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Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report 44

Photo russian_mosque

12 August 2011

Edited and Written by Gordon M. Hahn (unless otherwise indicated)

IIPER accepts outside submissions

ANNOUNCEMENT: As a consequence of reduced employment and the need to find additional income, IIPER will be coming out only once per month for the foreseeable future.  Any leads on employment opportunities would be most appreciated. 




* IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted.  Research assistance is provided by Yelena Altman, Seth Gray, John Andrew Jones, Leonid Naboishchikov, Anna Nevo, and Daniel Painter.



In late July, on the eve of Ramadan, the two leading amirs, other lower-standing amirs, and it likely most if not all of the mujahedin of the CE’s Nokchicho Vilaiyat (NV) who broke with CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov in August of last year renjoined with Umarov and the CE hub’s fold.  Several videos from a Madzhlisul Shura and other gatherings show, among other things, breakaway, independent NV (INV) amir Hussein Gakaev and his naib Aslambek Vadalov renewing their bayats to Umarov.

The reunification of the INV with the NV and the CE was originally covered in three videos posted on the various CE websites.  Only one was given a separate page on a CE site, with the others on sidebars; the latter could thus disappear from CE websites but can be found on Youtube.  The video “Delaration of Amir of the Caucasus Emirate Dokku Abu Usman, amir Hussein, and amir Aslambek, Shabaan 1432 (July 2011),” with poor quality audio, begins showing the three amirs hugging with overlayed dramatic music playing while background text praises Allah and announces the ‘fitna preodolena’ (the dissent or split has been overcome).[1]  Umarov, with ‘Mansur’ Hussein Gakaev seated to his right and Vadalov to his left, begins the declaration by announcing in Russian that the NV “fitna” (dissent or split) and disagreements “are in the past” and the CE’s “jihad is turning a new page.”  He repeats apparently the same statement in Chechen.[2]

It will be recalled that in early August of last year, after rumors that Umarov’s health was deteriorating, the CE’s amir resigned and appointed Vadalov his successor only to retract his resignation, prompting Gakaev, Vadalov, and Tarkhan Gaziev to renounce their bayats to Umarov.  Just a week earlier, Umarov had appointed Vadalov as his naib and designated successor and prmoted Gakaev to the position of NV amir.  On August 10th of last year Gakaev, Vadalov, CE deputy military amir and Al Qa’ida emissary, the Arab Jordanian national Abu Anas Muhannad, and the amir of Chechnya’s Southwestern Front Tarkhan Gaziev, standing with some 20 other presumed NV amirs and mujahedin, declared that they were renouncing their bayat to CE amir Umarov and were no longer subordinate to him.[3]  Gakaev noted Umarov had made “numerous mistakes” which they had tried to bring to his attention and criticized him for resigning his post and then reversing that decision after what he called a madzhlisul shura had adjourned and the amirs had dispersed, saying that if Umarov had to do this then at least he should have brought in a new team.  This suggested that perhaps a part of the problem may consist of a dispute between these four Chechen amirs and another group of leading amirs close to Umarov, perhaps Chechens, perhaps the then Dagestan and OVKBK amirs, ‘Seifullah Gubdenskii’ Magomedali Vagabov (who was simultaneously the CE’s Shariah Court qadi) and Asker Dzhappuev, respectively, perhaps others.  This, as I noted at the time “could point the way to a possible compromise by way of a return to the status quo either before the appointments of Vadalov and Gakaev or before Umarov’s resignation.”[4]  At the time, Gakaev indeed stressed that the Chechen/Nokchicho mujahedin were not leaving from the Caucasus Emirate, and if, “Allah willing”, tomorrow or after a month the mujahedin of the other vilaiyats realize their mistake in remaining loyal to Umarov and join the Nokchicho amirs in selecting a new CE amir, then, Gakaev offered, they will be able to “go forward together.”  He also told the mujahedin of the other CE vilaiyats’ mujahedin, all of which at present remain loyal to Umarov, that they were the Chechen mujahedin’s “brothers.”[5]  Days later Umarov released all the splitters from their CE positions.

Some NV amirs and mujahedin remained loyal to Umarov, but the bulk of the NV appears to have defected along with the four main dissenters to forma an independent NV (INV). Soon Umarov and CE qadi, Dagestan Vilaiyat amir ‘Seifullakh Gubdenskii’ Magomedali Vagabov, and several prominent Arab jihadi sheikhs issued statements accusing the Arab Jordanian national Muhannad of sewing dissent among the NV mujahedin (see IIPER, Nos. 24, 25, 26, 28 and 30).  Muhannad was subsequently killed by Russian forces this past April (see IIPER, No. 39).

In a second rather hazy video with sketchy audio posted on CE websites on the occasion of the announcement that the CE and NV have reunified with the INV, appears to be from a session of a Shariah court hearing, at which issues related to the fitna were resolved.[6]  Again seated in the forest, Umarov, Gakaev and Vadalov are seated to the right of an amir, likely a qadi, who is difficult to identify precisely and who holds and appears to refer to a book (likely the Koran or Sunna).  The prospective qadi somewhat resembles and perhaps is CE qadi Ali Abu Mukhammad Al-Dagistani, but he also seems to resemble an Arab or even African.  The qadi speaks in Arabic, and his words after some time begin to be translated into Russian by a hooded mujahed seated to his immediate left.  He says that the split that occurred last year has two “roads”: one political, the other legal or “Shariah”-based.  The rest of the qadi’s remarks are difficult to make complete sense of due to the poor quality of the audio.[7]

Umarov follows the qadi, saying, among other things, that the split has been overcome and its consequences have been limited.[8]  He then announces that he is taking the position of amir of the NV in addition to his position as CE amir and is abolishing the NV’s Eastern and Southwestern Fronts.  Dividing the NV into two theatres, referred to in one CE posting as “military sectors (voennyie sektora), Umarov announced he is appointing Gakaev as amir of the NV’s eastern theatre (vostochnoe napravlenie) and as one of his naibs for the NV and amir ‘Khamzat’ Aslan Byutukaev as his other NV naib and as amir of the NV’s western theatre (zapadnoe napravlenie).[9]  ‘Khamzat’ Aslan Byutukaev is the amir of the notorious Riyadus-Salikhiin Martyrs’ Brigade or Battalion (RSMB), the CE’s special suicide bombing detachment created by Shamil Basaev and Al Qa`ida operative Khattab in the early 2000s during the period of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya.  Byutukaev is visible both in this and the third video on the reunification discussed below.   It also remains unclear why Vadalov was not made a NV naib or sector/theatre amir.  He may be appointed Gakaev’s naib for the eastern theatre.  It also remains unclear why Tarkhan Gaziev, the other major dissenting Chechen amir, is not present or mentioned at the Shariah Court session or anywhere else in these videos and reports.

The qadi again speaks, with the masked mujahed again translating into Russian.  The qadi again mentions the political and Shariah law aspects of the split and states that if it is known that someone is sewing dissent or fitna dividing the group, then it is permissible to kill him.  The video closes by, first, showing an amir Byutukaev and then another amir hugging Umarov and, second showing Umarov sitting between and then standing and hugging and shaking hands with Gakaev and then Vadalov.  As the video ends, Umarov can be seen smiling, presumably as a result of this important political success.[10]

In the third video on the CE reunificiation, a series of NV amirs and perhaps some rank-and file mujahedin are seen renewing their bayats to Umarov.[11]  Interestingly, this video is dated June 2011 as opposed to the other two, which were from July.  This may suggest that Umarov began to win over some of the middle-ranking breakaway INV amirs and mujahedin, prompting Gakaev and Vadalov to return to the fold.  An audio introduction notes that Umarov visited one of the NV’s jamaats.  From the video this single jamaat numbers some 30 or more mujahedin, as 42 mujahedin are visible in the video, not counting Umarov and the mujahed holding the camera.  Many of the faces are the same as those that appear in the Shariah Court session on the fitna discussed above.[12]

Speaking in Chechen with the video providing Russian-language captions, Umarov opens the meeting, saying that “we” have come to find out the mood of the young mujahedin and receive the bayat from them.  He continues putting their jihad in the context of the global jihadi revolutionary movement:

The situation in the Umma is extremely grave. The signs of this are that across the world religion is being oppressed, Muslims are subjected to persecution, and everywhere Satan is seducing Muslims. As our Prophet foretold, peace and Allah’s blessing be upon him: ‘All the nations will attack you of.’  That is exactly the situation of Muslims today, and it seems to me that the situation of the Muslims of the Caucasus is even more difficult because we are resisting the most insidious and despicable of all the infidels.  They use in the war against us a certain methodology to deceive the young generation, turn it away from Jihad, and not allow young Muslims to fulfill Allah’s will.  They try to seduce young Muslims with earthly beauties, produce luxurious cars, and they even build mosques and much else.

But praise to Allah, despite all this, the youth are not deceived by this, and are going to Jihad.  I look and see here many new recruits, and this makes me happy because when we fulfill our duty and leave, Allah willing, Jihad will continue and there is someone to pass the baton on to.  Therefore, praise to Allah, first of all I want to thank the young people.  Let Allah be pleased by you for the fact that you have come out to fulfill the duty laid out by Allah.  You have gone out onto the path of those who stood at the source of this path beginning with Dzhokar (Dudaev), Yandarbiev, Maskhadov, and Shamil.  They began this path, and we are continuing it.  And it falls to us to finish this path.  They laid down their lives on this path, and we must not lose the basis, which they laid down.

Today, we are receiving the bayat of our brothers.  Up until now, there has been fitna among us which could only be resolved by Shariah law.  Today with us are scholars and a Shariah investigation, and the Shariah court has already begun, and, Allah willing, therefore removing the fitna that was among us, we have come here to receive the bayat from them.  It would not be superfluous even to renew the bayat each year.  Well, now is the time to renew the bayat, because this is the place from where the time of troubles came.  Allah willing, we are beginning this work in the Nokchicho Vilaiyat.  The fitna did not spread to the other Vilaiyats, praise to Allah and Allah’s mercy.  And from this place the fitna comes, God willing, if we do not make prayer.

I also want to inform you that the Military Amir has come here, concerned about our fate.  His name is Khamzat, and let Allah be pleased with him.  And also here is Ingushetiya’s qadi, and let Allah be pleased with him.  We will begin the taking of the bayat with very oldest amir, the amir of the ‘Riyadus Salikhiin’ battalion, Khamzat.”[13]

‘Khamzat’ Aslan Byutukaev, amir of the suicide bombers’ detachment the noted Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs’ Brigade (RSMB), then takes the bayat to Umarov.  The wording of the oath is as follows: “I swear to Allah that while you will be on Allah’s path, I am your mujahed and will be subordinate to you.”  Among the other amirs giving the bayat to Umarov identified or identifiable in the video are amir Islam, Mukhammad – the amir of Sunzha, and one Muslim who looks like Muslim Gakaev.[14]

Umarov closes by stressing: “Our main goal is to raise the word of Allah above all others. We can only raise the religion of Allah when we united and indivisible.  I am not talking only about among us but about the whole world.  The unbelievers have directed all of their force, all of their system so as not to divide and not allow us Muslims to be united.  Therefore, I ask you to avoid gossip (gybatov, spleten).  Beautifully and kindly carry the religion of Allah!”  Umarov then closes leading the mujahedin in prayer, asking Allah for “victory over the unbelievers.”[15]  Umarov appears healthy, motivated and confident and speaks as one who has perhaps undergone a real conversion to the jihadi version of fervent Islam within the framework in which ideology always functions of political ambitions and psychological drives.

At the time of the split in August-September 2010 numerous hypotheses were put forward to explain it.  The overcoming of the split appears to confirm some of these hypotheses but to cast grave doubt upon others.  The most popular indeed virtually the single explanation promoted in most quarters was that the NV mujahedin’s break with Umarov represented a revival of the radical ethno-nationalist separatism that predominated under the ChRI until 2002. The NV amirs’ reunification with Umarov puts a real damper on this interpretation of events; one that was informed more by pro-Chechen wishful thinking, rather than sober analysis.  Former ChRI foreign minister Akhmed Zakaev, who broke with the jihadists only with the CE’s creation in October 2007, the National Endowment for Democracy’s Miriam Lanskoy, and the Jamestown Foundation’s Mairbek Vachagaev, among others, made this claim.[16]  They did so, despite the fact that the INV splitters, as I noted in IIPER No. 28, had emphasized the following in announcing their break with Umarov:

Do not think that the cause of our split is specficially Nokchicho (Chechen for ‘Chechnya’), Ichkeria or that we desire something even more.  No, of course.  Our intentions, and Allah sees this, is the establishment of the Law of Allah, the laws of Shariah, the liberation of our people, the Caucasus, and all Muslims, Allah willing.  All our major Amirs, who left us – Maskhadov and Shamil and Abdul-Khalim (Sadulaev) as well as the Akhmadovs, the Baraevs – had these same intentions.[17]

I proposed in IIPER (No. 32, 13 January 2011) that the split was likely the result of a combination of dissatisfaction with Umarov’s leadership, as the splitters stated, as well as: resource scarcity, competition over the distribution of resources and perhaps leadership positions, and inter-ethnic competition within the jihadist movement as Dagestans and Kabards began to overtake the Chechens within the CE:

The causes and consequences of the split remain somewhat murky but have become much clearer since summer.  The original four defecting amirs appear to have been genuinely distressed with aspects of Umarov’s leadership style.  They complained in subsequent videos about his failures to convene shuras in making decisions and to secure military, food and medical supplies.  The latter complaints seem to suggest that the NV defectors could also have been dismayed by the diversion of resources and leadership posts like the CE qadi to the non-Chechen vilaiyats.  The growing number of attacks carried out by the GV until this March and by the DV and OVKBK suggests such a diversion.  This is said with the caveat that much of the funding and supply of the CE mujahedin appears to come from their own local sources such as the collection of the zakat from the local population and internal Russian diasporas and contributions from corrupt officials and criminal activity.  The Chechens’ declining status within the CE is significant compared to their domination of leadership posts under the ChRI and before the recent years’ expansion into the rest of the Caucasus.  The Dagestanis growing role is likely to foster jealousy among the Chechen ranks, given the latter’s ethnic pride and cultural preference for autonomy.

The revival of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria project – to build an independent Chechen state rather than a Caucasus-wide Islamist state – appears not to have been a factor in the split, and there is no evidence that such a project is supported by any of the mujahedin in the North Caucasus. (IIPER, No. 32)

This version of events appears to be confirmed by the reunification.

The reasons for the reunification remain unclear.  To the extent that the split was engendered by Muhannad’s ambitions and manipulation of foreign assistance, as Umarov, Vagabov, and Arab sheikhs claimed, then his death in April may have paved the way for the rapprochement.  In addition, the breakaway INV may have found that separated from the CE and Umarov their resource problems and limited capacity to attract recruits were compounded.  The INV would also have missed out on the notoriety sought by jihadists that the U.S. State Department’s designation in May of the CE as a special terrorist organization and its offer of a reward of $5 million for information leading to Umarov’s capture.

The reunification is bad news for Moscow, and is likely to be followed by an uptick in jihadi operations in late summer and autumn. 



The Caucasus Emirate-affiliated website continues to issue monthly reports on the number of attacks carried out by the CE mujahedin and the casualties that have resulted from those attacks (and presumably Russian counter-terrorism operations) among both Russian state agents and on the side of the mujahedin as well.  The data did not include mention of the 24 January 2011 Moscow Domodedovo Airport suicide bombing carries out the CE, its Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs’ Brigade, and specifically the ethnic Ingush mujahed and Ingushetiya native Magomed Yevloev.  The data does include the two 14 February 2011 coordinated suicide bombings carried out in Gubden, Dagestan by the ethnic Russian couple of Vitallii Razdobudko and Maria Khorosheva.  Also, since the reports continue to divide fatalities and wounded into the categories of kafiry (infidels) and murtady or marionetki (apostates or puppets), we are unable to delineate between casualties among state agents and those among civilians from the jihadi sources.  Therefore, we are including the total number of fatalities and wounded.

The CE’s data through June show that in the first six months of 2011 the CE mujahedin are claiming responsibility for 384 attacks: 383 in the North Caucasus and 1 in Moscow at Domodedovo.  The largest portion of CE attacks carried out continues to belong to its Dagestan


Table 1. CE Data on Number of Attacks and Casualties in the First Six Months of 2011 (the numbers in parentheses represents the figure for June).

Vilaiyat of the  Caucasus Emirate  










Nokchicho Vilaiyat or NV (Chechnya)       44 (16)          

38 (21)


104 (42)


20 (0)

Galgaiche Vilaiyat or GV


      42 (18)  

   11 (2)


14 (6)


   13 (0)

Dagestan Vilaiyat or DV


    220 (33)  129 (28)  

  189 (44)

    64 (6)



      74 (11)


   38 (4)


    49 (10)


   23 (6)


Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat**


        3 (0)


     5 (0)


6 (0)

     0 (0)



 1*** (0)

   39 (0)    180 (0)  

     1 (0)



     384 (78)  

 260 (55)


  552 (102)

 121 (12)

*OVKBK – the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya and Karachai, the CE’s jihadi network the North Caucasus republics of Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya.

** Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat covers the North Caucasus regions of Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai for the CE.

*** This attack and the attendant casualties are from the 24 January 2011 suicide bombing at Moscow’s Domodeovo Airport not included in the mujahedin’s numbers on casualties in the North Caucasus.


SOURCES: The data for attacks in the North Caucasus was provided by the CE-affiliated website “Imarat Kavkaz. Svodka boevikh deistvii modzhakhedov Imarata Kavkaz za mesyats Safar 1432 goda po Khidzhre (Yanvar’ 2011),” Kavkaz tsentr, 5 February 2011, 23:30, citing; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhakhedov za rabi’ al’-avval’ 1432 goda po Khidzhre (4 fevralya – 5 marta 2011 g.,” Umma News, 6 March 2011, 14:31,———–1432—-4—5–2011-.html and Kavkaz tsentr, 6 March 2011, 17:09,; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats rabias-sani 1432 po khidzhre (6 marta – 5 aprelya 2011 g.,”, 6 April 2011, 13:30,–1432-6-5-2011-.html and “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevikh operatsii,” Kavkaz tsentr, 7 April 2011, 13:19,; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats dzhumada al’-ulya 1432 goda po khidzhre (6 aprelya – 3 maya 2011 g.),” Umma News, 4 May 2011, 2:18,–1432-6-3-2011-.html and “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhakhedov,” Kavkaz tsentr, 4 May 2011, 18:00,; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats dzhumada as-sani 1423 goda,” Kavkaz tsentr, 6 June 2011, 21:20,; “Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhakhedov za mesyats dzhumada as-sani 1423 goda po khidzhre (4 maya – 3 iyunya),”, 6 June 2011, 18:43,———-c–1432—-4—3–2011-.html; Imarat Kavkaz: Svodka boevikh deistvii I poter’ za iyun’ 2011 goda,” Kavkaz tsentr, 1 July 2011, 19:04, For the Moscow Domodedovo Airport attack see “V osushchestvlenii terakta v aeroportu Domodedovo uchastvovali, kak minimum, 5 chelovek,” Ekho Moskvy, 8 February 2011, 21:00, and “Terakt v Domodedove podgotovili i proveli, kak minimum, 5 chelovek,” Ekho Moskvy, 8 February 2011, 22:03,


Vilaiyat (DV) mujahedin, as it has for more than a year.  Now nearly 60 percent of the attacks and casualties inflicted in Russia this year have occurred in Dagestan.  However, June saw a sharp fall in the number of attacks carried out by the DV mujahedin, dipping below its monthly average for the year despite the fact that June is typically one of the most active months for all the CE’s vialiayats.  The mujahedin of the CE’s Nokchicho (Chechnya) Vilaiyat (NV) and Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV) in the titular Vainakh republics, which since last spring had been showing a relatively low level of operational activity, rehistered an uptick in activity, with a combined 34 operations compared to the very low level of activity and nearly dormant jihad during the first five months of 2011, when these CE nodes produced just a combined number of 52 attacks.  The GV continued to lag behind Chechnya’s mujahedin.  The OVKBK continues rebounded from its 3 attacks in March, with its 11 in April, 12 in May and 11 in June.  It remains the second most active jihadi front for the CE, as it has been since spring of last year.

In sum, the CE’s own data shows that its jihadi is becoming an almost purely Dagestani effort.  If one compares IIPER’s numbers, which rely on both jihadi and non-jihadi sources’ reporting, with the CE’s figures, then it appears that the mujahedin are producing accurate but perhaps slightly inflated or at least higher numbers.



[1] See the video “Obrashchenie amira Imarata Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usmana, amira Khusseina, i amira Aslambeka, Shabaan 1432 (July 2011)” at “Raznoglasiya mezhdu chechenskimi modzhakhedami preodoleny,”, 25 Jult 2011, 10:48,

[2] “Obrashchenie amira Imarata Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usmana, amira Khusseina, i amira Aslambeka, Shabaan 1432 (July 2011).”

[3] “Ichkeria Info Video: Zayavlenie modzhakhedov Ichkerii ot 10 avgusta 2010,” You Tube, accessed 15 August 2010,

[4] “Ichkeria Info Video: Zayavlenie modzhakhedov Ichkerii ot 10 avgusta 2010.”

[5] “Ichkeria Info Video: Zayavlenie modzhakhedov Ichkerii ot 10 avgusta 2010.”

[6] This video was available on almost all CE websites, and as late as 10 August 2011 on the CE’s main website, Kavkaz tsentr, but it was posted on a sidebar from which it likely is soon disappear.  It can be found at “V Chechne zavershilos’ Shariatskoe razbiratel’stvo: Fitna preodolena, Shabaan 1432 (July 2011 g.m.),” You Tube, 24 July 2011,, last accessed on 10 August 2011.

[7] “V Chechne zavershilos’ Shariatskoe razbiratel’stvo: Fitna preodolena, Shabaan 1432 (July 2011 g.m.).”

[8] “V Chechne zavershilos’ Shariatskoe razbiratel’stvo: Fitna preodolena, Shabaan 1432 (July 2011 g.m.).”

[9] “V Chechne zavershilos’ Shariatskoe razbiratel’stvo: Fitna preodolena, Shabaan 1432 (July 2011 g.m.).”  See also “Raznoglasiya mezhdu chechenskimi modzhakhedami preodoleny,”, 25 July 2011, 10:48,

[10] “V Chechne zavershilos’ Shariatskoe razbiratel’stvo: Fitna preodolena, Shabaan 1432 (July 2011 g.m.).”

[11] “Vilaiyat Nokchicho: Modzhakhedy dayut bayat Amiru Imarata Kavkaz Dokku abu Usman, Radzhab 1432 (Iyun’ 2011 g.m.),” Youtube, 24 July 2011, and, last accessed on 10 August 2011.

[12] “Vilaiyat Nokchicho: Modzhakhedy dayut bayat Amiru Imarata Kavkaz Dokku abu Usman, Radzhab 1432 (Iyun’ 2011 g.m.),” Youtube, 24 July 2011, and, last accessed on 10 August 2011.

[13] “Vilaiyat Nokchicho: Modzhakhedy dayut bayat Amiru Imarata Kavkaz Dokku abu Usman, Radzhab 1432 (Iyun’ 2011 g.m.),” Youtube, 24 July 2011, and, last accessed on 10 August 2011.

[14] “Vilaiyat Nokchicho: Modzhakhedy dayut bayat Amiru Imarata Kavkaz Dokku abu Usman, Radzhab 1432 (Iyun’ 2011 g.m.),” Youtube, 24 July 2011, and, last accessed on 10 August 2011.

[15] “Vilaiyat Nokchicho: Modzhakhedy dayut bayat Amiru Imarata Kavkaz Dokku abu Usman, Radzhab 1432 (Iyun’ 2011 g.m.),” Youtube, 24 July 2011, and, last accessed on 10 August 2011.

[16] Testimony of Miriam Lanskoy, “Human Rights in the North Caucasus,” Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. Congress, 15 April 2011,; “Miriam Lanskaya o terakte v Domodedovo i momente istiny,” Caucasus Times, 2 February 2011,; and Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Factional Divisions within the Chechen Separatist Movement,” Jamestown Foundation North Caucasus Analysis, Vol. 11, Issue 8, 21 October 2010, 02:23,  Akhmed Zakaev was so enthusiastic that he declared he was subordinating his ChRI government-in-exile to the breakaway INV amirs.  See “Postanovlenie Kabineta Ministrov ChRI No. A-133,” ChechenPress, 10 October 2010,

[17] “Obrashchenie rukovodstva Vilaiyata Nokhchicho” and “Obrashchenie rukovodstva Chechenskogo soprotivleniya v ChRI,”, 7 October 2010, 3:22,;section=1#39953 and “Obrashchenie rukovodstva Chechenskogo soprotivleniya v ChRI,” ChechenPress, 7 October 2010,




               Islam, Islamism and politics in Eurasia report (IIPER) is a project of the Monterey Terrorism and Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California.  It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam and ethnic Muslim communities in Russia and Eurasia writ large.  All issues of IIPER can be found at

               IIPER is compiled, edited and, unless indicated otherwise, written by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn.  Dr. Hahn is Senior Researcher at the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and Visiting Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.  He is also a Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group and Analyst/Consultant for Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch,  He teaches courses on both politics and terrorism in Russia and Eurasia at MIIS.  Dr. Hahn is the author of two well-received books, Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002) as well as numerous articles on Russian, Eurasian and international politics.

               IIPER welcomes submissions of 1,500-6,000 words on any aspect of Islamic politics in Eurasia and financial contributions to support the project.  For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact:

Dr. Gordon M. Hahn

Senior Researcher and WMD Terrorism Database Manager

Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP)

460 Pierce Street

Monterey, CA – 93940 USA

Tel: (831) 647-3535 Fax: (831) 647-6522

Email: or

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