Afghanistan Caucasus Emirate Central Asia Chechnya Dagestan Egypt Ingushetiya Islamic Jihad Union Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Islamism Jihadism Kyrgyzstan North Caucasus Pakistan Putin Russia Tajikistan Uzbekistan

Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report 35

Photo russian_mosque

18 February 2011

Edited and Written by Gordon M. Hahn (unless otherwise indicated)




CENTRAL ASIA by Yelena Altman (unless otherwise indicated)



Anita Rai, Posture for a Democratic Egypt

* IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted.  Research assistance is provided by Leonid Naboishchikov, Daniel Painter, and Seth Gray.



The final casualty count of the Domodedovo Airport suicide bombing in Moscow appears to be 37 killed, 180 wounded with more than 120 of those taken to the hospital.[1] DNA analysis has confirmed that the Domodedovo Airport suicide bomber was Magomed Yevloev, who bore a strong resemblance to CE amir Dokku Abu Usman Umarov’s sidekick ‘Seifullah’ shown in a shakhid video posted on CE sites before the Domedeovo attack described in IIPER, No. 34.[2]  According to Russian law enforcement and a recent Life News video, Yevloev was high on narcotics and wandered around the airport for more than an hour before detonating his suicide belt.[3]

Aside from jihadi ideology and recruitment, which is ignored in the media, one version of Yevloev’s motive being circulated is that he sought to avenge the death of his brother-in-law, mujahed Bekkhan Bogatyryov, who was the husband of Yevloev’s 22-year old sister, Fatima, arrested under suspicion of having joined in the plot.  Thus, Kommersant reports that Fatima’s husband Bekhkan was a leader of the Plievo village jihadi jamaat and died from wounds along with the Plievo Jamaats’s amir Kharon Pliev after a shootout with police on August 12th.  An IED and a machine gun were allegedly found in their car, and police claimed they had prevented a terrorist attack.  According to Kommersant, the Yevloevs were in the Plievo Jamaat’s reserve until one of its key operatives, Islam Tochiev, was killed in autumn.  Tochiev was the organizer of the April 2010 suicide boming of the Karabulak city MVD headquarters.  From the Plievo jamaat’s reserve they ended up under the control of the former amir of the Sunzha area jamaat, Khamzat, who is now amir of the CE’s Riyadus Salikhin Martyrts’ Brigade and who appeared in the February 4th video with Umarov and Seifullah.[4]

As noted in IIPER, No. 34, also arrested so far in connection with the attack is Yevloev’s 16-year old younger brother Akhmed.  In addition, on February 3rd one Bashir Khamkhoev, “an alleged liaison for Ingush rebels with…Umarov,” was reportedly detained in connection with the attack after a shootout on the outskirts of Nazran, Ingushetia.  Firearms were found in his vehicle.  The bomb used in the attack might have been made at the house of Bogatyryov’s brother, Boris, in the village of Ekazhevo. The house was blown up by the FSB after several bombs were found there earlier in the month.  Boris Bogatyryov now is also on the federal wanted list.  Also arrested is one Umar or Akhmed Aushev, allegedly a friend and co-conspirator in the attack.[5]  Two others are wanted in the attack: Adam Ganizhev and Islam Yevloev.[6]  Ganizhev is reported to have been born in 1990 and a native of Orolov Oblast’ who was living recently in the village of Ali Yurt in Nazran District, Ingushetia.  Islam Yevloev was born in 1987 and is a native of Rostov Oblast’ and also lived in Ali Yurt.[7]  As noted in IIPER, No. 34, they left home at about the same time as suicide bomber ‘Seifullah’ Magomed Yevloev in fall 2010 and disappeared.  Another suspect has been identified by his last name only, Yandiev, in press reports.[8]  Reportedly, Umar Aushev and Yevloev’s brother and sister were with him last and traces of explosives were found on their hands.  The six suspects left Ali-Yurt in August, telling their parents that had found work in the Krasnodar Krai.  In reality, they left for the camp of the RSMB, which Umarov revived in 2009 for the purpose of carrying out suicide attacks deep inside Russia, as he openly claimed at the time.  Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov stated on February 9th that four other Inhushetia residents could be in training to carry out suicide attacks and were on the federal wanted list.[9]

There has been some misinformation or at least misinformed analysis of the CE amir Dokku Umarov’s claim of responsibility for the Domodedovo Airport bombing.  In one of their reports, Stratfor confesses to be “pretty skeptical” about the authenticity of Umarov’s claim.  Stratfor’s misplaced skepticism is based on several erroneous data points.[10]

First, Stratfor claims that “Umarov isn’t really known to work with militants from Ingushetia” and “doesn’t necessarily have as close of links to Ingushetia.”[11]  In fact, Umarov has associated and worked closely with Ingushetia’s mujahedin for years.  As head of the ChRI’s Security Council from the inter-war period in the late 1990s until his appointment as Abdul-Khalim’s vice president in 2005, he would have had ties to the Ingush Sector created in 2004.  Indeed, in June 2004 Umarov led hundreds of fighters from the Ingushetia, Sunzha and Achkhoi-Martan Sectors in an attack on Nazran, Ingushetia.  Along with the reorganization of the ChRI’s forces’ structure, president/amir Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev appointed Umarov commander of the Western Front.[12]  This reorganization removed the Ingushetia Sector from his purview to the new North Caucasus Front.  Thus, Umarov might have had fewer dealings with the Ingshetia Sector in the period from spring 2005 to July 2006 when he succeeded Sadulaev as the CHRI president-amir.  Soon, however, Umarov appears to have regained control over the Ingushetia Sector.  In an 18 April 2006 videotaped interview, Umarov claimed that its amir reported directly to him in contrast to the Kabardino-Balkaria Sector and Dagestan Front that reported first to Basaev, who then reported to Umarov and Sadulaev.[13]

Umarov’s ties to the Ingushetia Sector strengthened after he succeeded Sadulaev and became the ChRI’s president/amir.  He promoted the ethnic Ingush and Ingushetia Sector’s amir, Ali Taziev, alias ‘Magas’ or ‘Magomed Yevloev’ to the position of amir of the entire Caucasus Front in September 2006.  Ten months later, on 7 July 2007 Umarov appointed Magas to succeed Shamil Basaev as the amir of the military committee of ChRI’s ruling Shura.  Magas remained amir of both the military committee after the CE’s formation and the renamed Ingushetia Sector, the CE’s G’alg’aiche Vilaiyat (GV), until his capture by Russian forces in June 2010.  Magas and his successor, amir Adam, would have declared their loyalty to Umarov upon appointment as amir of the GV.  Under Magas’s command the Ingushetia front became the center of gravity of the jihad from summer 2007 to March 2010.

Besides Magas, the other major force behind the GV’s rise was Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii.  After meeting with Umarov upon arriving in the North Caucasus, the half-Buryat, half-Russian convert to Islam from Buryatia was sent to Ingushetia by Umarov.  As IIPER covered in detail, Buryatskii was then instrumental in the wave of suicide bombings carried out in large part by the Riyadus Salikhin Martyrs’ Brigade which was revived by Umarov and with which Buryatskii worked closely by his own and others’ accounts.  As a result of these steps, suicide bombings engineered by Buryatskii hit Ingushetia for the first time with four in 2009.  Buryatskii helped to organize two of the most spectacular suicide attacks of that year: the attempted assassination of Ingushetia’s president Yunusbek Yekurov in June in which the president was near fatally wounded and the complete destruction of the entire Nazran MVD headquarters by a suicide truck bomber in August on the day Yevkurov returned to Ingushetia.  Buryatskii was killed in march and Magas was captured in June, striking a severe blow to the GV’s operational capacity.

When Magas was captured by Russian forces, Umarov and his naib, amir Supyan Abdullaev, posted a declaration to the GV mujahedin which began with Umarov began by expressing his “sadness which, thanks to Allah, does not weaken us” in regard to Magas’s capture.  He added that their “beloved brother” had met with “bad luck” and had been betrayed by “several enemies.”[14]

Stratfor may question the Ingush-Umarov connection in the Domodedovo attack, but they ought to explain then why (, the website of the CE network’s Ingushetia node, the GV, posted both of Umarov’s videos in connection with the Domodedovo attack.  The first video shows the would-be suicide bomber, named Seifullah, before the attack, and he very much resembles the ethnic Ingush, Magoned Yevloev, in photographs published in the Russian press, as I noted in IIPER, No. 34.  The second video, in which Umarov claims responsibility for the already executed attack, was given its own page on[15]  As noted above, one Bashir Khamkhoev, “an alleged liaison for Ingush rebels with…Umarov” was detained after a shootout on the outskirts of Nazran, Ingushetia.  Firearms were found in his vehicle.[16]

Stratfor’s claims that Umarov has been “weakened considerably” since the August 2010 split with some Chechen mujahedin, covered in detail by IIPER.[17]  As I have shown, Umarov has only been weakened among the Chechen mujahedin, who were already far fewer than those in the other three key vilaiyats of Dagestan (DV), Ingushetia (GV), and the United Vilaiyat of Kabardia, Balkaria, and Karachai (OVKBK).  As far as we know, no amirs from these latter vilaiyats joined with the few in the Chechen or ‘Nokchihci Vilaiyat’ (NV) to renounce their bayats to Umarov during the split last summer; a split that appears, therefore, to run only through the NV.

Stratfor also seems off base in claiming that Umarov claimed responsibility for the Sayano-Sunzhenskaya Hydroelectric Dam’s destruction and has made “many false claims.”[18]  Umarov did not but the RSMB did claim responsibility for the dam explosion.  Articles on CE-affiliated websites, rather, occasionally included hints and suggestions that it was the result of a sabotage attack (presumably by the mujahedin) and no accident.  I know of no proven false claim of responsibility made by Umarov, and he has proven to be capable of carrying through on his threats. I will only briefly mention the most obvious connection between Umarov and numerous recent suicide bombings: Umarov revived the RSMB suicide bombing unit with a public statement in April 2009 and since then there have been 31 suicide bombings after a long relative lull in such attacks for several years.



Warnings in early February that suicide bombings were imminent in Dagestan and Ingushetia have proved somewhat prescient already with attacks coming in Dagestan and Chechnya.  Police souces told Life News that two 16-year-old teenagers from Dagestan, Aygyul Abdullayeva and Asiyat Adzhiyeva, were wanted in connection with potential attacks.  Ingushetia President Yunusbek Yevkurov stated on February 9th that four other Inhushetia residents could be in training to carry out suicide attacks and were on the federal wanted list.[19]

In the evening of Valentine’s Day, two suicide bombers detonated their cargoes in Gubden, Karabuadkhkent District, Dagestan.  Two policeman were killed and twenty-seven were wounded in the two attacks.[20]  On February 15th, two mujahedin blew themselves up after being surrounded in an apartment block in Chechnya’s capitol, Grozny, killing themselves.  One of the two mujahedin was identified as ibragim Gakaev.  They were said to be waring the suicide belts, suggesting they may have been preparing to carry out suicide attacks.[21]

The Dagestan attacks appears to be the denouement of those involved in the failed New Year’s Eve suicide bombing covered in IIPER, No. 34.  The Nogai Jamaat, which is likely part of the CE’s Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat, became operationally active in 2010.  The female suicide bomber was identified preliminarily as Marina Khorosheva, who was to be the other New Year’s Eve suicide bomber, according to previous reports.  On February 14th she attempted to enter a local administration building in Gubden but was stopped and then detonated her bomb at the door.  Khorsheva is the wife of Vitalii Razdobud’ko.  Law enforcement has not identified the second bomber but has not ruled out that it was Razdobud’ko, who detonated his bomb later in the evening when his car was stopped at a police checkpoint also in Gubden, killing one policeman and wounding twenty-two.[22]

Gubden is the native town of the infamous and deceased former DV amir Magomedali Vagabov, aka Seifullah Gubdenskii, who was also the CE’s qadi from March to August 2010, when he was killed by Russian forces.  It is possible that Vagabov is behind the invigoration of the Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat (NSV); there are close ties and much movement of people back and forth between Dagestan and Stavropol.  As noted in IIPER, No. 34, some of the suspects tied to Razdobud’ko had moved from Dagestan and maintained ties to, and frequently visited Dagestan.  The NSV’s operational territory includes Stavropol and Krasnodar Krais (Territories); the former also borders the Republic of Karachai-Cherkessia (KChR), which is the territory charged to the CE’s United Vilaiyat of Kabardia, Balkaria and Karachai (OVKBK).  The move into Stavropol was evident last years (see IIPER, No. 32) and could be connected with developing a network in, or at least moving CE operations in the direction of Krasnodar in order to pose at least a threat to the 2014 Olympics to be held in that region’s resort city of Sochi.  Thus, things also took a downturn in Stavropol and KChR in February.  On February 4th mujahedin attacked a MVD convoy in the KChR village of Adyge-Khabl’, killing three MVD troops.  On February 15th Stavropol and KChR OMON troops found the alleged perpetrators in the forest along the Stavropol-KChR border.  In the ensuing shooutout between mujahedin and police one Stavropol OMON was killed and four were wounded; and four mujahedin were killed.  They were identified as Aidemir Alakaev, Zurab Dumenov, Marat Kivalov, abd Mussa Aibazov.[23]

There have now been three successful suicide bombings in 2011 in Russia.  One in Moscow and two in Dagestan.  The suicide bombings in Chechnya were failed in that they did not occur against a target but occurred in an effort to avoid arrest.  The first suicide bombing in 2010 occurred on March 29th in the Moscow subway.  The first of 2009 occurred on May 16th in Grozny, Chechnya.  This is the first time there have been two suicide bombings in February in Russia. 



On January 27, amir ‘Khasan’ Adam Zelimkhanovich Guseinov, the first naib of Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) amir Israpil Velidzhanov, was killed by security and police forces.  Guseinov was also amir of  the DV’s Northern Sector, one of three DV sectors.  The mujahedin report he had fought jihad for 8 years since 2003.[24]  He was killed along with his common law wife or girlfriend, named Suniyat, according to the mujahedin, who offered resistance by uncontrollably firing a machine gun, according to the FSB.[25]

Guseinov was born in 1978 and was a native of Khasavyurt District.  In April 2010, according to the FSB, he became amir of the Aukhovskoi jamaat operating on the territory of Khasavyurt, Kazbek, and Novolak districts.  The FSB reports that in 2003 he left Dagestan for Chechnya to train in camp for suicide bombers.  From 2003 to 2008 he was a member of various jihadi jamaats, and in May 2004 he was put on the federal most wanted list.  The FSB says he was the organizer of explosions of stores in Khasavyurt, expropriations of money from entrepreneurs, and numerous assassinations and attacks on personnel of law enforcement organs, including the 26 September 2010 assassination of the head of Khasavyurt District Dzhambulat Salavov.  He also participated in the 23 October 2010 attack by mujahedin on the base of special MVD troops in Dagestan.[2]



For comparison with IIPER’s count of jihadi-related attacks and incidents in 2010 (see IIPER, No. 33), here is the data from Kavkaz uzel, the website of the Russian human rights organization ‘Memorial’.[27]  Unfortunately, Kavkaz uzel does not distinguish between mujahedin and non-mujahedin casualties except for its figure for the overall number of those killed.  Nor do the data distinguish between casualties among state agents and civilians.  For Kavkaz uzel’s casualty figures broken down by region and by killed and wounded see the Table:


Table 1: Kavkaz uzel’s Figures for Casualties from the Caucasus Jihad in 2010 By Region.


Attacks/               Total                                           Jihadists

Region                         Incidents*       Casualties      Killed    Wounded      Killed

Dagestan                        260                   685              378         307               176

Ingushetia                      143                   326              134         192                 63

Chechnya                         99                   250              127         123                 80

Kabardino-Balkaria          90                   161                79           82                 25

North Ossetia                     7                   195                24         171                   2

Stavropol                            4                     89                10           79                   2

Karachai-Cherkessia   no data                   4                  2             2                   1

TOTAL                          606               1,710              754         956               349


*For my attacks/incidents, Kavkaz uzel reports “explosions and Terrorist attacks” and “clashes” between law enforcement personnel and “members underground bands.”

Source: “Vooruzhennyi konflikt na Severnom Kavkaze: 1719 zhertv za 2010 god,” Kavkaz uzel, 18 January 2011, 23:33,


According to Kavkaz uzel, there were 1,710 (754 killed and 956 wounded) casualties in the “armed conflict in the North Caucasus” in 2010, with 349 of those killed having been mujahedin (“members of underground bands”).  Also, there were “no less than” 225 law enforcement personnel killed and 180 civilians killed in the “armed conflict in the North Caucasus” in 2010.  Kavkaz uzel also reported that 2010 was the first year that the number of casualties among law enforcement agencies and secret services approached the number of casualties among the mujahedin.  Prior to last year, approximately three militants were killed for every police and security officer.[28]

In February Russia’s Interior Ministry reported killing some 300 militants and detaining another 500 in 2010.  However, in January Internal Troops Commander-in-Chief, Army Gen. Nikolay Rogozhkin, stated 108 militants were killed in the North Caucasus in 2010, and in December 2010 Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev said that his interior troops had eliminated 84 militants in the North Caucasus Federal District in 2010. The discrepancy, which was even reported by Russia’s RIA-Novosti, underscores the importance of our methodology of averaging Russian security and jihadi claims.[29]  Unfortunately, jihad reporting on its own casualties is even more distorted, excessiviely reducing our numbers for mujahedin casualties.  This estimated figure remains a difficult one to nail down with any confidence.




Security Agencies in Kyrgyzstan have begun an arduous operation against extremist activity.  Radical groups are taking advantage of the volatile situation in Kyrgyzstan to further their extremist agenda but for the first time in many years, Kyrgyzstan is engaging in a large scale operation.  According to spokesman Rysbek Bykyn of the State National Security Committee (GKNB), the radical groups are “using Islam as a guise in their attempts to undermine the state.”[30]  Although there has been debate among human rights activists and security officials over the degree of force employed, Kyrgyz officials feel that it is just. In the past two months, Kyrgyz security has detained those presumed to be involved in extremist activities. As reported by and, “firearms, explosives, extremist literature, and videos featuring terrorists calling for Jihad against the new government” have already been confiscated.[31]  Most of the operations are being conducted in Osh and several Oblasts along the border with Tajikistan.



A propaganda video entitled, “Glad Tidings from Pakistan” was released in December 2010 featuring mujahideen “martyrs” including many Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fighters along the Afghan-Pakistan border.[32] Asia Times Online additionally reported that the militant group Jundallah, an Al Qaeda affiliate, collaborates with the IMU; it is shown to be fighting along other Jidahis from Tajikistan, Germany, Turkey, Russia, and Tunisia.  The footage includes guerrilla operations, training school footage, and invocations by Sajna, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader, and Noor Islam, a patron of Uzbek militancy.[33]



Tajikistan authorities are continuing with security measures. According to Central Asia Online, Tajik authorities have already arrested 50 alleged IMU members, seized 270 firearms, including 6 submachine guns and 18 pistols.[34]  The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is suspected of being behind the bombing of January 21-22 outside the Sughd Oblast Interior Department and National Security Committee building in Khudzhand and the law enforcement agencies’ headquarters in Istaravshan.[35]

Tajik authorities, including President Emomali Rahmon, are concerned about the growing spread of Islamic extremism in mosques.  The president urged the mosques to be used for prayers only, not as a platform for religious extremist propaganda. Thus, Tajikistan is requiring all mosques to be registered with the state and urging all studying abroad in madrassahs to return home.  According to, there are 1,250 illegal mosques in Tajikistan.[36]

The current plan is to reinforce border, airport, and railway station security and construct additional border infrastructure. The preparations are contingent on available funds. Training of rescue officers, as well as placement of security cameras in all vulnerable locations are on the agenda.  All equipment is provided by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the government of Switzerland. 



Although the government of Tajikistan reported that militant leader, Alovuddin Davlatov, aka Ali Bedaki, had been killed on January 04, 2011, a YouTube video has surfaced showing him being interrogated in the back of a police car. The video is undated.  Thus, reports of Bedaki’s death in battle are under examination.  Tajik Interior Ministry Chief of Staff Tokhir Normatov believes the video to be fake.[37]


Posture for a Democratic Egypt

by Anita Rai, author of Jihad and Terrorism

640 AD: Umar bin al-Khattab, second Caliph of the Muslims, decided to expel the non-Muslim population, mainly comprising Jews and Christians from the Hijaz in Arabia.  In announcing this decree he said, “Two religions will not co-exist in the land of the Arabs.”  Accounts differ on the extent to which the Caliphal Command was carried out.  However, it can be incontrovertibly deduced that Najran, Tayma, Yamamah, Wadi al-Qura, and other places were cleared of most Christians and Jews. Same year, the Caliph’s army invaded Egypt.

Amr bin Aas, captain of the Muslim army, asked what should be done with the Library of Alexandria. Caliph Umar replied: “If the books contain things opposed to the Quran, they must be burnt. If they contain things in accordance with the Quran, they are superfluous because the Book of Allah is sufficient. Therefore, burn them all.”  Approximately 700,000 scrolls were burnt in Alexandria.  Works of mathematics, science, and philosophy, were distributed to 4000 public baths of Alexandria.  Ibn al-Qifti reported that these scrolls took more than six months to burn out.  Persian academic treasures and art fared no better after Umar’s army took Persia. Most were either burnt or drowned in the Euphrates.

In light of these defining historical facts it is important to remember that Muslim Brotherhood the Salafi Islamist organisation founded by Hasan al-Banna and further strengthened by Sayyid Qutb, is the ideological successor of Caliph Umar bin Khattab.  With the Egyptian military’s promise of building an open and democratic Egypt, most of the protestors and activists are returning home to reassume day-to-day obligations and the general public has already returned to its normal life.  Euphoria of a Mubarak-free Egypt will eventually die down and an anxious restlessness will take over.  A people battered for long by mal-governance, illiteracy, pervasive poverty, corruption, rampant religious and sexual discrimination, and unemployment cannot be accused of impatience and suspicion.  It is but natural that the first thing Egyptians want is a guarantee for a speedy start to a credible delivery of the promises made by the military.

A country that has been a stranger to democracy for decades, it will be by any means a long, difficult, and challenging task to democratize her at a pace commensurate with the expectations of the people. In its fourth communiqué issued on Saturday 12/02/11, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of Egypt stated: “The current government and governors shall continue as a caretaker administration until a new government is formed.”  History readily bears witness that whenever the military comes to power and does not provide a precise plan for handing over power to the people’s elected representatives the transitional government becomes a lasting one under some pretext or another. In order to make the promise of systematic transfer of power to a democratically-elected government believable to the people, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of Egypt should involve every political party truly representative of the Egyptian people, in the running of the transitional administration on basis of committed fairness and transparency.

The Supreme Council’s communiqué also states: “The Arab Republic of Egypt is committed to all regional and international obligations and treaties.”  A week ago Iran’s Supreme Leader and theocrat, Ayatollah Khamenei said, the developments in North Africa are inspired by an “Islamic awakening, which followed the great Islamic Revolution of the Iranian nation.”  In an interview with the state-funded BBC Persian TV Kamal al-Halbavi, a senior member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood thanked Khamenei for supporting the revolution in Egypt.  Halbavi hopes Egypt will have “a good government, like the Iranian government, and a good president like Mr. Ahmadinejad, who is very brave.”  He also hopes for Egypt’s development in every field, “like Iran, achieving more technological and scientific advances and becoming a regional power.” The mutual aim and admiration between Tehran and the Muslim Brotherhood reek strongly of a far more enduring hatred they mutually harbor against the secular world than their decisively dividing dogmas.

Egypt’s Peace Treaty with Israel is the most sensitive and critical of all her “regional and international obligations and treaties.”  Welcoming Hosni Mubarak’s departure as historic change, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said: “We also expect the future Egyptian governments will uphold peace in the Middle East and respect the treaties concluded with Israel, and that Israel’s safety will be guaranteed.”  The rousing passion for legitimate change and the empowerment of the Egyptian people must be directed into a coherent strategy for structuring an open, fair, inclusive, and modern government, with utmost care and caution.  Otherwise, the Muslim Brotherhood, a large Islamist party with strong sponsorship, organization, and popularity, is sure to win a majority of seats or at least emerge as a powerful stakeholder with one or more affiliates in the Parliament.  In case of no single majority party, wheeler dealers amongst the elected representatives would not mind awfully to cut a deal with their ‘Muslim Brothers.’  In its rush to please the people if an ill-advised Council rushes a process of democratization, one that would consequently legitimize and enhance the Brotherhood’s dominance, the first thing to be put in danger will be Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel.  Enjoying the full backing of Islamic Republic of Iran and Muslim Brotherhood ‘services’ operating in more than 70 countries, nothing would stop the global fanatic fraternity of Islamists from “striking terror into the heart” of Israel with the sole aim of wiping her off the map of the world it intends to order.  Her existence threatened with extinction, Israel will have no option but to employ everything in her power to stop the enemy from winning. This war, so to speak, won’t be the Third World War but the last – one that would end the world as we know it. Do we have the stomach to dwell on this scenario even for the length of a breath?



[1] “V osushchestvlenii terakta v aeroportu Domodedovo uchastvovali, kak minimum, 5 chelovek,” Ekho Moskvy, 8 February 2011, 21:00, and “Terakt v Domodedove podgotovili i proveli, kak minimum, 5 chelovek,” Ekho Moskvy, 8 February 2011, 22:03,

[2] “VS Ingushetii ostavil pod strazhei podozremaevogo po delu o terakte v Domodedovo’,” Kavkaz uzel, 16 February 2011, 19:00,

[3] Natalya Krainova, “Suicide Bombers Strike in Caucasus,” Moscow Times, 16 February 2011,

[4] Musa Muradov, “U rodnykh snertnika vzyali otpetchatki geksogena,” Kommersant, 10 February 2011,

[5] “VS Ingushetii ostavil pod strazhei podozremaevogo po delu o terakte v Domodedovo’,” Kavkaz uzel, 16 February 2011, 19:00, and Natalya Krainova, “Bombing Motive Could Be Revenge,” Moscow Times, 11 February 2011,

[6] Pyotr Orlov, “Arestovany brat i sestra predpolagaemogo smertnika, vzorvavshegosya v ‘Domeodedovo’,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 8 February 2011,; “Terakt v Domodedove podgotovili i proveli, kak minimum, 5 chelovek,” Ekho Moskvy, 8 February 2011, 22:03,

[7] “Videozapis’ Doku Umarova,” Interfax, 8 February 2011, 11:38,

[8] Natalya Krainova, “Officials Say Airport Blast Family Effort,” Moscow Times, 10 February 10, 2011,

[9] Musa Muradov, “U rodnykh snertnika vzyali otpetchatki geksogena,” Kommersant, 10 February 2011,; “VS Ingushetii ostavil pod strazhei podozremaevogo po delu o terakte v Domodedovo’,” Kavkaz uzel, 16 February 2011, 19:00,; and Natalya Krainova, “Officials Say Airport Blast Family Effort,” Moscow Times, 10 February 10, 2011,

[10] Ben West, “Dispatch: Caucasus Leader Claims Moscow Airport Attack,” Stratfor, 8 February 2011, 23:04,

[11] West, “Dispatch: Caucasus Leader Claims Moscow Airport Attack.”

[12] “V Ingushetii zaderzhan boevik iz bandy Dokka Umarova,” KavkazWeb, 9 May 2006, 18:22,

[13] “D. Umarov: ‘My bolshe ni predlozhim Rosii mira’,” Kavkaz tsentr, 18 April 2006, 03:01,

[14] Umarov added that they still did not know how Magas had been exposed to capture but that the CE command was investigating and would avenge those involved in his capture. “Tekst obrashcheniya Amira IK Dokku Abu Usman i Amir Sup’yana k kodzhakhedam G’alg’aiche (Video),” Kavkaz tsentr, 20 July 2010, 12:10,

[15] See “Amir Dokku Abu Usman: ‘Spetsoperatsiya v Moskve byla provedena po moemu prikazu,”, 8 February 2011, 1:13,

[16] Natalya Krainova, “Bombing Motive Could Be Revenge,” Moscow Times, 11 February 2011.

[17] West, “Dispatch: Caucasus Leader Claims Moscow Airport Attack.”

[18] West, “Dispatch: Caucasus Leader Claims Moscow Airport Attack.”

[19] Natalya Krainova, “Bombing Motive Could Be Revenge,” Moscow Times, 11 February 2011,

[20] “Smertnitsa sovershila terakt v Dagestane,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 14 February 2011, 20:26,

[21] “Vlasti Chechni soobshchayut o podryve dvukh smertnikov pri popytke ikh zaderzhaniya v Groznom,” Kavkaz uzel, 15 February 2011, 15:55,

[22] “Vtoroe vzryvnoe ustroistvo v Gebdene bylo sobrano na osnove miny,” Kavkaz uzel, 16 February 2011, 11:33,

[23] “V rezul’tate spetsoperatsii na granitse Karachaevo-Cherkessii postradali  stavropolskie omonovtsy,” Kavkaz uzel, 15 February 2011, 17:56,

[24] “Vilaiyat Dagestan: Stal Shakhidom (inshaalLakh) naib amira Dagestana Adam Guseinov,” Kavkaz tsentr, 29 January 2011, 00:44,

[25] “Vilaiyat Dagestan: Stal Shakhidom (inshaalLakh) naib amira Dagestana Adam Guseinov” and “Informatsionnyie soobshcheniya,” National Anti-Terrorism Committee, 27 January 2011, 20:55,, accessed 29 January 2011.

[26] “Informatsionnyie soobshcheniya,” National Anti-Terrorism Committee, 27 January 2011, 20:55.

[27] “Vooruzhennyi konflikt na Severnom Kavkaze: 1719 zhertv za 2010 god,” Kavkaz uzel, 18 January 2011, 23:33,

[28] According to Kavkaz uzel, there were 1,710 (754 killed and 956 wounded) casualties in the “armed conflict in the North Caucasus” in 2010, with 349 of those killed having been mujahedin (“members of underground bands”). “Vooruzhennyi konflikt na Severnom Kavkaze: 1719 zhertv za 2010 god,” Kavkaz uzel, 18 January 2011, 23:33,

[29] “Russian Interior Troops Killed 300 Gunmen In North Caucasus In 2010 – General,” RIA-Novosti, 15 February 2010.

[30] “Kyrgyzstan Starts Large-Scale Anti-Terrorist Operations,”, 04 February 2011, and “Кыргызстан развернул масштабные антитеррористические операции,”,

[31] Ibid.

[32] “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: ‘Glad Tidings from Pakistan’,” The NEFA Foundation, 24 January 2011,

[33] “Jihadis Answer Call to Arms,”, 10 February 2011,

[34] “Northern Tajikistan Tightens Security,”, 08 February 2011,”

[35] Ibid.

[36] “Tajik President Concerned over Expanding Religious Extremism,”, 11 February 2011,

[37]“Tajiks Say Ali Bedaki Video Is A Fake,”, 02 February 2011, and “Video Sheds Doubt on Reported Death of Tajik Militant Leader,” Central Asian Newswire, 03 February 2011,



               Islam, Islamism and politics in Eurasia report (IIPER) is a project of the Monterey Terrorism and Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California.  It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam and ethnic Muslim communities in Russia and Eurasia writ large.  All issues of IIPER can be found at

               IIPER is compiled, edited and, unless indicated otherwise, written by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn.  Dr. Hahn is Senior Researcher at the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and Visiting Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.  He is also a Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group and Analyst/Consultant for Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch,  He teaches courses on both politics and terrorism in Russia and Eurasia at MIIS.  Dr. Hahn is the author of two well-received books, Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002) as well as numerous articles on Russian, Eurasian and international politics.

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