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Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report 16

Photo russian_mosque

June 7, 2010



* IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted.  Research assistance is provided by Leonid Naboishchikov, Daniel Painter, Fabian Sievert, and Daria Ushakova.



The martyrdom videos of the ‘shakhidkas’ or female suicide bombers who carried out the March 29th, 2010 bombings of the Moscow subway system can be viewed on the website ‘Kavkaz Chat.’  In the videos, the shakhidkas are dressed virtually identically, suggesting they were videotaped by the same person and/or at the same time and place.  The video title claims they were taped in Dagestan on March 25th.[1]



On March 24, the qadi of the CE’s Shariah Court and the amir of the CE’s United Vilaiyat of Kabardia, Blakaria, and Karachaia (OVKBK) Anzor Astemirov or Seifullah was killed by Russian security forces.  On an April 20th video posted on May 16th, the OVKBK’S new amir, ‘Abdullah’ Asker Dzhappuev, announced and introduced himself; the video was posted on several CE sites, including the OVKBK’s[2]

The OVKBK encompasses Russia’s republics of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR), Karachaevo-Cherkessia (KChR), and perhaps Adygeya.  The OVKBK is formed in such a way as to unite fraternal ethnic groups divided under Soviet rule (and still so divided under Russian rule) into separate administrative-territorial units.  Titular nationalities of these republics – the Kabardins, Cherkess, and Adygs – are all Circassian ethnic groups or, in the case of the Balkars and Karachais – Alan ethnic groups.  Since Astemirov’s death, rather than a decline in jihadi terrorism in the KBR, where almost all CE operations in the noted republics has occurred, we have seen an explosion of violence at levels not seen since the days of the United Islamic Jamaat ‘Yarmuk’ in 2004-2005.[3]

Abdullah Asker Dzhappuev was previously amir of the OVKBK’s Elbrus Sector; Elbrus district is located in the KBR and is home to Europe’s highest mountain and a major ski resort.[4]  One Adam Ruslanovich Dzhappuev was on the federal wanted list for participation in the massive 13 October 2005 jihadi raid on the KBR’s capitol Nalchik by some 200 mujahedin led by Astemirov and Shamil Basaev.[5]  Adam (now aka Abu Dudzhan) was also listed as one of Astemirov’s four naibs or deputies in a decree Astemirov issued in March 2009.[6]  He was also reported to be amir of the Yarmuk jamaat at this time, though it had not been heard from in years and was thought disbanded.  Adam Abu Dudzhan Dzhappuev would be the last of those newly appointed naibs killed within a mere three months after their appointments in March 2009.  He was killed on 21 June 2009.  Asker may be Adam’s brother.

Abdullah Asker Dzhappuev is already Astemirov’s second successor.  On 1 April 2010, Russian sources claimed the new OVKBK amir was an unidentified mujahed killed by security forces on March 31st in the KBR’s capitol Nalchik.  Although his name was not released, it was reported that he was born in 1970 and had been Seifullah’s naib (deputy) for finances.[7]  On April 18th, Kavkaz uzel citing MVD sources, identified the OVKBK’s new amir and vali (governor) as 39-year old, Arsen Tatarov,[8] but a later report stated Tatarov was the amir killed on March 31st.[9]

New OVKBK amir Dzhappuev had come to prominence recently.  On February 5th the website of the CE’s OVKBK posted a “statement of the press service of the staff of the Armed Forces of the United Velayat of Kabardia, Balkaria and Karachai of the Caucasus Emirate” stating that the mujahedin of the OVKBK’s Elbrus sector, headed by Asker Abdullah Dzhappuev, uncovered FSB intelligence gathering base and equipment in an apartment in the village of Neitrino in the high mountainous Elbrus district of Russia’s Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR), which is included by the CE within the virtual borders of its OVKBK.  Supposedly, the FSB “infidels” heard rumors were spreading that they, the apartment’s occupants, were conducting themselves suspiciously and therefore abandoned the base fearing the mujahedin would get wind of their presence.  The mujahedin, according to the statement, at first planned to storm the building but then decided to enter it clandestinely.  They found it filled with intelligence gathering equipment such as listening devices which were “illegally” used to eavesdrop on the locals.  Dzhappuev and his mujahedin took whatever equipment could be of use to them and burned the rest.[10]  After introducing himself as amir in the April video, Dzhappuev produced another in late May where he talks about this OVKBK intelligence coup discussed in the February posting.  Perhaps intelligence the captured listening equipment yields is facilitating the OVKBK mujahedin’s intensified operational capacity.

Whatever the cause, the increased tempo of OVKBK operations since Astemirov’s death and perhaps already under Dzhappuev’s command, is unmistakable and impressive.  On May 1st the OVKBK mujahedin executed the largest terrorist attack in the KBR since the October 2005 Nalchik raid.  The attack copied the May 2004 that killed Chechen President Ramazan Kadyrov’s father and former Chechen president Akhmed Kadyrov and several other pro-Moscow Chechen leaders during the May 9th Victory Day celebrations.  This time, the mujahedin blew up the VIP reviewing stand at horse racing track at the peak of Nalchik’s May Day festivities.  The attacked killed one civilian, a 97-year old Great Patriotic War veteran, and wounded some forty civilians and officials.  Among the 39 wounded were KBR’s Culture Minister Ruslan Firov and former MVD chief Khachim Shogenov.  Eleven of the wounded remained hospitalized on May 2nd, and 18 were treated in ambulances or hospital and sent home.  As some in the republic have noted, the real target of the attack likely was KBR president Arsen Kanokov.[11]  In a summary of the OVKBK’s terrorist activity for April and May, amir Dzhappuev promised to compensate the family of the killed war veteran, if he was “really” killed by the bomb,” which Dzhappuev claimed was meant only for the VIPs, and “his non-participation with the infidel” is proven.[12]

However, even before this attack and continuing afterwards, a noticeable increase in the number of attacks was marked in the KBR.  According to the OVKBK mujahedin’s own report, they carried out 22 attacks in April and May.  Four more bomb or IED attacks were prevented when the authorities uncovered and disarmed the explosives.[13]  My own count estimates approximately 20 attacks in the KBR during this two-month period, since several of the attacks reported by the mujahedin and Russian authorities did not have conclusively the signature of CE operations.  My preliminary total for the number of attacks in the KBR through May 31st, 2010 is 24 attacks (for final estimate, see IIPER, No. 17).  I estimate tentatively that those 24 attacks have killed 12 and wounded 15 state agents, and killed 1 and wounded some 34 civilians, approximately.  For comparison, the total number of attacks estimated for the KBR in 2008 was 28; they killed 11 and wounded 20 state agents and killed 2 and wounded 2 civilians.  In 2009 there were approximately 23 attacks, killing 7 and wounding 13 state agents and killing 1 and wounding 3 civilians (see IIPER, No. 8).  Thus, the OVKBK mujahedin have carried out more operations and inflicted more casualties in April and May 2010 than they did in all of 2009 and equaled the level of violence attained in 2008.

The ability of the OVKBK to maintain this level of operational intensity remains to be seen.  The KBR has been on the periphery of the CE’s jihadi terrorism with some 26 attacks per year on average for the last few years compared to well over a hundred each year in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan each.  Recently, the KBR MVD claimed there are 37 mujahedin from the KBR on its wanted list and the federal list.[14]

On May 30th “the amirs of the sectors” of the OVKBK posted a video on dated from April 20th when the number of attacks in the KBR began to grow.  It appears that it was taken either before or after a planning shura that preceded the new wave of attacks, including the May Day attack.  The 22-minute video included Dzhappuev and 7 other amirs, suggesting there are 7 sectors across the KBR and KChR.  Nalchik, Baksan and Elbrus sectors – all in the KBR – were already known to exist.  Four of the amirs spoke for a few minutes without identifying himself or his sector.  Abdullah opened and closed the meeting.  All the statements were rather typical if bland appeals to follow the true form of Islam and join or support the mujahedin.  Three of the seven amirs wore masks.[15]

The increase in jihadi activity in the KBR has coincided with Dzhappuev’s abundant use of the site.  Although the scale of his use does not exceed that of Astemirov’s, it is important to remember that the latter was both OVKBK amir and the CE Shariah Court’s qadi requiring him to post numerous theologically oriented video lectures.  Dzhappuev by contrast is concentrating on political and operational issues.  This, along with the high number of operations, including the high-profile May 1st attack, suggests that he harbors considerable ambition, perhaps to achieve the kind of notoriety achieved in Ingushetia and across the Caucasus by the late Said Abu Saad Buryatskii.



In May Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a decree on guaranteeing security at the 2014 XXII Olympic Games scheduled to be held in Russia’s southern resort city of Sochi and creating a special “operational staff” towards that end to be headed by the head of the FSB’s First Service.[16]  On June 3rd Russian FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov warned of a particular terrorist facing the Olympic Games, in particular specific chatter among the CE’s amirs that Russian security services were picking up.[17]  A main CE website, Kavkaz tsentr, noted Bortinkov’s warning.[18]

There can be no doubt that the Caucasus Emirate mujahedin pose a threat to the 2014 Olympic games scheduled for Russia’s southern resort city of Sochi.  The Sochi Games will be taking place in in Krasnodar Krai, which has seen some if limited terrorist activity over the years.  However, CE amir Umarov recently focused on Krasnodar Krai when he promised that the CE would “liberate Krasnodar Krai, Astrakhan and the Volga lands” from infidel rule.[19]

Krasnodar surrounds the Adygeya Republic, the titular nationality of which is the traditionally Muslim ethnic group the Adygs or Adygeis.  The Adygs are one of several Circassian and traditionally Muslim ethnic groups in the Caucasus, including the Kabards of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya (KBR) and the Cherkess of the republic of the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia (KChR) in Russia as well as the Abkhaz of Georgia’s breakaway Republic of Abkhazia and the Shapsugs who can be found in both Georgia and Russia.  The Kabards and Cherkess of Russia are somewhat more Islamized than the other Circassian ethnic groups.

However, the Adygs of Adygeya – in close proximity to Sochi, Krasnodar – have produced a small jihadi element over the years.  Recently, a jamaat from Adygeya announced its existence and declared its loyalty to the CE and amir Doka Abu Usman Umarov in September 2009.[20]  A month later Russian authorities announced the arrest of “the leader of Adygeya’s Wahabbis”, one Asker Setov, who resisted arrest and fired on police.[21]  More recently, in April a letter from a CE supporter appeared on the Kavkaz tsentr website.  The site titled the letter/article “Russian Terrorists Are Committing Outrages in Emirate Sochi” and the author referred to Sochi as “an occupied city.”[22]  The CE legitimizes its claim of sovereignty over Krasnodar and Adygeya as Muslim lands on those territories’ inclusion in the Crimean Khanate conquered by Imperial Russia under Catherine the Great.[23]

In March 2009 three agricultural airplanes disappeared in Adygeya.[24]  There was a spate of bomb attacks shortly after Sochi won the right to host the 2012 Olympic Games, but apparently none were connected to the mujahedin.  The were likely the result of inter-clan and criminal competition for control over resources appearing in Sochi as a consequence of the massive construction projects required for Sochi to meet the challenge of hosting the Olympics.

There have been no jihadi-related incidents in Adygeya so far this year.  However, the CE site ‘Kavkaz tsentr’ recently claimed that state security and law enforcement organs were following closely and harassing those in Adygeya they suspected of radical Islamic sympathies and had arrested and beaten 8 such suspects recently.  Security forces also reportedly declared they wanted two Adygs on suspicion of belonging among the mujahedin.[25]

A wakeup call came on May 26th when a massive car bomb detonated in downtown Stavropol’ the capitol of Stavropol’ Krai (Territory).  The attack eventually took the lives of 9 and wounding some 42.  The breakdown of casualties between state agents and civilians remained unclear, but the majority appear to have been civilians.  Stavropol is a step closer to Krasnodar and Sochi than the North Caucasus’s titular Muslim republics.  Although Stanvropol has seen little jihadi activity in the past and it remains unclear who the perpetrators were, the attack’s modus operandi was clearly jihadi and consistent with the recent CE attacks.  As of writing no CE force had claimed responsibility yet.  The CE regards Stavropol as part of its Vilaiyat of the Nogai Steppe, for which no amir, jamaat, or sector has ever appeared.  However, the sharp rise in the operational activity in the KBR by the CE’s OVKBK mujahedin detailed above raises the question of whether some of these elements could be involved; the KBR is located in the western North Caucasus closer than the eastern North Caucasus republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, where usually most CE activity is concentrated.

Given the CE’s growing global pretensions, there can be little doubt that it will attempt to attack the 2014 Olymic Games.  An attack would not necessarily have to be organized from Krasnodar or Adygeya, though to be sure such an approach might make it easier to reach any target without being interdicted.  A successful attack would serve the CE’s purposes in several ways.  It would increase the CE’s cache within both the North Caucasus and the global jihadi revolutionary movement and deliver a blow to Russia’s credibility as a stable, modern state.




VILAIYAT NOKCHICHO (Chechnya): Amir – Doka Abu Usman Umarov.

WESTERN FRONT (Southern raions bordering Georgia): Amir – unknown.  Predecessors – present CE Amir/president Dokka Umarov.

  • Sernovodsk Jamaat: Amir – Abdul Salamov.

NORTHWESTERN FRONT: Amir – Abubakar Elmuradov, 24 September 2006.

  • Subunit “Imam” (cited 9 November 2006).
  • Amir Assad (Northwestern Front unit commander)

NORTHERN FRONT: Amir – Daud (cited 6 January 2010).  Predecessors – Muslim (killed October 2007); Tahir Bataev (killed 21 March 2007); Kamal (killed 30 January 2006)

SOUTHWESTERN FRONT: Amir – Tarkhan Gaziyev, 24 September 2006.

Naib – Khamzat (cited 24 April 2009).

  • Urus Martan Sector: Amir – Abdul Malik (killed January 19 2010); Islam (cited 24 April 2009).
  • Nozhai-Yurt Sector: Amir – Masud Temiraliev (killed October 2009).
    • Asamat-Yury Village Jamaat: Amir – Abubakar Pashaev (killed October 2009).
  • unidentified sector: Amir – Rustam Mahauri (last cited 9 July 2009)

EASTERN FRONT: Amir – Aslanbek Vaduev (cited 24 April 2009); Predecessors: Suleiman Imurzaev (Hayrullah, killed 4 April 2007).

Naib – Hussein (last cited 24 April 2009).

  • Vedeno District: Amir – Ilman Istamirov (Village Kevzina?, killed February 4, 2010Amir Turpal-Ali Dzamalhanova (killed 4 December 2009).
  • Nozhai Yurt District (Benoy-Yurt village?): Amir – Abubakar Pashayev (cited October 16, 2009).
  • Tsentoroi Sector: Amir – Aslan Israilov (aka Sayyab), (killed 19 December 2009).

SOUTHEASTERN FRONT (formerly Eastern front): Amir – unknown.  Predecessors: Sultan Khadisov (‘Musa’, killed 24 September 2006); Akhmad Avdorkhanov (killed 12 September 2005).

Eastern parts of Chechnya: Amir – unknown; Predecessors: Sultan Khadisov (aka Musa); Akhmad Avdorkhanov (killed 12 September 2005).

  • Argun Sector: Amir – Islam.
  • Gudermes Sector: Amir – Massoud Tamiralieva (cited 3 October 2009).
  • Kurchaloi Sector: Amir – unknown.  Predecessors – Rizwam Osmaev (aka Gyurza), killed 7 November 2009; Ayub (cited 21 January 2008); Abu Khalid al-Urdani (last cited 3 February 2007).
  • Shali Sector: Amir – Hassan Ozdamirov (aka Herat), killed 7 November 2009.  Predecessors – Assad (24 April 2009); Hussein (cited 6 January 2009); Supyan Abdulaev (2003 – March 2007).

Naib – Muslim (cited 25 August 2009).

    • Shali Town: Amir – Abubakar Musliev (cited 30 June 2009).
  • Shatoi Sector: Amir – unknown.  Predecessors – Ramzan (Ramzan Salou), killed 1 November 2007.

Naib – unknown.  Predecessors – Hairullah Khamzatov, killed 26 May 2007.

CENTRAL FRONT: Amir – Abubakar Basaev (last cited February 2007).

DZHOKAR (GROZNYI) FRONT: Amir – unknown.  Predecessors – Salambek Akhmadov (killed 21 March 2010); Aslan Murtazaliev (killed 18 October 2009); Abu Omar as-Seif (killed February 2006).

  • Groznyi Jamaat: Amir –  unknown.  Predecessors – Timur Gayev (captured 18 June 2006).
  • Northern Sector: Amir – Abdul Rakhman.
  • Mujahideen Unit Grozny: Amir – Arsanakaev Supyan (cited 5 October 2009).

PLAINS OF CHECHNYA(?): Amir – Ali Hasanov (aka Iban), killed late October 2009.

Other Amirs:

Askhab – Shelkovoi village? (cited 6 January 2010).

Khadis – Amir of Itum-Kalinskii District (cited 24 April 2009).

Muhammad – Amir of the Naur District.

Abdul Aziz.



In mid-April, Stratfor suddenly acknowledged the seriousness of the CE threat and claimed it had “Russian sources” saying “there are connections between the group (CE) and high-profile jihadists like Ilyas Kashmiri,” who heads the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Jihadi e-Islami.[26]



[1] “Obrashchenie sestry pered operatsiei istishkhad, k rodstvennikam i musul’manam na russkom yazike, Vilaiyat Dagestan, 25 mart 2010 god,” Kavkaz Chat, accessed 4 June 2010,

[2] The video “Obrashchenie Amira OB”edinennogo Vilaiyata KBK Abdullah Asker Dzhappuev” was posted on the OVKBK’s website on May 16th and was still accessible on its first page on 1 June 2010.  The text announcement taken from the video can be found at “Ob”edinennyi Vilaiyat KBK. Valiem i komanduyushchim modzhakhedov vilaiyat Kabardy, Balkarii i Karachaya naznachen amir Abdullakh (Asker Dzhappuev),” Kavkaz tsentr, 16 May 2010, 15:49,

[3] Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 152-165.

[4] “Mudzhakhidy iz”yali shpionskoe oborudovanie kafirov v pos. Neitrino,”, 5 February 2010, 19:28,

[5] Aleksandr Zhukov, Kabardino-Balkaria: Na puti k katastofe, Legal Defense Center ‘Memorial’, Kavkaz uzel,, Appendix 9, accessed 31 May 2010.

[6] Imarat Kavkaz. Ob”edinennyi Vilaiet Kabardy, Balkarii i Karachaya,”, 31 March 2009, 01:17, and Ob”edinennyi Vilaiyat KBK. ‘Osistematizatsii meropriyatii, provodimykh v ramkakh i’dada,” Kavkaz tsentr, 31 March 2009, 07:28,

[7] Luiza Orozaeva, “V Nalchike prokhodit spetsoperatsiya, ubit mestnyi zhitel’,” Kavkaz uzel, 31 March 2010, 18:40, and “Ubitogo v Karbardino-Balkarii mestnogo zhitelya siloviki schitayut liderom boevikov,” Kavkaz uzel, 1 April 2010, 14:59,

[8] “MVD: v Kabardino-Balkarii snachala goda zaderzhany 14 posobnikov boevikov,” Kavkaz uzel, 18 Aoril 2010, 10:25,

[9] “Shkhagoshev: terakt v Nalchike – pryamoe pokushenie na prezidenta Kabardino-Balkarii,” Kavkaz uzel, 4 May 2010, 17:59,

[10] “Mudzhakhidy iz”yali shpionskoe oborudovanie kafirov v pos. Neitrino,”, 5 February 2010, 19:28,

[11] “Shkhagoshev: terakt v Nalchike – pryamoe pokushenie na prezidenta Kabardino-Balkarii,” Kavkaz uzel, 4 May 2010, 17:59,

[12] “PRESS-RELIZ Komandovaniya modzhakhedov Ob”edinennogo Vilaiyata KBK, Imarat Kavkaz,”, 1 June 2010, 19:48,

[13] “PRESS-RELIZ Komandovaniya modzhakhedov Ob”edinennogo Vilaiyata KBK, Imarat Kavkaz,”, 1 June 2010, 19:48,

[14] “V Kabardino-Balkarii v rozysk ob’yavleny okolo soroka boevikov,” Kavkaz uzel, 4 May 2010, 22:10,

[15] “Kratkoe obrashchenie amirov sektorov Ob”edinennogo Vilaiyata KBK, Imatat Kavkaz,”, 20 April 2010, accessed 31 May 2010.

[16] “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 14 maya 2010 g. N 594 ‘Ob obespechenii bezopasnosti pri provedenii XXII Olimpiiskikh zimnikh igr i XI Paralimpisskikh zimnikh igr 2014 goda v g. Sochi’,” Rossiiiskaya gazeta, 19 May 2010,

[17] “Russian Security Chief Warns of Sochi Threat,” Associated Press, 3 June 2010,

[18] “Terband FSB opasaetsya ‘sryva olimpiada’,” Kavkaz tsentr, 3 June 2010, 11:58,

[19] “Amir Imarata Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usman: ‘My osvobodim Krasnodarskii krai, Astrakhan i Povolzhskii zemli…”, Kavkaz tsentr, 8 March 2010, 11:38,

[20] Dzhamaat al-Gharb, “Adygeya. Obrashechnie Dzhamaata ‘al-Garib k musul’man Adygei,” Kavkaz tsentr, 23 September 2009, 15:25,

[21] “V Krasnodarskom krae zaderzhan emir vakhkhabitov Adygei,” Kavkaz uzel, 9 October 2009,

[22] “Russkie terroristy beschinstvuyut v imaratskom Sochi,” Kavkaz tsentr, 11 April 2010, 12:59,

[23] Farkhad Hussein, “Simpatiyu k modzhakhedam i nenavist’ k Moskve i Krasnodaru,” Chechen Times, 25 December 2008,

[24] Aslan Shazzzo, “V Adygee ischezli tri samoleta AN-2,” Kavkaz uzel, 25 March 2009, 20:30,

[25] “Adygeya. Kafiry aktivizirovali presledovanie musul’man v Adygee,” Kavkaz tsentr, 12 May 2010, 15:14,

[26] Scott Stewart and Ben West, “The Caucasus Emirate,” Stratfor, 15 April 2010, 08:56,



The Monterey Institute for International Studies has recently opted to combine its very popular and highly regarded M.A. International Policy Studies degree specializations in Terrorism Studies and Nonproliferation Studies into a combined new M.A. Program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies, a program that will now have an even higher profile and greater institutional autonomy. Apart from combining two of the Institute’s strongest academic programs, this will ensure that students take the introductory courses in both subjects but will also allow them to concentrate primarily on either terrorism or nonproliferation (or, if they prefer, to focus on both subjects equally, e.g., on CBRN terrorism). As you may already know, our students have an exceptionally high success rate getting jobs in these specialized fields.

The Institute is also introducing a new one-semester (or one-year) Certificate in Terrorism Studies for professionals or students who wish to obtain specialized academic training in this subject without spending an entire two years in residence. Prospective students can be admitted into this Certificate Program without meeting the somewhat stringent language requirements that regular students must meet.

If you know of any students or professionals who might find this new program of particular interest, or who wish to obtain outstanding preparation for careers in these fields, or who wish to obtain further specialized training before going on to obtain a doctorate, it would be very much appreciated if let them know about our new program.



The Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia report (IIPER) is a project of the Monterey Terrorism and Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California.  It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam and ethnic Muslim communities in Russia and Eurasia writ large.  All issues of IIPER are archived at

IIPER is compiled, edited and, unless otherwise indicated, written by Prof. Gordon M. Hahn.  Dr. Hahn is Senior Researcher at the MonTREP and Visiting Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of International Policy Studies at MIIS.  He is also a Senior Researcher, at the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group and an Analyst/Consultant for Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch,  He teaches courses on both politics and terrorism in Russia and Eurasia at MIIS.  Dr. Hahn is the author of two well-received books, Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002) as well as numerous articles on Russian, Eurasian and international politics.

Research assistance for IIPER is provided by Leonid Naboishchikov, Daniel Painter, Fabian Sievert, and Daria Ushakova.

IIPER welcomes submissions of 1,500-6,000 words on any aspect of Islamic politics in Eurasia and financial contributions to support the project.  For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact or

For additional information, please contact:

Dr. Gordon M. Hahn

Senior Researcher and WMD Terrorism Database Manager

Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP)

460 Pierce Street

Monterey, CA – 93940 USA

Tel: (831) 647-3535 Fax: (831) 647-6522


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