation of all its parts, one of which is ‘I’. But precisely because of this, I accept all the other parts as expediently and harmoniously corresponding to themselves, and it is warm and cozy for me in this world, despite those tribulations which from time to time fall down on me: suffering and evil are also parts of this world, and they are necessary in it, and it seems my suffering takes on some meaning and justification in this system of this integral Bozhii mir….Everything is in it.”[41] This quintessential statement of Russian monist tselostnost’(and hint of communalism) is the other side of the coin to her rather Russian rejection of American individualism and “hedonism.” [42]
Conclusion
In pre-Soviet and Soviet Russia, the entire ideology, society and culture were aggressively and intentionally anti-bourgeois. Post-Soviet Russia retains a strong resident of anti-meshchantsvo. Pre-Soviet Russia’s political spectrum was saturated with varying elements all rejecting bourgeoisism in one or another way. Traditionalist conservatives, reformist liberals, and revolutionary socialists and anarchists rejected bourgeoism. Pro-Westerners and anti-Westerners, including the Slavophiles rejected the bourgeois way. Russian Orthodox believers and communist and anarchist atheists expressed disdain for it. The communists in power forced an intensely anti-bourgeois state ideology on all Soviet society, strengthening this strand in Russian political and economic culture. However, the discreditation of the Bolshevik experiment, with its vast cost in human life and culture, offered a brief opening through which a new view of bourgeoisism appeared among Russians. Consumerism, business, the market economy made inroads into Russia in the early 1990s. But one discreditation followed another. The excesses of the gawdy ‘new Russians,’ the corruption of the 1990s’ oligarchs, and the fiasco they made of republican government has led to a revival of the traditionalist conservative Russian Orthodox critique of bourgeois values as crudely material and ensconced in a West again seen by Russians as in decay. These phenomena helped sustain a significant leftist critique of bourgeois capitalism in Marxist and/or Leninist terms.
In terms of behavior, anti-bourgeois attitudes may even be reflected in a significant number of Russians’ preference for the extreme in their ‘leisure’ time, the rejection of a law-based state manifested in massive corruption and considerable criminality, or the promised romanticism and adventure of a military life. As Sarkisyants noted, Herzen so reviled the European bourgeoisie that he declared “(g)lory to chaos and destruction! Long live Death!” [43] Russians today are less revolutionary (though anti-monarchist Herzen was not much of a revolutionary), but many would understand and sympathize with the sentiment.
Although many Russians today aspire to the comforts of bourgeois life, many aspire to even greater comforts and the thrills that can be imbibed with the leisurely, good life. However, the political influence of the traditional, Orthodox-oriented intelligentsia now supportive of the Putin government lends it the greatest cultural power in Russian society nearly on a par with the Russian Orthodox Church and the political elite with which it intersects. These actors cannot abide bourgeois values of materialism, individualism, consumerism, and entrepreneurship autonomous from the state and acting at times against the interest of collective society.
FOOTNOTES
[1] James Billington, Rossiya v poiskakh sebya (Moscow: Rosspen, 2005), [translated into Russian from the English-language publication James H. Billington, Russia in Search of Itself (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)], p. 163.
[2] I. I. Yevlampiev, Istoriya russkoi metafisiki v XIX-XX vekakh (St. Petersburg: RKhGA, 2020), p. 66.
[3] Vladimir Kantor, Lyubov’ k dvoiniku: Mif i realnost’ russkoi kul’tury (Moscow: Nauchno-politicheskaya kniga, 2013), p. 94.
[4] G. P. Fedotov, Russkaya religioznost’- Chast’ 1: Khristianstvo Kievskoi Rusi, X-XIII vv., in G. P. Fedotov, Sobranie sochinenii v 12 tomakh, Vol. 10 (Moscow: ‘Matris’ Sam & Sam, 2001), p. 43.
[5] Pavel Florenskii, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth: An Essay in Orthodox Theodicy in Twelve Letters (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 193.
[6] Grigorii Tul’chinskii, Politicheskaya kul’tura Rossii: Istochniki, uroki, and perspektivy (St. Petersburg: Aleteiya, 2018), p. 61.
[7] Tul’chinskii, Politicheskaya kul’tura Rossii: Istochniki, uroki, and perspektivy, p. 63.
[8] Manuel’ Sarkisyants, Rossiya i messianism: k ‘russkoi idee’ N. A. Berdyaeva (Saint Petersburg: Saint Petersburg State University, 2005) [originally published as part of Manuel Sarkisyants, Russland und der Messianismus des Orients (J.C.B. Mohr, 1955)], pp. 135-6.
[9] Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelya, 1873-1881, (Saint Petersburg: Lenizdat, 2001), pp. 177-80.
[10] Sarkisyants, Rossiya i messianism: k ‘russkoi idee’ N. A. Berdyaeva, p. 127.
[11] F. M. Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelya:1873-1881 (St. Petersburg: Lenizdat, 1991), pp. 291-2.
[12] Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelya:1873-1881, p. 242.
[13] Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelya:1873-1881, p. 80.
[14] Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelya:1873-1881, p. 248.
[15] Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelya:1873-1881, p. 293.
[16] Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelya:1873-1881, p. 433.
[17] Konstantin Leont’ev, “Pis’mo o vostochnykh delakh,” Grazhdanin, 1883, http://az.lib.ru/l/leontxew_k_n/text_0350.shtml, chapter VI.
[18] Herzen cited in Vladimir Kantor, Lyubov’ k dvoiniku: Mif i realnost’ russkoi kul’tury(Moscow: Nauchno-politicheskaya kniga, 2013), p. 299.
[19] Manuel’ Sarkisyants, Rossiya i messianism: k ‘russkoi idee’ N. A. Berdyaeva (Saint Petersburg: Saint Petersburg State University, 2005) [originally published as part of Manuel Sarkisyants, Russland und der Messianismus des Orients (J.C.B. Mohr, 1955)], pp. 151-2. Intuitivist philosopher Nikolai Losskii also notes Berdyaev’s anti-bourgeoisism, See N. O. Losskii, Istoriya russkoi filosofii (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1991), p. 288.
[20] Sarkisyants, Rossiya i messianism: k ‘russkoi idee’ N. A. Berdyaeva, p. 147.
[21] N. A, Berdyaev, “O dukhovnoi burzhuaznosti,” Put’, No. 3, March-April 1926, https://archive.org/details/B-001-028-092-093-ALL/Put_N03/mode/2up and http://odinblago.ru/path/3/1/, p. 4.
[22] Rene’ Guenon, The Crisis of the Modern World, (Philmont, N.Y.: Sophia perennis, 2025), pp. 33-41. First published in German in 1942.
[23] Nikolai Berdyaev, Sud”ba Rossii (St. Petersburg: Azbuka, 2016), pp. 207 and 217-18.
[24] D. S. Merezhkovskii, L. Tolstoi i Dostoevskii: zhizn’ i torzhestvo (Moscow: Nauka, 2000), p. 478.
[25] Sarkisyants, Rossiya i messianism: k ‘russkoi idee’ N. A. Berdyaeva, p. 141.
[26] Stepun cited in Vladimir Kantor, Lyubov’ k dvoiniku: Mif i realnost’ russkoi kul’tury, p. 392.
[27] Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), p. 223.
[28] Sarkisyants, Rossiya i messianism: k ‘russkoi idee’ N. A. Berdyaeva, p. 131.
[29] Avril Pyman, Pavel Florensky: A Quiet Genius: The Tragic and Extraordinary Life of Russia’s Unknown da Vinci (New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 113.
[30] Dzheffri Roberts, Biblioteka Stalina: Vozhd’ i ego knigi (Moscow: Izdatelstvo AST, 2026), p. 237.
[31] Tul’chinskii, Politicheskaya kul’tura Rossii: Istochniki, uroki, and perspektivy, pp. 115-17 and 124-7.
[32] Tul’chinskii, Politicheskaya kul’tura Rossii: Istochniki, uroki, and perspektivy, p. 127.
[33] Tul’chinskii, Politicheskaya kul’tura Rossii: Istochniki, uroki, and perspektivy, p. 128.
[34] Tul’chinskii, Politicheskaya kul’tura Rossii: Istochniki, uroki, and perspektivy, p. 122.
[35] Tul’chinskii, Politicheskaya kul’tura Rossii: Istochniki, uroki, and perspektivy, p. 127.
[36] Aleksandr Dugin, Chetvertyi put’: Vvedienie v chetvertuyu politicheskuyu teoriyu(Moscow: Academicheskii proyekt, 2014), pp. 62-4.
[37] Dugin, Chetvertyi put’: Vvedienie v chetvertuyu politicheskuyu teoriyu, pp. 62-6.
[38] Dmitrii Itskov, “Put’ k neochelovechestvy kak osnova ideologii partii ‘Evolyutsiya 2045’,” 2045.ru, 9 November 2012, http://www.2045.ru/articles/30840.html, last accessed on 24 October 2020.
[39] Kseniya Kasyanova, Kseniya Kasyanova, O Russkom Natsionalnym Kharaktere(Moscow and Yekaterinburg: Akademicheskii Proekt and Delovaya kniga, 2003), pp. 183-5.
[40] Kasyanova, O Russkom Natsionalnym Kharaktere, pp. 186-91.
[41] Kasyanova, O Russkom Natsionalnym Kharaktere, pp. 257-8.
[42] Kasyanova, O Russkom Natsionalnym Kharaktere, pp. 235-46.
[43] Sarkisyants, Rossiya i messianism: k ‘russkoi idee’ N. A. Berdyaeva, p. 141.
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About the Author –
Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D., is an Expert Analyst at Corr Analytics, www.canalyt.com. Websites: Russian and Eurasian Politics, gordonhahn.com and gordonhahn.academia.edu
Dr. Hahn is the author of the new book: Russian Tselostnost’: Wholeness in Russian Thought, Culture, History, and Politics (Europe Books, 2022). He has authored five previous, well-received books: The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin (McFarland, 2021); Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West, and the “New Cold War” (McFarland, 2018); The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus and Beyond (McFarland, 2014), Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), and Russia’s Revolution From Above: Reform, Transition and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime, 1985-2000 (Transaction, 2002). He also has published numerous think tank reports, academic articles, analyses, and commentaries in both English and Russian language media.
Dr. Hahn taught at Boston, American, Stanford, San Jose State, and San Francisco State Universities and as a Fulbright Scholar at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia and was a senior associate and visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Kennan Institute in Washington DC, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group.



