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Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report 42

Photo russian_mosque

22 June 2011

Edited and Written by Gordon M. Hahn (unless otherwise indicated)

Submissions are welcome




CENTRAL ASIA by Yelena Altman (unless otherwise indicated)


* IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted.  Research assistance is provided by Seth Gray, Leonid Naboishchikov, Anna Nevo, and Daniel Painter.



The first quarter of 2011 saw at least approximately 151 terrorist attacks and jihad-related violent incidents in Russia driven by the Caucasus Emirate (and its breakaway Nokchicho Vilaiyat mujahedin) (see Table 1).  This marks an unprecedented number of attacks for this time


Table 1. Estimated Number of Jihadi Terrorist Incidents and Casualties in Russia during 2010. Estimate is Based on Average of the Jihadi-Reported Minimum Figures and of the Average Between the Minimum and Maximum Figures from the Non-Jihadi Reports, from Data Compiled by the Author (the percentage change from 2009 is in parentheses).

Region  Attacks/ Violent Incidents State Agents Killed State Agents Wounded Civilians Killed Civilians Wounded Mujahedin Killed Mujahedin Wounded Mujahedin Captured/ Surrendered
Chechnya      12        9      25       4       0     12        0        12
Ingushetia      14        6        4       0       0     17        2          5
Dagestan      88      18      65     21     24     38        0        53
Kabardino-Balkaria      33      20      30       6       2     27        1          1
Karachaevo-Cherkessia        1       3        0       0       0       0        0          0
Adygeya        0       0        0       0       0       0        0          0
North Ossetia        0       0        0       0       0       0        0          0
Other North Caucasus (Stavropol)        2       4        3       0       0       3        0          1
North Caucasus Total   
















Tatarstan        0        0


       0       0       0       0        0         0
Bashkiria        0        0        0       0       0       0        0         4
Astrakhan**        0        0        0       0       0       2        0         0
Moscow***        2        0        0      37     180       1        0         7
Total    152      60      127      68     206    100        3       83

* The data that forms the base for this table’s figures were researched by Gordon M. Hahn as well as Seth Gray, Leonid Naboishchikov, Anna Nevo, and Daniel Painter.

** It remains somewhat unclear whether the incidents in Astrakhan this year are connected to the CE.

*** The two mujahedin killed in Moscow were the Moscow Domodedovo Airport suicide bomber and the would-be suicide bomber who died on New Year’s Eve when she was preparing her suicide vest for the failed plot targeting Moscow’s holiday celebrations.  There was also an explosion near Moscow’s FSB Academy in Moscow on March 9 that produced no casualties for which the CE’s Rayadus-Salikhin Martyrs’ Brigade claimed responsibility.

Methodology: The data in this table are estimates. The estimates represent where possible the average of the mimimum jihadi-reported figures and of the average of the minimum and maximum figures from non-jihadi sources. The logic behind this methodology is based on the tendency of Russian and local government and non-jihadi Russian and local media (often tied to or dependent on government reporting) to underreport the number of terrorist incidents and their resulting casualties as well as the tendency of jihadist sources to exaggerate the jihadists’ capacity by sometimes claiming responsibility for attacks carried out by others for criminal, ethnic, or clan purposes and exaggerating the numbers of casualties caused by their own attacks. Data for jihadi wounded, captured and surrendered typically come from non-jihadi sources. Incidents include not only attacks carried out, but also counter-terrorist operations and successful and attempted arrests.  They do not include prevented attacks (deactivated bombs, etc.).  Mujahedin include only fighters; they do not include facilitators, financiers, and the like.

Sources: The jihadi sources’ data for attacks in the North Caucasus was provided by the CE-affiliated website “Imarat Kavkaz. Svodka boevikh deistvii modzhakhedov Imarata Kavkaz za mesyats Safar 1432 goda po Khidzhre (Yanvar’ 2011),” Kavkaz tsentr, 5 February 2011, 23:30, citing; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhakhedov za rabi’ al’-avval’ 1432 goda po Khidzhre (4 fevralya – 5 marta 2011 g.,” Umma News, 6 March 2011, 14:31,———–1432—-4—5–2011-.html and Kavkaz tsentr, 6 March 2011, 17:09,; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats rabias-sani 1432 po khidzhre (6 marta – 5 aprelya 2011 g.,”, 6 April 2011, 13:30,–1432-6-5-2011-.html and “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevikh operatsii,” Kavkaz tsentr, 7 April 2011, 13:19, For the Moscow Domodedovo Airport attack see “V osushchestvlenii terakta v aeroportu Domodedovo uchastvovali, kak minimum, 5 chelovek,” Ekho Moskvy, 8 February 2011, 21:00, and “Terakt v Domodedove podgotovili i proveli, kak minimum, 5 chelovek,” Ekho Moskvy, 8 February 2011, 22:03, Also, the Caucasus Emirate’s websites, especially Kavkaz tsentr (, (, Jamaat Shariat (, (, as well as non-jihadi sources, especially Kavkazskii uzel (, but also,, and are used to compile this data.


year.  These included approximately 20 special counter-terrorist operations undertaken by law enforcement that led to the killing, wounding, or capture of mujahedin or of security forces.  These 151 attacks/incidents led to at least approximately 60 state agents (civilian officials and military, police and intelligence personnel) being killed and 127 wounded, and 68 civilians killed and 206 wounded.  For comparison, during the first three months of last year, there were 60 percent fewer attacks, an estimated 62 jihadi attacks and jihadi-related violent incidents in Russia.  Those 62 attacks/incidents led to approximately 39 state agents killed and 91 wounded, 49 civilians killed and 143 wounded (see IIPER, No. 13).   Total killed reached 88, and total wounded 192, for a total of 280 total casualties in the the first quarter across Russia.

Looking at the individual regions for this year, Dagestan continues, as it has since spring 2010, to be the jihad’s center of gravity, with 88 attacks so far this year making up over half of all the attacks.  The Republlic of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) is still seeing the second highest level of jihadi violence with 33 attacks/incidents.  There has been one estimated attack so far this year in Karachai-Cherkesia (KChR), which along with the KBR, is considered by the CE mujahedin to be the territory of their United Vilaiyat of Kabardia, Balkaria, and Karachai (OVKBK).  By contrast, Ingushetia’s mujahedin of the so-called Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV) have been responsible for 14 attacks/incidents, and Chechnya remains the laggard of the four main CE vilaiyats, having carried out 13 attacks.  Incidentally, it is still not possible to know which attacks in Chechnya are being carried out by which group – the CE’s Nokchicho Vilaiyat loyal to CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov or the breakaway independent Nokchicho Vilaiyat (INV) led by Hussein Gakaev.

Dagestan is by far the most dangerous and deadly North Caucasus republic for state agents and civilians alike.  Only Moscow, with the high casualty rate from the January Moscow Domodedovo Airport suicide bombing outpaces Dagestan in terms of jihadi-inflicted casualties.  Approximately 18 state agents were killed and 65 were wounded in Dagestan through March of this year.  Thus, the CE’s Dagestan Vialiayat (DV) mujahedin outpaced the some 50 state agent casualties inflicted by the OVKBK in the KBR and KChR, the 34 state agent casualties in Chechnya, and 10 in Ingushetia.  Civilian casualties have been highest in Dagestan as well (except for Moscow) with at least approximately 45 (21 killed, 24 wounded) in the first quarter of this year, followed in descending order by 8 in the KBR (6 killed, 2 wounded), 4 killed in Chechnya, and none in Ingushetiya.  Thus, in the North Caucasus republics overall casualties were highest in Dagestan with approximately 128 (39 killed, 89 wounded), followed by 58 (26 killed, 32 wounded) in the KBR, 38 in Chechnya (13 killed, 25 wounded), and 10 in Ingushetia (6 killed, 4 wounded).  Dagestan’s mujahedin are now inflicting more than half of the overall number of casualties in the four main Muslim republics, 128 out of 234.

The Chechen mujahedin’s attacks are the most efficient, however, producing over 2 casualties per attack.    Ingushetia’s Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV) mujahedin are the least efficient in their attacks, inflicting less than one casualty per attack.  The OVKBK is inflicting 1.7 casualties per attack; the DV – 1.44 casualties per attack.

Mujahedin Losses

Some 100 mujahedin were killed in Russia in the first quarter of this year.  Facilitators, financiers, and the like are not included in the category of ‘mujahedin.’  This figure of 100 mujahedin killed includes 3 suicide bombers – 2 in Dagestan and 1 in Moscow.  This means that Russia and local security forces killed approximately 97 mujahedin in the first quarter.  This figure of 97 includes the 2 alleged mujahedin killed in Astrakhan, and it remains unclear whether they were tied to the CE, though there are CE reports of an Astrakhan jamaat (see IIPER, No. 41).  Recall that last year Umarov promised to ‘liberate’ Astrakhan as well as the Krasnodar (part of the CE’s so-called Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat) and the Volga.  Astrakhan could fall under the self-declared Idel-Ural Vilaiyat (IUV), which has declared its loyalty to, and requested assistance from the CE and Umarov but has not received a return endorsement from Umarov as far as has been made public at least.  The IUV would surely include Tatarstan and Bashkortostan where 4 alleged mujahedin were captured in February.[1]  But again their ties to the CE are not confirmed.  Thus, the number of captured and surrendered mujahedin was 83 overall and 72 in the North Caucasus.  Less than a handful of these were identified as fighters belonging to the breakaway Chechen mujahedin of the INV.  Four of the captured/surrendered mujahedin were alleged members of the CE and natives of Bashkiriya detained in Bashkortostan in February on charges of being tied to the CE.  In mid-February, there were also several detentions of mujahedin in Moscow, including the arrest of the amir of the Achkoi-Martan jamaat, his wife and two naibs allegedly seeking to take a train to Moldova.  The number of captured/surrendered also includes those arrested in Moscow and Ingushetiya in connection with the January Moscow Domodedovo Airport suicide bombing and in Dagestan, Volgograd and Moscow in connection with the failed Moscow New Year’s Eve suicide bombing plot. 

Suicide Attacks

There were three successful suicide bombings in the first quarter of 2011: the January 24th suicide attack carried out by the 20-year old ethnic Ingush Magomed Yevloev at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport which killed 37 and wounded 180 and the two February 14th suicide bombings by the ethnic Russian couple and mujahedin Vitalii Razdobudko and Marina Khorosheva in Gubden, Dagestan hours apart.  The former killed 1 and wounded 22, the latter killed 1 MVD police and wounded 5 MVD police.  There were no suicide bombings in March (or April).  Thus in the first quarter of 2011, there were three suicide attacks carried out by CE-tied jihadists compared to just one in the same period in 2010.  These 3 successful attacks left 3 suicide bombers dead and killed 39 (2 state agents and 37 civilians) and wounded 207, at least 5 of which were state agents.  There was one interdicted suicide bombing attempt in Chechnya when two female suicide bombers detonated their bombs upon being stopped and asked for identification by police in February.  There were no casualties.

The geography of the first quarter’s suicide attacks looks as follows.  Two of the three suicide attacks were perpetrated in Dagestan by ethnic Russians with ties to Stavropol and perhaps Dagestan.  The other occurred in Moscow and was committed by an ethnic Ingush recruited by Ingushetiya’s GV and prepared by the CE’s Riyadus-Salikhiin Martyrs’ Brigade.  Chechnya and the KBR – that is the CE’s NV and OVKBK and Gakaev’s INV – had no known connection to these suicide bombings.

The fourth suicide attack of 2011 did not occur until May 4th in Makhachkala, Dagestan.  It killed one MVD policeman, wounded another as well as several passers-by and was carried out by a Dagestani and Makhachkala resident named Abakar Aitperov, born in 1979.[2]  Since May 4th, there has not been another suiced attack in Russia. 



The U.S. Department of State has offered a $5 million reward to anyone providing information leading to the CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov’s location.[3]   As reported in IIPER, No. 41, on 26 May 2011 the U.S. State Department finally placed the Caucasus Emirate (CE) on its list of specially designated international terrorist organizations after balking last year, as IIPER reported, on an already belated decision to do so and opting for placing only the CE’s amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov on the list.[4]  It took three and a half years from the Umarov’s declaration of the CE and jihad against the U.S. Britain, and Israel for the U.S. government to take this step, not to mention that these same mujahedin were engaged in terrorism under the CE’s predecessor organization, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya. 



In mid-May CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov gave an interview to the CE’s central website Kavkaz tsentr on the jihad and death of Al Qa`ida’s Osama bin Laden, the CE’s strategy of the bee, and other issues.[5]  The English translation follows:

KC: The beginning of this spring has been marked by casualties among the Mujahideen of the Caucasus Emirate. The leading commanders of the Emirate – Emir Supyan, Emir Hassan, Emir Abdullah and others – martyred (Insha’Allah). These are tangible casualties.  Can we say that the Mujahideen are weakened?

Dokka Abu Usman: The casualties we incurred have not weakened us and will not weaken us in the future, Insha’Allah. War is impossible without casualties. Since 1999, we have lost many of our emirs and leaders, but the Jihad did not stop, but vice versa, it expanded and strengthened. Generations of the Mujahedin replace each other.  New young men take place of the deceased.  More and more young men want to join the Mujahedin, but unfortunately we can not accept all the newcomers.

Another thing is that due to casualties, we have to correct our plans, to change tactics on the fields.  However, that does not mean that a relative calm, for example, in Ingushetia, testifies about the weakening of the positions of the Mujahedin.

At one place, the activity of the Mujahedin could be reduced for tactical reasons, and in other place, they could be intensified.  There could be a calm in Nalchik, but a major sabotage attack could be carried out in Vladivostok.  We consider the Caucasus Emirate and Russia as a single theater of war.

We are not in a hurry.  The path has been chosen, we know our tasks, and we will not turn back, Insha’Allah, from this path.  Today, the battlefield is not just Chechnya and the Caucasus Emirate, but also the whole Russia.  The situation is visible to everybody who has eyes.  The Jihad is spreading, steadily and inevitably, everywhere.

I have already mentioned that all those artificial borders, administrative divisions, which the Taghut drew, mean nothing to us.  The days when we wanted to secede and dreamed of building a small Chechen Kuwait in the Caucasus are over.  Now, when you tell the young Mujahedin about these stories, they are surprised and want to understand how those plans related to the Koran and the Sunnah.
Alhamdulillah!  I sometimes think that Allah has called these young people to the Jihad, so that we, the older generation, could not stray from the right path. Now we know that we should not be divided, and must unite with our brothers in faith.  We must reconquer Astrakhan, Idel-Ural, Siberia – these are indigenous Muslim lands.  And then, God’s willing, we shall deal with Moscow ulus (district – Kts).

KC: As you know, the US said that they had been able to kill bin Laden. There was a statement on behalf of al-Qaida posted on the Internet, which confirmed the martyrdom of their Emir.  What is your assessment of what happened?  The US says that the death of bin Laden will positively (for the West) affect the overall situation in the world.

Dokka Abu Usman: If the death of Sheikh Osama bin Laden is confirmed, then we will only say the words from the Holy Koran – “We all belong to Allah and to Him shall be our return.”

We ask Allah that He accepts the martyrdom of Sheikh bin Laden, because that man abandoned his wealth and peaceful worldly life for the sake of protecting Islam.  And that is a great goal, and the reward for it is great.

With regard to the question of whether bin Laden’s death will affect the situation in the world, I think that the infidels do not believe themselves that their life became easier.  According to all signs, it is clear that the world is in such situation that the death of the leaders of the Jihad cannot stop the process of the revival of Islam.
That development will go forward, regardless of the fact if the United States, Russia or the UN want it or not.

We all see that the world has changed very much.

For the first time in decades, the awakening of the Islamic Ummah from hibernation has become so clear and widespread.  The Mujahedin and true scholars operate more than ever simultaneously in different regions of the globe, supporting each other and realizing the common goal.  Ordinary Muslims take to the streets and express their support for the Mujahedin, demanding to restore the Sharia.
And in response, the infidels are frightening the public with al-Qa`ida that allegedly became more active in the Caucasus, the Philippines, Yemen and Somalia.

KC: In this regard, we would like to hear your opinion about so-called “Arab revolutions.” Some experts say that these revolutions were initiated by Western countries.

Dokka Abu Usman: For the West, these developments were as much a surprise as for the Arab regimes.  It is obvious. And it is all nonsense that America planned here, and the CIA acted there…

Allah, praise to Him, shook those regimes by His Will and Wisdom, humiliated those Taghuts who were in power for many years and humiliated the religion, and humiliated the Muslims.

And it is another problem that Western countries are trying to use the wave of “Arab revolutions.”  And they manage to do it, although not everywhere.

At present, it is not all clear, and it is not clear how the events will unfold further.
Everybody sees today how America and other Western countries betray their allies, puppets, who faithfully served them for many years.  Subhan’Allah, these dictators sought greatness from the infidels, while all the glory belongs to Allah and his Messenger (peace be upon him).  Now the masters rejected them and left them to be devoured by the crowd.

The time has come for collapse of dictatorial regimes, which the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) warned about, and it is obvious.

Even if the infidels manage put in power new puppets, I am sure that there will be no longer former control over these countries now.  A completely new situation emerges before our eyes, Allah opens up new opportunities for the Muslims.
Another problem is how this opportunity will be used by the Muslims.  Because Allah does not change the condition of the people unless they change it themselves.
At present, there is a state of confusion in Libya. Although, according to incoming information, groups of Mujahedin are operating there.  There is a hope that they will be able to lead the Muslims.

There is no sufficient information about the situation in Egypt and Tunisia.  We hope for the best, but at present, a certain calm is felt there, and, unfortunately, news reaches us that some well-known Jamaats are again going to play the game of “Democratic Islam.”

Events in Syria, as it seems, just start to unfold.  There is unrest in Algeria, Morocco and Jordan.

Perhaps, the most interesting events, of all Arab countries, can be expected in Yemen, where the positions of the Mujahedin are most promising and from where a serious military movement could start.

The only thing I can say for certain is that if there are no armed force of Muslims, no Jihad and no fighting, nobody would allow us to establish the Sharia of Allah.  If it were possible, it would have been done already by our Prophet (peace be upon him).

KC: May Allah reward you in goodness for the interview and your comments.[6]

Umarov’s most important points are the CE’s expanded territorial goals, which go far beyond the Caucasus, his respect for bin Laden, the progenitor of the global jihadi revolutionary movement and alliance, in many ways.  Regarding the territorial scope of the CE’s aspirations, Umarov is as explicit as ever in describing them and the influence of the younger, more globalist mujahedin in defining them.  Thus, young mujahedin “are surprised and want to understand how those plans related to the Koran and the Sunnah” when they hear of the Umarov’s and his colleagues limited former vision of “a small Chechen Kuwait in the Caucasus.”  Thus, the CE now “must reconquer Astrakhan, Idel-Ural, Siberia – these are indigenous Muslim lands. And then, God’s willing, we shall deal with Moscow district.” [7]

Clearly, Umarov held bin Laden in great esteem, as anyone who has signed on to his type of global jihadi revolutionary movement would, issuing the standard mujahedin’s prayer that Allah will accept bin Laden’s “martyrdom” and abandonment of “his wealth and peaceful worldly life for the sake of protecting Islam.”[8]

Also of interest is Umarov’s description of turning the level of jihadi activity up and down according to local conditions in each of its vilaiyats recalls the “strategy of the bee” I extrapolated from late ChRI president Aslan Maskhadov’s description of the ChRI’s “tactic of the bee” to the ChRI’s shifting focus of attacks from republic to republic.[9]  Here, however, he is being a little disingenuous in ignoring the role in the ebbing of activity in vilaiyats like Chechnya and Ingushetiya played by successful Russian counter-terrorism operations that ended in the deaths of numerous amirs, including Umarov’s own naib Supyan Abduallaev just a few months back and his top military amir ‘Magas’ Magomed Yevloev a year ago, many among others. 



On May 27th the CE-affiliated website posted the text of an audio tape made on February 12th by CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov and asent to one ‘Abu Khamz’, who is instructed to have it transposed and posted on CE sites.[10]

Umarov’s first order of business was to propose prayer for “our brothers who are becoming martyrs in Dagestan and in Kabardiya” and promise to do everything to “lighten the burden, which they are bearing on the path of Jihad,” thereby acknowledging that the CE’s Dagestan Vilaiyat mujahedin and United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya, and Karachai (OVKBK) mujahedin continue to do most of the heavy lifting and that they had suffered major losses in the deaths of leading amirs.  He also acknowledged that the CE had limited resources, “big difficulties” and “few capable, experienced” fighters and that “after some of our work, there is very much work in turn by the enemy,” and “several plans” were undone by the infidels’ efforts, apparently having in mind the failed New Year’s Eve suicide bombings that apparently targeting the Moscow Red Square holiday celebrations.[11]

Umarov also briefly discusses the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, blessing them if their goal is “the establishment Allah’s law, His religion, and Shariah” and not simply the replacement “of one dirty slave of the non-believers for another dirty slave, Amra Musa or Mohahhad al-Baradei.”[12]  But the purpose of the video letter appears to have been to clear up some of the contentions within and perhaps outside the CE regarding the decision to declare the CE, which was part of the reason for a split within the CE’s Chechen wing – the Nokchicho Vilaiyat – late last summer.

The Seeds of Umarov’s Turn to Project ‘Imarat’

Umarov then turned to his October 2007 decision to declare the Caucasus Emirate, contrasting himself to head of the secular nationalist Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya government-in-exile, Ahkmen Zakaev, and exile Russian oligarch Boris Berezovskii, who live off of KGB and FSB funds, he had decided to join the jihad which was “going on across the entire world”: “I went on jihad to raise up Allah’s word, to fulfill my duty (using the Arabic ‘farz’), because I love Allah and I love His religion.”[13]  In particular, he discloses some details of the infighting that occurred as far back as 2002 between the different jihadi and nationalist elements within the CE’s predecessor organization, the ChRI.  He claims that Maskhadov was in conflict with those who wanted to declare jihad under the Islamist banner and bandon the nationalist Ichkeriya project.  Claiming he often discussed such things with Maskhadov, Umarov claims that the latter hoped the West “would hold to its declarations” and expected “some sort of justice from them.”  The only way out so that they “could finish the second war” was to compromise with the radical wing by appointing Abdul-Khalim Sadualev as his successor and by having Sadulaev pledge to appoint Umarov as his successor.  He explains that Maskhadov’s decision was based on his knowledge of Umarov’s relations with Zakaev, but Umarov does not specifiy what his relation ship with Zakaev was like at the time and how that would have managed “to remove difficulties for the people.”[14]

Umarov relates how he came to understand that the ChRI’s slogans were not resonating and came around to the idea of a jihadist emirate, describing the growing tensions between the nationalist separatists and the jihadists within the ChRI.  He recounts two days of negotiations in 2002 with ‘Khamzat’ Ruslan Gelaev, Vakha Arsanov and Abdul-Malik Mezhidov, who were refusing to take the bayat or loyalty oath to Maskhadov, because they claimed what the latter was leading was not jihad but simply a fight for an independent Ichkeriya.  Umarov and Basaev (as well as Abu Hamz, who left after the first day) were trying to convince the three to take the oath to Maskhadov and remain with the ChRI.  Umarov admits that he said to the jihadists at the time that he more than any of them disliked Maskhadov.  On the second day, Basaev was able to convince them to take the oath by promising a gradual transition to jihadism towards which he was working.  Gelaev’s statement on the second day seem to have impressed Umarov, who recalls: “I at the time, to speak truthfully, did not understand these things….  I listened like a persopn who was not there, (but) at the same time I was the amir of the Southwestern Front and a member of the madzhlis and I had to listen.  For me this was very important, and I attentively remembered everything (that Gelaev said).”  Umarov also notes that in 2002 in Duba-yurt, they issued an “ultimatum” to Maskhadov, presumably on such a transition, but they put it aside in order to avoid a final split and the defection of the nationalists to side of the “apostates” under the pro-Moscow Akhmed Kadyrov Chechen leadersdhip.  Umarov states that: “(T)his was a mistake and if at that time we had exposed these people, then, perhaps, we would already have been cleansed then.  But we are still not fully cleansed today.” [15]

Umarov is a bit unclear in that he states Basaev convinced them, apparently speaking about taking the bayat to Maskhadov, bu then states that they took the bayat to him and Basaev after which they were dispatched to undertake some unidenitifed operation in North Ossetiya.  Apprently later,  Umarov caught up with Gelaev who states that he now intends to leave for Iraq to fight because in Iraq there is “true jihad” and an “emirate has been declared.”  A debate ensued in which Seif Islam (killed last year) and ‘Mansur’ Arbi Yevmirzaev supported Umarov’s arguments that the ChRI was fighting jihad.  “(M)any scholars” and “many Arabs”  backed Gelaev.  In the end, according to Umarov, he was able to convince Gelaev to remain in Chechnya, but the divisions and the jihadists’ arguments proved food for thought for Umarov.  Eventully, he notes, he came around to the idea of more strict jihadism and declaration of an emirate.  As is well-known, Gelaev was killed in 2004 trying to cross back over the border into Georgia where he was intermittently based.[16] 

Umarov, Basaev, and Sadulaev

Umarov also reveals that Shamil Basaev was less than enthusiastic about the former’s appointment as ChRI President Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev’s vice president in 2005, despite the fact that Basaev had nominated Umarov (and according to previous reports Umarov nominated Basaev).  Umarov was told about Basaev’s discontent by Seif Islam, who read the expression on Basaev’s face when he heard the news apparently at a shura.  Earlier, perhaps after thre shura, Basaev had gruffly requested he be driven away and refused to answer Umarov’s queries as to what was wrong with him.  When Basaev returned a few days later, he asked forgiveness explaining that he and Sadulaev had come to an agreement that an emirate would be declared and Basaev would become Sadulaev’s naib.  In return, Basaev would travel the North Caucasus garnering bayats to Sadulaev.  Umarov writes that he then offered to resign and become Basaev’s “mujahed.”  Basaev refused and explained that he had spoken with Sadulaev, who assuaged him by explaining that he had to fulfill his promise to Maskhadov to appoint Umarov as his second-in-command and that he “will declare an Emirate and, in any case, transform the state.”[17]  This seemed to imply that the reorganization of the ‘state’ would allow some reshuffling of appointments.  This episode may explain why Umarov appointed Basaev as both premier and vice president upon Sadualev’s demise in June 2006; Basaev himself would also be killed by Russian forces in July.

After the October 2005 operation in Nalchik, the capitol of Kabardino-Balkariya, which Basaev led along with “Seifullah’ Anzor Astemirov, Basaev and Umarov sat down to talk.  Basaev relayed that both the Astemirov’s Kabardin mujahedin and the Dagestani amir Rasul Makasharipov had demanded that he assure them that an emirate be declared and all ‘taghut’ institutions of the infidel be abolished before they would declare the bayat to Sadulaev.  Umarov replied that he trusted the new ChRI president and that if Basaev began to ruin relations with Sadualev he would also ruin them with him.  Umarov then sent an audio cassette to Sadulaev warning him of his concerns and probably of Basaev’s intensifying push for an emirate.  Sadulaev sent a cassette in return in which he explained that he was in negotitations with ChRI ‘foreign minister’ Akhmed Zakaev in ‘exile’ in London and with former ChRI defense minister Islam Khalimov and asked Umarov and Basaev to wait until the negotiations were completed.  If they failed, he would “make changes, the transformation of the state.”  Upon Basaev’s next visit with Umarov, the latter suggested they hear the cassette, which Basaev initially refused to do.  Basaev gave the impression that he believed Zakaev and/or Khalimov were responsible for Maskhadov’s death, because when on the tape Sadulaev mentioned he was negotiating with them, Basaev leaped up (with one leg as he was not wearing his prosthesis) and exclaimed: “This one is also preparing to die.  They will will also kill this one.  There is no doubt about it.”  He immediately asked Umarov if he will declare an emirate when he becomes amir.  To this, Umarov claims he said that Basaev will become the next amir and that he would declare the bayat to him, that it did not matter who became amir as long as they worked together, and they would declare an emirate but that preparation was necessary.  Basaev interrupted to say that he would send his “close comrade” Shamsuddin Batukaev to acquire the necessary knowledge to prepare the declaration.  Batukaev was appointed by Maskhadov during the inter-war period to head the ChRI’s Shariah Court, later became the CE’s chief representative abroad, and was arrested in Turkey in December of last year.  Where Batukaev would be sent, Basaev or, at least, Umarov did not say.  Sadulaev was killed  “some time after” this meeting, according to Umarov, which appears to have occurred between November 2005 and spring 2006, when Sadulaev began to break with Zakaev, the negotiations apparently having ended in failure.[18]

The overall picture that emerges from Umarov’s rather disjointed account of the pre-emirate period is one similar to that which has emerged in the past.  Basaev was pushing for a jihadist emirate backed ‘from below’ by Astemirov and some Dagestani amirs, while Sadulaev was attempting to hold things together with the nationalists as he prepared for declaration of the emirate.  Umarov appears to be hedging his bets, mildly supporting declaration of an emirate, and trying to prevent a split between his predecessors as president, Maskhadov and Sadulaev, on the one hand, and Basaev, on the other. 

Why Umarov Declared the Emirate

Consistent with the previous picture of a ChRI in disarray by 2006, Umarov claims that at about the time of the events described above, his Southwestern Front did not have even 30 mujahedin.  This also appears to have prompted Umarov’s decision to create the emirate.  Basaev had already created a seals for the Caucasus Emirate, its “Supreme amir,” and it military amir, so when Shamsuddin arrived to prepare the declaration in accordance with Shariah law.  His declaration came just after a cassette had been sent to him by Astemirov but apparently before it had reached Umarov in which the Astemirov stated that if Umarov did not declare the emirate, then he would.  Umarov claims that if this had happened, then the Dagestani and Ingush would have declared their loyalty to Astemirov’s emirate, there would have been “a concrete schism,” and he and the Chechens would have been left alone.  Moreover, he claims many of the Chechens did not want to keep supporting the ethnonational separatist project of an independent Ichkeriya because it had been discredited by “demagogues” like Zakaev and because the younger generation had never even heard of Ichkeriya.[19]  The impression one gets from this account is that Umarov’s decision to declare the CE was driven by a good deal of political expediency and necessity, in particular the desire to maintain the Caucasus mujahedin’s unity, rather than by his theo-ideological commitment to jihadism or the idea of the emirate per se.  His other statements prior and after this, however, show a full commitment to the idea of the emirate.  Indeed, the issue is resolved in his closing paragraphs, where he notes: “The Emirate had to be declared; the times and a new generation of Muslims brought us to this decision.  I do not regret this, and I am proud of it.  Today we are all witnesses to the blessings (barakat) from this decision.  We see how the religion (din) is spreading, and there will be advantageous consequences. About this there is no doubt.”[20]

Days Numbered?

The loss of many amirs, including almost all of the mujahedin figuring in this account, Umarov’s years and waning health, and the onset of a new fighting season put the CE amir at risk.  Thus, his account of his decision to declare the CE has the aura of settling one’s affairs before the end.  Indeed, he seems somewhat wistful at the end of this missive.  Instructing its recipient to transcribe, edit as necessary and see to publication of his recording along with a photograph of him, he closes:

None of us knows today where and when his life will be cut off.  I am prepared for this and am calm and do not suffer.  Next to me are very many good mujahedin with good faith and they work from their souls.  Therefore, I think that we are being cleansed.   Allah willing, it is left to be concerned with finances, and I am prepared for death in any place and even to sit behind the wheel of truck. [Here Umarov seems to mean commandeer a truck bomb suicide attack.]

(My) big request is that you compose material from this audio of mine, and you know well everything about the battles which we waged in this war.  You know that we did not hide behind anyone’s back.  You publish everything.[21]

All the factors I mention above suggest that Umarov’s days are numbered; something Umarov seems to understand himself.  Indeed, it was less than seven weeks later that his naib Supyan Abdullaev was killed in an air attack by Russian forces, with early reports suggesting that Umarov, his wife and doctor might also have been killed.  It remains unclear whether Umarov was at the scene of the attack.  Umarov must have designated a successor, but we know of no new naib.  At any rate, Umarov seems ready to die, and his odds of making it through this spring-fall fighting season seem slim to none. 



The CE’s qadi, Abu Mukhammad al-Dagestani (Dagistani), issued a video which was accompanied by a stennogramm of his statement.  It is a rather pedestrian jihadi tract emphasizing the Muslims’ and mujahedins’ fate is to suffer as Allah puts them through trials to see who is worthiest of his blessing in the afterlife.  Dagestani notes the CE’s recent losses mentioning by name his predecessor and OVKBK amir ‘Seifullah’ Anzor Astemirov, killed in March 2010, and CE naib Supyan Abduallaev, killed in March 2011 and urges passing through the trials by continuing jihad.[22] 



Some recent global jihadi revolutionary ideological tracts published on CE-affiliated websites include:

The CE’s main website Kavkaz tsentr posted the chapter ‘Jihad in the Name of Allah’ in Russian translation from Sayid Qutb’s classic global jihadi revolutionary work Milestones [Sayid Qutb, Milestones, 2nd ed. (Karachi, Pakistan: International Islamic Publishers Ltd., 1988), pp. 107–142), translated by S. Badruh Hasan, M. A.].[23]

Since April,, the website of the CE’s OVKBK, has been carrying installments from Al Qa`ida in the Arab Peninsula leader Anwar Al-Awlaki’s cycle of lectures on one of the Prophet Mohammed’s companions Abu Bakr As-Saddiq.  The first installment appeared on April 24th, the fifth and most recent on June 20th.[24]

On May 25th Kavkaz tsentr and other CE sites carried a Russian translation of Osama bin Laden’s last public statement.[25]

On June 16th Kavkaz tsentr carried an announcement that Ayman Al-Zawahiri had become Al Qa`ida’s new amir.[26]

The website of the CE’s OVKBK posted an excerpt from a brief video Sheikh Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Fazzazi on where to make the hijra.[27]  Fazzazi is one of the most prominent Salafist Jihadist sheiks in Morocco.  An ardent supporter of Osama bin Laden supporter, he is credited with involvement in the subway attacks in Madrid, Spain.  He was sentenced in Morocco to 30 years in prison.  His prominence is reflected in the call by one of the supervisors of the “Shumukh Al-Islam” Jihadi forum asks surfers to collect material relating to the seven prominent Salafi sheikhs: Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, Sheikh Abu Musab Al-Suri, Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi (a self-proclaimed CE supporter), Sheikh Abu Assem Al-Hadushi, Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Fazzazi and Sheikh Abu Qatada Al-Filastini. The material will later be published in an anthology that can be downloaded on the forum and to be dedicated to the former Amir of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, who was killed in April 2010.[28] 



On May 31st ethnic Chechen and former Chechnya resident Lors Dukaev (Doukaev) was sentenced to 12 years in prison on charges of terrorism.[29]  As noted in IIPER, No. 41, in early may Danish prosecutors indicted the Chechen Lors Dukaev who, as reported by IIPER last year, was arrested in Denmark last September after he accidentally detonated in a Copenhagen hotel a letter bomb he was allegedly preparing in order to carry out an attack on the Danish newspaper known for publishing cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.  Dukaev received cuts on his face in the balst, but no one else was injured.  Denmark Prosecutor Joergen Steen Soerensen said Lors Dukayev had wanted to “seriously frighten the population” and destabilize the country.  The bomb was filled with steel pellets and contained triacetone triperoxide, which terrorists used in bombs that killed 52 people in London in 2005.[30]  Dukaev is a boxer born in Chechnya currently residing of Belgium and was arrested in a park near the hotel shortly after the small blast in fall 2010.  Danish intelligence has concluded that Dukaev was operating alone.  He faced a possible life sentence.[31] 



A 35-year-old Tajik woman, who has been on the terrorist wanted list in Tajikistan since 2006, was arrested in Moscow.  She is alleged to have been involved in extremist activities both in Tajikistan and internationally, “calling for the overthrow of the constitutional system and the creation of an Islamic republic in its place.”[32]  Because Russia and Tajikistan have no extradition treaty, the Russian court will have to decide whether to release her to Tajikistan or try her in Russia.  Meanwhile, she remains in a pre-trial detention center in Moscow.


CENTRAL ASIA – Prepared by Yelena Altman and Gordon M. Hahn


The first successful suicide acts in Kazakhstan occurred on 17 May and 24 May. The first blast occurred near the security services headquarters in Aqtobe and was committed by a 25-year-old Rakhimzhan Makhatov in Aqtobe and injured three people, including a member of thre security services.  Makhatov reportedly wore a suicide bomber’s belt or vest filled with explosives.[33]  He had previously committed crimes and was part of an organized criminal group and had converted to Islam on the demands of his fiancé` and reportedly joined an underground Islamist group to which she belonged.[34]  The second attack, a car bomb, occurred outside the Kazakh security service detention facility in the capitol city of Astana and killed two, but authorities quickly began casting doubt on the version that this second explosion was indeed a terrorist attack.[35]

There has been no claim of responsibility for either attack.  Readers may recall that in November of last year, a jihadi jamaat from Kazakhstan calling itself ‘Ansaru-d-din’ issued an appeal on, the website of the Ingush mujahedin of the CE, the G’alg’aiche Vilaiyat (see IIPER, No. 32). The statement asked to help the jamaat distribute to Kazkahstan’s Muslims a propaganda article from “a file with information highlighting the theme of jihad.”  Th article was titled ‘The Commandment of Jihad and Related Situations’ (Hukm dzhikhada i polozheniya, svyzannyie s etim).”  The statement contains a link to “Hukm dzhikhada i polozheniya, svyzannyie s etim”, and both the appeal and the propaganda article call Kazakhstan’s Muslims to the global jihadi revolutionary movement.[36]

These apparent suicide attacks occurred, respectively, during deliberations on whether, and days after the May 18th vote in Kazakhstan’s parliament to send troops to join the international coalition fighting the Taliban and Al Qa`ida in Afghanistan.  On May 21st the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan issued a statement “Regarding the decision by Kazakhstan to send troops to Afghanistan.”  The statement condemned the decision made by the parliament, as it supports the Western efforts allegedly to eliminate Islam rather than supporting the Muslim peoples of Kazakhstan and Afghanistan.[37]  On June 9th, perhaps influenced by these attacks and the Taliban’s implicit threat, Kazakhstan’s Senate rejected the proposal to send those troops.

It is Kyrgyzstan, not Kazakhstan, that has taken the lead to increase security around the country and in Central Asia as whole.  Kyrgyzstan recently hosted a tripartite meeting of the defense ministers of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan to discuss safety protocol.[38]  The conversations centered on military and technical cooperation including conducting joint military and security exercises.[39]  Kyrgyzstan is going as far as possibly legalizing wiretapping in order to prevent terror attacks.[40]  More specifically, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are working to resolve border disagreements, as cooperation is integral to any effort to prevent further Al Qa`ida, Islamic Jihadi Union, IMU, and Hizb-ut Tahrir Islami penetration into the region this summer.  “The Kyrgyz province of Osh and the Tajik region of Gorno-Badakhshan will step up collaboration in developing small- and medium-sized businesses in the region.”[41]  Such cooperation, in particular, could help to reduce, if not prevent illegal border crossing including that by narcotics traffickers.



Jundullah Studios has released several new videos from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.  “The Afghanistan Blitz” eulogizes the recent martyr Miqdād al-’Almānī.[42]  “Sisters Manual,” another video from the organization, was released on 2 June 2011.[43]  “What’s Happening in the Tribal Areas Part 6” and “The Mujāhid #3″ are newly released installments in the video series.[44]  The Studio has also translated the video “Abū Ṣafīyyah” into English which features the German citizen, who was killed in October 2009 in Afghanistan.[45]  Furthermore, the Deputy amir of the IMU released a reverential statement towards Osama Bin Laden.[46]



Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami (HTI) has been recruiting from among the poor and emotionally imbalanced to add to their extremist organization in Uzbekistan.  Furthermore, the extremists target the families of the recruits who have been killed or imprisoned to pressure them to avenge their loved ones.[47]  The organization tries to recruit women, especially those who are psychologically and emotionally unstable.  Allegedly, after training a new recruit, the group asks new members to create additional “party cells.”  HTI pays such recruiters about US $50 for each new member and US $100-150 for the distribution of its literature.[48]



Janatullo Abdurahmonov, a member of the Islamist organization, Tablighi Jamaat, has been sentenced to over three years in prison for recruiting followers and attempting the violent overthrow of Tajikistan’s constitutional system.[49]



[1] “Alleged Islamic Extremists Detained In Russia’s Bashkortostan,” RFERL, 8 February 2011,

[2] “MVD: samopodryv v Makhachkale sovershil zhitel’ goroda Abakar Aitperov,” Kavkaz uzel,

[3] Reward for Justice – Doku Umarov Reward Offer, U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman, 26 May 2011,

[4] See “Designation of Caucasus Emirate,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman, 26 May 2011,

[5] For the original see “Amir Dokku Abu Usman o bin Ladene, Imarate Kavkaz I poteryakh modzhakhedov,” Kavkaz tsentr, 17 May 2011, 00:01,  For the English translation see

[6] “Amir Dokku Abu Usman o bin Ladene, Imarate Kavkaz I poteryakh modzhakhedov.”

[7] “Amir Dokku Abu Usman o bin Ladene, Imarate Kavkaz I poteryakh modzhakhedov.”

[8] “Amir Dokku Abu Usman o bin Ladene, Imarate Kavkaz I poteryakh modzhakhedov.”

[9] See Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 88 and 91.

[10] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[11] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[12] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[13] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[14] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[15] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[16] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[17] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[18] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[19] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[20] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[21] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Doku Abu Usman: Mudzhakhidy Provozglasili Imarat Kavkaz i ya gorzhus’ etim,”, 27 May 2010, 05:13,

[22] “Obrashchenie Kadiya Imarata Kavkaz k mudzhakhidam,”, 14 May 2011, 14:57,

[23] “Voina, mir, Islamskii dzhikhad, ego stupeni i estestvennaya neobkhodimost’,” Kavkaz tsentr, 28 April 2011, 16:57,

[24] For Part1 see; Part 2 –; Part 3 –; Part 4 –; and Part 5 –

[25] “Video: Polnyi perevod poslednogo obrashcheniya Sheikha Usamy bin Ladena k Islamskoi Umme,” Kavkaz tsentr, 25 May 2011, 21:52,

[26] “Aiman as-Zawahiri stal liderom ‘Al-Kaidy’,” Kavkaz tsentr, 16 June 2011, 11:27,

[27] “Sheikh Mukhammas al’-Fazzazi: Kuda delat’ khidzhru?,”, 16 May 2011, 19:51,

[28] See, cited in International Institute for Counter-Terrorism Periodical Review, ICT’s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, IDC Herzliya, Israel, September 2010,, p. 20.

[29] “Doukaev far 12 ar for terror,”, 31 May 2011, 11:32, and “Dukaev poluchil 12 let za ‘terroristicheskie namereniya’,” Kavkaz tsentr, 31 May 2011, 15:11,

[30] “Denmark Charges Chechen With Terrorism,” Moscow Times, 3 May 2011,, citing the Associated Press.

[31] “Denmark Charges Chechen With Terrorism,” Moscow Times, 3 May 2011,, citing the Associated Press.

[32] “Moscow mulls extradition of alleged Tajik female extremist,” Central Asia Newswire, 23 May 2011, and “Female activist of one of Tajik Islamist groups detained in Moscow,” News.TJ, 30 May 2011,

[33] Kazakhstan Suicide Bombing Puts Spotlight on Western Regions,”, 24 May 2011, 2:10,; “Two die in Kazakhstan car blast,” AFP, 24 May 2011,; and “Suicide Bomber has Shahid Belt in Blast in Kazakhstan,” RETWA, 17 May 2011,

[34] “Kazakh City Hit By Suicide Blast, First Known Attack Of Its Kind,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 17 May 2011, and “Suicide bomber attacks Kazakh secret police HQ ,” Telegraph, 17 May 2011,

[35] “Blast Kills Two Outside Kazakh Security Service Building,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 24 May 2011 09:02,

[36] “Obraschenie Kazakhstanskogo dzhamaata ‘Ansaru-d-din’,”, 10 November 2010, 1:01,

[37] New statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: ‘Regarding the Decision by Kazakhstan to Send Troops to Afghanistan’,”, 21 May 2011, and “Taliban warns Kazakhs not to send troops to Afghanistan,” Central Asia Newswire, 23 May 2011,

[38] “Kyrgyzstan hosts tripartite defense meeting,” Central Asia Newswire, 23 May 2011,

[39] Ibid.

[40] “Kyrgyzstan to legalize wiretapping for anti-terrorism purposes,” Central Asia Newswire, 30 May 2011,

[41] “Kyrgyz, Tajik border regions sign cooperation accord,” Central Asia Newswire, 23 May 2011,

[42] “Jundullah Studios presents a new video from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: ‘The Afghanistan Blitz’,”, 02 June 2011,

[43] “Jundullah Studios presents a new video from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: ‘Sisters Manual’,”, 02 June 2011,

[44] “Jundullah Studios presents two new videos from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: ‘What’s Happening in the Tribal Areas Part 6’ and ‘The Mujāhid #3’,”, 02 June 2011,

[45] “Jundullah Studios presents an English translation of an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan video: ‘Abū Ṣafīyyah’,”, 26 May 2011,

[46] “Jundullah Studios presents a new statement from the Deputy Amīr of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ‘Abd al-Fataḥ Aḥmadī: “Long Live Bin Lāden’,”, 23 May 2011, and “The Translation of a Statement of Abdul Fattah Ahmadi, the Vice-Amir of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” Azelin, May 2011,

[47] “Radical recruiters in Uzbekistan target the poor, emotionally imbalanced,” Central Asia Online, 21 May 2011,

[48] Ibid.

[49] “Tajikistan sentences recruiter for Islamist group,” Central Asia Newswire, 06 June 2011, and “Qurghon Teppa resident gets jail term of 3½ years for affiliation with Jamaati Tabligh,” News.TJ, 06 June 2011,



               Islam, Islamism and politics in Eurasia report (IIPER) is a project of the Monterey Terrorism and Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California.  It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam and ethnic Muslim communities in Russia and Eurasia writ large.  All issues of IIPER can be found at

               IIPER is compiled, edited and, unless indicated otherwise, written by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn.  Dr. Hahn is Senior Researcher at the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and Visiting Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.  He is also a Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group and Analyst/Consultant for Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch,  He teaches courses on both politics and terrorism in Russia and Eurasia at MIIS.  Dr. Hahn is the author of two well-received books, Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002) as well as numerous articles on Russian, Eurasian and international politics.

               IIPER welcomes submissions of 1,500-6,000 words on any aspect of Islamic politics in Eurasia and financial contributions to support the project.  For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact or

For additional information, please contact:

Dr. Gordon Hahn

Senior Researcher and WMD Terrorism Database Manager

Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP)

460 Pierce Street

Monterey, CA – 93940 USA

Tel: (831) 647-3535 Fax: (831) 647-6522


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