June 21, 2010
- CE MILITARY AMIR AND INGUSHETIA VILAIYAT AMIR ‘MAGAS’ CAPTURED
- CAUCASUS EMIRATE (CE) TERRORISM, MAY 2010
- THREE SUICIDE BOMBINGS INTERDICTED IN MAY 2010
- WAS DAGESTAN VILAIYAT’S QADI THE KIZLYAR SUICIDE BOMBER?
- THE MUFTI YEVTEEV CONTROVERSY
- RADICALIZATION AMONG BASHKIR YOUTH REPORTED
- CAUCASUS EMIRATE’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP, AS OF MAY 2010 (PART 3 – INGUSHETIA AND DAGESTAN)
- ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW NON-PROLIFERATION/TERRORISM STUDIES MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE AND TERRORISM STUDIES CERTIFICATE PROGRAM
* IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted. Research assistance is provided by Leonid Naboishchikov, Daniel Painter, Fabian Sievert, and Daria Ushakova.
CE’S MILITARY AMIR AND INGUSHETIA VILAIYAT AMIR MAGAS (ALI TAZIEV/MAGOMED YEVLOEV) CAPTURED
On June 9, Russian FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov reported to President Dmitrii Medvedev on the capture of leading CE commander, the amir of CE Shura’s MiIitary Committee and of the G’ialgliache (Ingushetia) Vilaiyat Ali Taziev also known as Magas and sometimes identified in Russian and Caucasus media as Akhmad Yevloev. In the past, there has been some confusion in the reporting on who Magas actually was. Sometimes he was referred to as Yevloev, other times as Taziev. The jihadi sites only referred to him as Magas. Magas never issued video messages and had not appeared in any jihadi photographs or videos in many years. Nor did he issue any statements, at least none that had his name under them.
The CE-affiliated website Kavkaz tsentr suggested that Magas had been poisoned like Caucasus-based AQ Abu Ibn Khattab was in 2004 and that this allowed Russian intelligence forces to capture him alive. The site stressed “the daring and decisiveness of amir Magas” would not have allowed him to be captured alive otherwise.
Taziev’s capture is another in a string of major neutralizations of leading CE figures. This is the first neutralization that has come in the form of a capture as opposed to the killing of top leaders. Recent Russian successes included the killings of Dagestan Vilaiyat amir Umalat Magomedov also known as al-Bara on New Year’s Eve, Riyadus Salikhin Martyrs’ Battalion operative and leading CE propagandist and recruiter Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii on March 3rd, and CE Shariah Court qadi and United Vilaiyat Kabardia, Balkaria, and Karachai amir Anzor Astemirov (aka Seifullah) on March 24th, among other lesser amirs, including the amir of Grozny Salambek Akhmadov, killed on March 21st. Thus, in a matter of a little more than five months Russian forces have removed from the jihad the amirs of three of its key regional commands, excepting only that of Chechnya; the CE’s top operative, propagandist, and recruiter, Buryatskii; and its top ideologist and theologist, Astemirov.
Also, Taziev’s capture strikes another blow to the Ingushetia mujahedin. On September 5th, 2009 two of its key amirs were killed by Russian forces: Rustam Dzortov, also known as Abdul Aziz, and his naib Magomed Aliev, also known as ‘Abdul Malik’. Buryatskii’s demise in March also hit them hard, as he operated almost exclusively in Ingushetia. Now the CE’s amir for Ingushetia has been removed.
Most importantly, Taziev, as the CE’s military amir and commander-in-chief during war time, was perhaps the Caucasus mujahedin’s second most powerful leader after amir Umarov. This could seriously degrade CE’s operational capacity, especially if he reveals all he knows to Russian intelligence.
CAUCASUS EMIRATE (CE) TERRORISM, MAY 2010
In May 2010 Russia saw approximately 49 terrorist attacks and terrorist-related violent incidents, bringing the total for the first five months of this year to 147 jihadi attacks/incidents. Those 147 attacks/incidents have led to approximately 76 state agents killed and 155 wounded, 56 civilians killed and 176 wounded. It remains unclear whether the May 26th car bomb explosion in Stavropol, which killed 7 and wounded 41 civilians, was a CE operation; neither the mujahedin nor the authorities have thus far claimed so. According to non-jihadi Russian sources, in the first five months of 2010 Russian security and police forces have killed 129 to 134, wounded 4 to 6, and captured 37 to 43 mujahedin. Over a hundred facilitators have been captured.
As noted in IIPER, No. 16, the CE expanded its activity in the KBR to a new level. Thus, so far this year the CE has shown capacity to carry out operations over a larger geographical area than in recent years. The unprecedented number of attacks in Kabardino-Balkaria, the March 29th Moscow subway suicide bombings and possibly the first attack ever carried out in Stavropol demonstrate this.
Ingushetia, which lost its lead within the CE jihad in April 2010 in terms of number of incidents, still places second to Dagestan, with the mujahedin of the former having executed some 43 attacks/incidents to the Dagestanis’ 46 in the first five months of this year. The fall off in attacks in Chechnya so far this year by 30 and the increase in the KBR by 25 is striking. Dagestan continued to be most deadly for state agents, with approximately 36 killed there through May of this year, compared to some 19 in Chechnya and 12 in Ingushetia. On the other hand, Ingushetia has seen nearly as many overall casualties among state agents this year, with some 83 (some 12 killed and 71 wounded), approaching Dagestan’s 90 casualties (36 killed and 54 wounded). The mujahedin in Chechnya continue to lead the Ingush in numbers of state agents killed with 19 this year; 20 have been wounded in Chechnya this year. The KBR mujahedin have inflicted the most civilian casualties of all the regions in the North Caucasus, if one excludes the Stavropol car bomb attack. The March 29th Moscow subway suicide bombings caused the bulk of the civilian deaths and wounded inflicted by the CE this year – 40 of the 56 killed and 121 of the 176 wounded.
SOURCES: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, http://www.ng.ru, http://www.izvestia.ru, http://www.kommersant.ru, http://www.kavkazcenter.com, http://www.jamaatshariat.com/ru, http://www.islamdin.ru, and hunafa.com.
THREE SUICIDE BOMBINGS INTERDICTED IN MAY 2010
The month of May saw three suicide bombing attempts interdicted before each of the three male suicide bombers was able to detonate his explosives. Two were interdicted on Victory Day, May 9th, and were likely targeting Victory Day celebrations commemorating the victory over fascist Germany in what Russians call the Great Patriotic War or World War II. The first failed May 9th attack occurred in Chechnya, where a suicide bomber was shot and killed as he tried to detonate his explosives while police checked his papers some 300 yards from a MVD checkpoint. There were no other casualties in the failed attack besides the would-be bomber. The second May 9th interdiction occurred in the same manner but in Dagestan instead of Chechnya. The month’s third interdicted attack occurred on May 31st when, according to Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechen forces killed a suicide bomber on his way to commit an attack. None of these interdicted attacks resulted in any casualties besides the would-be suicide attacker.
The first interdicted attack of the year occurred on April 9th, in the village of Ekazhevo, Ingushetia), when a female suicide bomber’s explosives detonated after police shot her during a special operation that ended in a shootout between several mujahedin. The explosion killed one and wounded five MVD servicemen. Seven mujahedin were killed, including the shakhidka.
If the April interdiction is indeed counted as an interdiction, then the number of attacks remains at 5 or 7 for the year, depending on whether one counts two double suicide bomber attacks as one attack or as two attacks. IIPER is inclined to count double attacks as two separate attacks, since it is possible one could be interdicted while another is successfully executed. As a result of these 11 successful and failed attacks, 11 suicide bombers have been expended, three of which were female. One of three female suicide bombers failed; three of eight male attackers failed. The number of casualties resulting from successful and attempted suicide attacks at the end of May remains the same as at the end of April: 20 killed and 44 wounded state agents, 43 killed and 112 wounded civilians.
WAS DAGESTAN VILAIYAT’S QADI THE KIZLYAR SUICIDE BOMBER?
On May 26th, an article posted on the website of the CE’s Dagestan Vilaiyat mujahedin, JamaatShariat.com, announced that the qadi of the Dagestan Viliaiyat’s Shariah Court, one Daud, had been killed in Kizlyar. This could mean that Daud was the suicide bomber who detonated his suicide vest on March 31st in that town, killing 9 and wounding 18 MVD personnel and killing 3 and wounding 9 civilians. The suicide bomber was identified by Russia’s Investigative Committee as Daud Dzhabrailov. However, in the article it is said he was killed “in battle” in Kizlyar.
Jamaat Shariat writes that Daud studied in Syria for seven years and was one of the leading mujahedin in terms of his knowledge of Islam. For this reason he was appointed the Dagestan Vilaiyat shairat court’s qadi. It also writes that Daud issued fatwas and was one of the first to begin carrying out the zakat or Islamic tax for the mujahedin. The article also warns ‘infidels’ about papers found among Daud’s things included his calls to Muslims to pay the zakat. Refusal to pay, the papers and the Dagestani mujahedin threaten, warrants “the strictest punishments.” The article closes noting that Daud has been replaced by a mujahed named ‘Khalid’ whose full jihadi nom de guerre may be Khalid Abu Usama.
THE MUFTI YEVTEEV CONTROVERSY
On May 2nd the North Ossetia’s chief mufti Ali-khadzhi Yevteev gave an interview to Russia’s Regnum news agency that caused considerable controversy in Russia, especially within its Muslim community. The interview also provides som interesting details on the state of Islam in the predominantly Christian republic. Yevteev is an ethnic Russian who converted from Christianity and the first ethnic Russian to become a mufti in Russia. North Ossetia’s Muslim Spiritual Administration (DUMSO), which he heads, is part of the umbrella organization of regional DUMs, Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR), which is the most dominant Muslim umbrella group in Russia at present. There are plans to try to unite the SMR with the other two leading umbrella organizations, however.
In the interview, mufti Yevteev acknowledged that he had once been “very radical.” He “dreamed of giving his life for Allah” and was once a student of the notorious Anzor Astemirov (aka Seifullah) — the late amir of the CE’s United Vilaiyat of Kabardia, Balkaria and Karachai and qadi of the CE’s Shariah Court — and Astemirov’s late long-time associate and mentor, imam Musa Mukozhev at a time when they headed the independent Islamist ‘Jamaat of Kabardino-Balkaria’ before it morphed into the jihadi terrorist jamaat, the “United Islamic Combat Jamaat ‘Yarmuk’,” in 2004-2005. Mukozhev was killed by Russian forces in spring 2009, Astemirov on 24 March 2010.
Yevteev converted to Islam in autumn 1996 at the age of 22 after he met Muslims, including former Chechen separatists, from Mukozhev’s and Astemirov’s Institute for Islamic Studies in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria. He then studied at the Uchkeken madrassah in Russia’s Republic of Karachai-Cherkessia (KChR). The students there – Yevteev does not say how many – went to train with the notorious Al Qa`ida terrorist Khattab in Chechnya. Then these friends either left to fight in Chechnya or spread out across the country. Yevteev went to study Islam at Egypt’s Al Azhar University and then studied for four more years in Saudia Arabia.
Yevteev returned to North Ossetia during vacations and eventually came into conflict with members of a small independent jamaat he had helped found in the republic before he left to study in Egypt; presumably modeled on the Jamaat of Kabardino-Balkaria. The jamaat had declared the previous mufti an infidel and the DUM a tool of the FSB and banned the mufti from their mosque. They had decided that if a second Chechen war began, they would go fight, and like the Jamaat of Kabardino-Balkaria, they kept their animosity to the state secret. Suspicions then arose within the jamaat, which according to Yevteev had “an army system,” about whether he was really studying abroad and what he was up to, apparently suspecting he was spying for the authorities. The jamaat’s amir Yermak Tegaev demanded he cease his studies abroad and return to the jamaat. Yevteev refused and began to be ostracized. The jamaat began to split, dividing Muslims into those not ready for the jamaat and those untrustworthy. Yevteev worked with all sides and was soon invited by the DUMSO chief mufti to become his deputy mufti, an offer Yevteev accepted. Then amir Tegaev called upon the jamaat’s members to take for the forest and jihad, but only two members followed him, according to Yevteev. Tegaev, also according to Yevteev, argued that there was no future for Islam in North Ossetia, and it was better to fight. “(W)e lose and we go to paradise, we win (then) there will be a caliphate.” This story rings very much true, given its similarity with the history of the Jamaat of Kabardino-Balkaria and its evolution into Yarmuk.
Yevteev acknowledged his extremism was misguided and stated that “much bad has been done by Muslim hands in Russia.” Yevteev also noted that Islam came to Ossetia before Christianity did, and an “absolute majority” of Ossetians were Muslims until Christianity’s arrival. He said that before he became mufti only 2% of North Ossetia’s population was Muslim but now it is 30%. He also claimed that 80% of ethnic Ossetians in the republic are Muslim, though only a few thousand of several hundred are practicing Muslims. He stated there were 21 mosques and Muslim parishes in the republic with more waiting registration. All are under control of the DUMSO. He added that the mosque in predominantly Muslim Beslan was given a new roof financed from North Ossetia President Taimuraz Mamsurov’s personal funds. The DUMSO also is petitioning the government to handover a former Shiite mosque presumably for the small Azeri Shiite community in the republic. Regarding the shortage of imams in Russia, Yevteev said there are 20 North Ossetians studying Islam in Egypt and Saudi Arabia who would be returning over the next 5-7 years, and at that time all the republic’s mosques would be staffed with qualified Islamic teachers.
Yevteev described a certain Islamic revival among the republic’s youth. He claimed that 98-99% of those regularly attending mosque were under 30 years of age. Some youth people in the republic are attracted to the jihad, according to Yevteev, and contact the mujahedin on the Internet and by cell phone. However, he says the DUMSO is working to undermine support for the jihad in part by discussing jihad according to the Koran, teaching there are 14 steps of jihad and only the last is violent. The mufti claimed that not to discuss jihad would be heretical, as it is a central tenet of the religion. But he tells young Muslims that they should reject violent jihad and that Russia is there country and not alien to Islam. On the other hand, he also said in the interview that he hoped to help “some Muslims” to live in a Muslim state, but no time soon. The statement was obtuse enough that it was not at all clear whether he was talking of Russia, Ossetia, or some place else. Later in the interview he said his position against violence does not come from any patriotism or love for his country but rather from his religion’s ban on murder. Thus, there was a tinge of an Islamist orientation in some of his commentary.
Yevteev also criticized the older generation of muftis and mullahs, who were resistant to the rise of younger Islamic clergy and their new teachings. He reported that the older muftis resisted him for a year and a half when he arrived in the DUMSO. He said muftis in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan had suggested that Yevteev was brought to the North Caucasus from Saudi Arabia by the FSB in order to put a “barrier” between the eastern and western North Caucasus so that the east’s Sufi brotherhoods could not spread west.
Yevteev said that in order to help DUMSO convince Muslims that Russia is their home, the authorities needed to be more forthcoming with funds for the building and restoration of mosques. In this connection he said that the authorities’ approach to the republic’s Muslims had improved with Taymuraz Mamsurov’s assumption of the presidency, but that bureaucrats still fail to grasp the need to give young Muslims places to read and learn about Islam under moderate imams so they do not turn to the forest and jihad. Yevteev called on the authorities – regional or federal, it was not clear – to create a Muslim television channel.
He also noted that during the August 2008 Georgian-Ossetian/Russian war he led a group of “guys” to South Ossetia in order to “watch and support” the Ossetians and was thanked by the South Ossetian leadership. He also described some tension between the North Ossetian leadership and the republic’s leadership. On a second trip to South Ossetia he and SMR chief mufti Ravil Gainutdin proposed sending ten Muslims from Georgia’s breakaway republic on the hajj, but South Ossetia’s authorized plenipotentiary for religious affairs rejected the idea for apparently technical reasons. Yevteev commented that their request was perceived by some as “recruitment” (verbovka). Yevteev also declared his support for polygamy, as many Russian muftis do, on the basis that it will solve the problem of an excess of woman to men and Russia’s demographic problems. He acknowledged he has two wives and the inheritance issues among Muslims are often settled by Shariah rather than Russian secular law.
Yevteev argued that North Ossetia was the only republic to establish Islamic institutions “by the peaceful path, without repressions.” He added: “I understand that I am an experimental, test variation for those who are watching the situation now. I very much hope that I manage to hold out and achieve success. I hope that I will be one of many who correct the situation in the North Caucasus and in Russia in general.”
The response to the interview with Yevteev was strong. Criticism centered around his characterization of jihad as “the most reliable way to earn yourself eternal bliss,” his apparent support for an Islamic state on Russian territory in future, his criticism of Russian orthodox clergy while his calling jihadists like Astemirov and Mukozhev his past “teachers.” A series of Muslim and secular figures criticized Yevteev’s statements to one degree or another, including the chairman of DUMSO’s Honorary Council Khasanbi Albegonov, its deputy Boris Morgoev, Chechnya’s mufti Sultan Mirzoev, mufti of the DUM of Krasnodar Kray and the Republic of Adygeya Yurbii Nemizh, chairman of the DUM of Saratov Mukaddas Bibarsov and, most importantly, SMR Chairman Gainutdin and Coordinating Council of the Muslims of the North Caucasus Chairman Ismail Berdiev. Yevteev was supported by Stavropol DUM Chairman mufti Mukhammad Rakhimov, deputy chairman of the DUM of the Asian Part of Russia Alfrid Mustafin, chairman of the organization ‘Russia’s Islamic Legacy’ Shavkat Avyasov (Yevteev is a leading member of this group), Islam.ru’s editor-in-chief Abdulla Rinat Mukhamedov, and Senior Fellow of the Institute of Oreiental Studies of the Russian Aacademy of Sciences and member of the Group for the development of Public Dialogue and the Institutions of Civil Society in the Caucasus Ruslan Kurbanov, among others. North Ossetia’s prosecutor opened an investigation to see if Yevteev’s remarks violated legislation on promoting inter-ethnic or inter-confessional antagonism.
On May 21st Islam.ru asked Yevteev to comment on the most controversial statements in the Regnum interview. He said his comments on the Russian Orthodox Church’s clergy and his acquaintanceship with Khattab were misunderstood and taken out of context. He said he had not seen a final version of the interview before it was posted on Regnum. On his studies under Mukozhev and Astemirov at the KBR’s Institute for Islamic Studies, he stated that he knew the future jihadists for 15 years but the institute existed under the auspices of the KBR’s DUM. He reiterated that it is normal for every Muslim to want to live in a Shariah law-based state, but he explained that he simply meant a state led by “just Godly laws” and there was not and could not be any implication by him of support for a caliphate. He also seemed to blame the negative reaction to this part of his comments to Regnum on a “negative attitude” toward Shariah law in Russian society. Finally, Yevteev defended his comments on jihad with the standard explanation that by jihad is meant simply “struggle on the path to Godly ideals.”
On May 20th, a congress of the DUMSO convened and left the decision to Yevteev whether or not he would remain in his post. This was apparently taken by Yevteev as a vote of no confidence, and he chose to tender his resignation that day. His resignation was accepted by the DUMSO five days later.
This controversy illustrates several aspects of state-Muslim relations in Russia. First, the state’s and both regional and umbrella DUMs’ efforts to bring new blood into the Islamic clergy are often confounded by distrust of younger mullahs’ ideas. Second, the state and older clergy are in constant fear that Islamist elements will attain positions of authority and split or completely undermine Russia’s official Islamic structures. Third, fear of Islamism and the resulting distrust of the young and the new are driven by the increasingly violent CE mujahedin, which is complicating the renewal of the Islamic clergy on the basis of a mutually legitimating relationship. Fourth, lack of progress in transforming the clergy increases the likelihood that some young Muslims will continue to turn to radical ideas and violent jihadism.
RADICALIZATION AMONG BASHKIR YOUTH REPORTED
On June 3rd, Nezavisimaya gazeta published an article based on inquiries from State Duma deputies and answers to them written by the FSB, MVD, the General Prosecutor’s office and its Investigative Committee (SKP). The deputies’ letters warned of increased politicization and “mass actions being carried out against republic (of Baskortostan) subunits of the federal security organs by “youth radical movements of an extremist nationalist strain.” According to the deputies’ letters, several of these youths fought with the Chechen resistance and have supported and had contacts with it (or the CE mujahedin, it remains unclear from the article). Included with the letter was supporting evidence in the form of video material. Also, the leader of the radical nationalist organization the Union of Bashkir Youth (SBM), Artur Idelbaev, met with Shamil Basaev in the mid-1990s when the latter already had ties with Al Qa`ida. The deputies asked the law enforcement and security organs to check whether this information and video were accurate.
Bashkortostan’s FSB confirmed the veracity of the video and the deputies’ conclusion and stated that a case had been opened and an investigation and search for the Bashkir nationalists is underway. The official charge comes under Article 205 of the criminal code regarding any public calls to carry out terrorist activity and “public justification for terrorism.” The MVD’s response disclosed that the SBM had been unregistered since 2006. The Nezavisimaya gazeta article closed with conjecture that the greater willingness of the siloviki to respond to such a deputies’ inquiry was encouraged by the presidential administration as it seeks to gather chips for its negotiations with Bashkortostan president Murtaza Rakhimov, whose tenure in office is coming to an end and an agreement on a replacement becomes necessary.
To be sure, the growing activity could be tied to the Bashkortostan succession struggle, but the more important information in the article may be that concerning the truly radical nature and perhaps Islamic leanings of the SBM, given its ties to the ChRI and perhaps CE. Recall that the CE still maintains Volga and Urals Fronts and that a cell of eight Islamic extremists, including several ethnic Ingush, carried out an attack in Bashkortostan and were arrested in late March (see IIPER, No. 13).
CAUCASUS EMIRATE’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP, AS OF MAY 2010
PART 3: INGUSHETIA AND DAGESTAN
VILAIYAT GYALGYAICHE (Ingushetia and Ossetia): Amir – Unknown. Predecessors: Ali Taziev (aka Magas, sometimes identified as Akhmad Yevloyev), captured 8 June 2010.
Naib – unknown. Predecessors – Adam Korigov? (killed 9 April 2010).
Naib – unknown. Predecessors – Akhmed Tsaloev? (killed 9 April 2010).
Ingushetia Front/Sector: Amir – Unknown. Predecessors – Rustam Dzortov (aka Abdul Aziz), killed 5 September 2009; Akhmed Yevloev (killed in 2006).
Naib – Magomed Aliyev (‘Abdul Malik’, killed in September 2009).
- Sunzhensky Sector: Amir – unknown. Predcessors – Abu Rizvan (Aslan Dzeit, killed February 2010);
- Naib – unknown. Predecessors – Hatsiev Bekhan (Arbi), (killed February 2010).
- Ingush Jamaat: Amir – unknown. Predecessors – Ilyas Gorchkhanov (killed 13 October 2005).
- Khalifat Jamaat: Amir – Alikhan Merzhoev. Predecessors – Magomed Khashiev (killed in October 2004).
- Amanat Jamaat (last cited 2007).
- Ingush Jamaat ‘Shariat’: Amir – Khabibulla (last cited 23 March 2007).
- Jamaat ‘Siddik’ (last cited 2006): Amir – Abdullakh Ganishev (last cited 2006). Predecessors – ‘Duka’.
- Ossetian Jamaat (last cited 2008): Amir – Alan Digorskii – perhaps one and the same jamaat as:
- Jamaat ‘Kataib al-Khoul’ (last cited 2008): Amir – Saad.
– operational group ‘Iraf’.
– operational group ‘Sunzha.’
DAGESTAN VILAIYAT/FRONT: Amir – unknown. Predecessors – Umalat Magomedov (aka Al-Bara), (appointed April 2009, killed 31 December 2009) Nabi Mediddinov (cited 14 August 2009); Omar Sheyhullaev (killed 10 March 2009); Ilgar Mollachiev (aka Mauz), killed 5 February 2009; Malachieva Elgar (killed in November 2008); Abdul Majid (killed 1 October 2007).
Predecessor Structure – Dagestan Front: Amir – Rappani Khalilov (killed 17 September 2007).
Naib – Zakir Navruzova (cited September 2009). Predecesors – Abduraham Zakatalsky (Nabi Nabiev), killed 17 September 2007.
Predecessor Structure – Congress/United Jamaat of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan: Amir – Rappani Khalilov. Predecessors – Bagautdin Magomedov (fled abroad in early 2000s)
Naib – Shamil Abidov.
- Shariat Jamaat (www.jamaatshariat.com; successor to the Ruslan Makasharipov’s Jannat Jamaat destroyed January 2005): Amir – Ibrahim Gadhzidadaev (cited 11 June 2009). Predecessors – Umalat Magomedov (aka Al-Bara), February-April 2009; Shamil Gasanov (cited 10 January 2007); Murad Lakhiyalov (killed 2006); Ruslan Makasharipov (killed July 2005).
- Shamilkala (Makhachkala) Jamaat: Amir – unknown. Predecessors – Marat Kurbanov (killed January 9, 2010); Gadhzimurad Kamalutdinov? (cited 8 October 2009); Omar Ramazanov (killed June 12, 2009).
- possible Makhachkala-based jamaat: Amir – Gadhzimurad Kamalutdinov (cited 8 October 2009).
- Buinaksk Jamaat: Amir – Mutashev.
- Derbent Jamaat: Amir – unknown.
- Karabudakhkent and Sergokalin, Gubden Raion: Amir – Magomedali Vagabov (aka Seifullah), (cited 12 April 2010).
- “Sury-Su” Nogai Jamaat (Untsukul, Karabudakhkent, and other Nogai-populated regions in Dagestan, last cited 2006): Amir – unknown. Predecessors: Tagir Bataev (killed 21 March 2007).
- Mujahideen Unit ‘Seyfullah’: Amir Abdulgafar (cited 22 January 2008)
- Other amirs:
Madrid Begov – jamaat in Makhachkala-Shamkhala (killed January 2010).
Shamil Kuppinsky (killed 31 December 2009).
Ibrahim (killed 31 December 2009).
 “Kafiry kosvenno podtverdili, chto amir Magas mog byt’ otravlen,” Kavkaz tsentr, 9 June 2010, 15:55, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/06/10/73063.shtml.
 “V Ingushetii na meste provedeniya spetsoperatsii podorvalas’ terroristka-smertnitsa,” Kavkaz uzel, 9 April 2010, 17:08, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/167550/; “”FSB: ubityie v Ekazhevo boeviki prichastny k terakty v Karabulake,” Kavkaz uzel, 9 April 2010, 20:23, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/167556/; “Vilaiyat G-alg-aiche. V Ekazhevo stali Shakhidami (inshaalakh) troe modzhakhedov,” Kavkaz tsentr, 10 April 2010, 10:40, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/04/10/71684.shtml.
 “Sud’ya Daud,” Jamaat Shariat, 26 May 2010, 15:48, http://www.jamaatshariat.com/ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=813:2010-05-28-17-10-13&catid=14:-&Itemid=29.
 “Shakhidy atakovali v Kizlyare bandu ‘OVD’. Ubito i raneno 27 murtadov, V ikh chisel glavar’-polkovnik,” Kavkaz tsentr, 31 March 2010, 10:09, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/03/31/71488.shtml.
 Marat Khabibullin, “Musul’manskie lidery osudili muftiya Yevteeva,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 May 2009, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2010-05-17/1_efteev.html; “Mufti Severnoi Osetii podal v otstavku, resehenie poka ne prinyato,” Regnum, 20 May 2010, 23:50, http://www.regnum.ru/news/kavkaz/osetia/1285856.html; and “Mozhno li naiti chernuyu koshku v temnoi komnate, osobenno, esli eyo tam net? Musul’manskie deyateli i eksperty ob interv’yu A. Yeteeva,” accessed 16 May 2010, Islam.ru, http://www.islam.ru/pressclub/islamofobia/blackcat/.
 Khabibullin, “Musul’manskie lidery osudili muftiya Yevteeva.”
 “Mufti Severnoi Osetii podal v otstavku, resehenie poka ne prinyato,” Regnum, 20 May 2010, 23:50, http://www.regnum.ru/news/kavkaz/osetia/1285856.html.
 “Dukhovnoe upravlenie musul’man Severnoi Osetii prinyalo otstavku muftii,” Regnum, 25 May 2010, 12:06, http://www.regnum.ru/news/kavkaz/osetia/1287008.html.
 Ivan Rodin, “Siloviki obsledovali Bashkiryu,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 June 2010, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2010-06-03/3_bashkiria.html.
ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW NON-PROLIFERATION/TERRORISM STUDIES MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE AND TERRORISM STUDIES CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS
The Monterey Institute for International Studies has recently opted to combine its very popular and highly regarded M.A. International Policy Studies degree specializations in Terrorism Studies and Nonproliferation Studies into a combined new M.A. Program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies, a program that will now have an even higher profile and greater institutional autonomy. Apart from combining two of the Institute’s strongest academic programs, this will ensure that students take the introductory courses in both subjects but will also allow them to concentrate primarily on either terrorism or nonproliferation (or, if they prefer, to focus on both subjects equally, e.g., on CBRN terrorism). As you may already know, our students have an exceptionally high success rate getting jobs in these specialized fields.
The Institute is also introducing a new one-semester (or one-year) Certificate in Terrorism Studies for professionals or students who wish to obtain specialized academic training in this subject without spending an entire two years in residence. Prospective students can be admitted into this Certificate Program without meeting the somewhat stringent language requirements that regular students must meet.
If you know of any students or professionals who might find this new program of particular interest, or who wish to obtain outstanding preparation for careers in these fields, or who wish to obtain further specialized training before going on to obtain a doctorate, it would be very much appreciated if let them know about our new program.
Islam, Islamism and politics in Eurasia report (IIPER) is a project of the Monterey Terrorism and Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California. It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam and ethnic Muslim communities in Russia and Eurasia writ large. All issues of IIPER can be found at http://www.miis.edu/academics/researchcenters/terrorism/research/Hahn/IIPER.
IIPER is compiled, edited and, unless indicated otherwise, written by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn. Dr. Hahn is Senior Researcher at the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and Visiting Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California. He is also a Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group and Analyst/Consultant for Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch, http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com. He teaches courses on both politics and terrorism in Russia and Eurasia at MIIS. Dr. Hahn is the author of two well-received books, Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002) as well as numerous articles on Russian, Eurasian and international politics.
IIPER welcomes submissions of 1,500-6,000 words on any aspect of Islamic politics in Eurasia and financial contributions to support the project. For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org or email@example.com.
Research assistance for IIPER is provided by Leonid Naboishchikov, Daniel Painter, Fabian Sievert, and Daria Ushakova.
For additional information, please contact:
Dr. Gordon Hahn
Senior Researcher and WMD Terrorism Database Manager
Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP)
460 Pierce Street
Monterey, CA – 93940 USA
Tel: (831) 647-3535 Fax: (831) 647-6522